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Preface 
This thesis intends to critically examine how a child victim of abuse is dealt with during a 
Crown Court trial. In trials for child abuse the victim would normally be the main prosecution 
witness, and so undoubtedly would be called to give evidence. However there has been 
substantial research conducted which has proved that the child abuse causes the victim 
significant physical and psychological damage, and this has led to a call for special protection 
to be given to victims during court proceedings. 
Through analysing the main processes in a Crown Court trial, this thesis will demonstrate that 
the criminal justice system has already provided special measures to help child victims of 
abuse, but that these measures do not offer enough protection. The thesis will critically 
examine recent legislative amendments, together with proposals from established academics 
designed to improve the situation, to test whether they would be helpful to a child victim, and 
whether they are feasible alternatives. Where the conclusion is reached that either existing 
measures or new proposals would not help the child, the thesis will propose possible 
alternative schemes. 
When talking about a Crown Court trial, the right of the defendant to due process must also be 
given prominent attention. Throughout this thesis, it will be demonstrated that quite often new 
measures designed to help a child victim may interfere with the defendant's rights. Where this 
happens, an analysis of human rights laws will take place to examine whether the measure 
remains viable, or whether as a result of the fiindamental right to a fair trial, the rights of the 
defendant must come first. This tension between the right of the defendant and the right and 
needs of the child victim can be seen throughout the thesis, and it necessarily limits the final 
solutions to the problems child victims face. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis will examine the position of child victims of abuse during a trial for child 
abuse. There has always been concern at the treatment of children in an adult court, 
and the Pigot report' was the first serious attempt to tackle this problem. However, the 
Pigot report was never fully implemented and since that time, considerable pressure 
from bodies such as the N.S.P.C.C. and from academics and those within the criminal 
justice system, has led to calls for better protection to be offered. 
In 1998 the government set up a new working group to examine, inter alia, the 
position of child victims of abuse who are called as witnesses. Their report^ has 
proposed major changes in the law, some of which have been enacted in the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. However the legislation, and indeed the 
report, was limited to one sphere of the process: that of the testimony of the child. 
Although the testimony of witnesses is probably the main process in the trial, there are 
other processes which can have considerable impact on a child victim. To some 
degree these aspects have been ignored both by the official governmental law reform 
bodies, and indeed by academics. Whereas there is considerable literature devoted to 
the testifying processes, little or no research has been dedicated specifically to 
ancillary matters. 
This thesis intends to critically examine the treatment of a child victim in a Crown 
Home Office (1989) Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence HMSO London. Hereafter 
referred to as the Pigot report. 
Home Office (1998) Speaking up for Justice: Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on 
Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses. Home Office. London 
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Court trial. It has been necessary to limit the scope of this thesis from the criminal 
justice system as a whole, to the Crown Court. However it is submitted that this is a 
prudent limitation as the majority of cases of child abuse will be heard at Crown Court 
level. This is due to the fact that some child abuse offences are triable only on 
indictment^ and even those which are triable either way'' would normally be so serious 
that they would be tried on indictment.^ However other limitations have also needed 
to be applied. Post-trial matters such as sentencing and post-conviction protection will 
not be examined in this thesis. The main justification for this is that the thesis is to 
examine the trial and matters following a verdict or a plea of guilt, are not in essence 
part of the "trial." Although it is fair to say that the child victim could be affected by 
these issues, the main aspects for concern in relation to child victims is the pre-verdict 
matters. 
It will be necessary to take one step back from what is normally considered to be the 
start of the trial. The thesis will begin by examining the decision to prosecute. 
Although it could be considered that this is not part of the trial, it remains a vitally 
important aspect as decisions reached at this stage govern whether there will be a trial 
or not. This thesis will examine whether the child victim, or his parents, have, or 
should have, a say on the decision to prosecute. This will involve examining issues 
such as victims rights and its interface with the rights of society. j 
The thesis will then turn to the issue of pre-trial delay. One of the main problems 
For example rape (section 1, Sexual Offences Act 1956) and unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
girl under 13. (Section 5, Sexual Offences Act 1956) 
For example, assault occasioning actual or grievous bodily harm (sections 47 and 20, Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861), indecent assault (sections 14 and 15, Sexual Offences Act 1956) 
and unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16. (Section 6, Sexual Offences Act 1956) 
The Mode of Trial guidelines gives guidance on either-way offences, and the presence of a 
vulnerable victim, is usually a reason to proceed on indictment. See Murphy, P. (ed) (1997) 
Blackstone's Criminal Practice Blackstone Press. London. pp.l010-I0I2. 
identified in relation to child abuse cases is the problem of delay. This thesis will 
examine whether there is a problem with pre-trial delay, and then examine what 
difficulties this may cause. The chapter will conclude by assessing what can be done 
to tackle pre-trial delay in order to solve the problems this may cause a child. 
Although child abuse can lead to a criminal prosecution, it is likely that the local 
authority would bring protection proceedings under the Children Act 1989. Given that 
these civil proceedings would examine the same, or similar, issues to the criminal 
trial, could this have an impact on the child, and indeed on the criminal process? The 
second part of this wil l examine the interaction between the civil and criminal 
processes, to decide whether this relationship is in conflict, and i f so, what the effects 
of this are, together with exploring any solutions to the problem. 
The third - and largest - section of this thesis will examine the testimony of children. 
As was noted above, the testimony of witnesses is the major process in the trial, and 
in cases of child abuse it is likely that the child will be the main prosecution witness. 
This part of the thesis will begin by examining the preliminaries of testifying 
(competence, compellability etc.) before moving on to the actual process of taking the 
testimony. In each case the current system will be examined, the strengths and 
weaknesses identified and then a critical examination of the proposed reforms will be 
undertaken to conclude whether they will improve the situation. 
Although this thesis focuses on child victims of abuse, whenever one is discussing the 
trial process it is necessary to examine the right of the defendant to due process. When 
discussing possible reforms in order to help the child victim, such reforms must not be 
incompatible with the right of the defendant to a fair trial. Throughout this thesis I 
- 3 -
will therefore be assessing whether it is possible to make such reforms without 
conflicting with the right to a fair trial, or whether the needs of the individual victim 
and the rights of the defendant act against each other. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 has helped strengthen the arguments concerning rights; 
not only in relation to the rights of the defendant, but the rights of individual members 
of society, and society as a whole. The Act wil l , when implemented, incorporate much 
of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. Although this Act 
will not be implemented until October 2000, for the purposes of this thesis it will be 
taken as implemented. The justification for this is it would seem prudent to analyse 
the position of both the child victim and the defendant after the incorporation of such 
an important instrument. 
The law, subject to the point concerning the Human Rights Act 1998 noted above, is 
correct as of the date of submission. 
4 -
Chapter 2 
Decision to Prosecute 
One of the most important aspects of the pre-trial process is the decision to prosecute. 
This chapter aims to assess the criteria used to decide whether a prosecution should be 
brought, this will involve examining aspects such as who makes the decision, what 
factors are taken into account when making this decision and where these factors are 
set out. 
W H O MAKES THE DECISION? 
In 1986 the Crown Prosecution Service came into being with the responsibility for 
prosecuting the majority of offences brought by the Crown. Child protection is 
considered to be an inter-agency concern but Working Together^ notes that this does 
not extend to the decision to prosecute as the matter remains one solely for the CPS, 
although they may, i f they so wish, consult other agencies involved in the child 
protection framework.^ 
However it could be questioned whether this is the most appropriate way of making 
the decision. It could be argued that since other aspects of child protection are 
conducted along inter-agency co-operation guidelines, the decision to prosecute 
should also be a multi-agency decision. I f a multi-agency prosecutorial review was 
established it is likely that the child protection conference'^  would be the body given 
responsibility for this decision. Although multi-agency prosecutorial review could 
Working Together Under the Children Act 1989 (1991). HMSO. London 
Ibid., at para 4.12 
The child protection conference is a forum for professionals of different agencies to be brought 
together to make decisions on the child's welfare. Working Together (1991) pp.41-51 
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carry some advantages - most notably that the impact a prosecution would have on 
the child's life would be more readily understood'' - it is likely that these agencies 
would focus strongly on the individual child rather than public policy arguments. This 
could be because a case conference is a creature of inter-agency co-operation, and 
thus perhaps not surprisingly, many members may not be familiar with the criminal 
justice system. A second reason may be that the main purpose of a case conference is 
deciding matters relating to the civil protection system^ which requires a child-
specific focus. However, in England and Wales, a prosecution is supposed to be the 
mechanism by which society can punish those who breach its rules^ and accordingly it 
is important that reference is made to public considerations. For this to be effective it 
is necessary that the decision is taken by reference to society rather than by focusing 
on the needs of a particular victim. The CPS are more likely to be able to appreciate 
the need to take society's interests into account, and as such it is submitted that the 
decision to prosecute in child abuse cases should remain with them. 
CRITERIA FOR DECISION 
Section 10, Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985 states that the CPS must publish a 
Code for Crown Prosecutors so that the public understand the criteria for the decision. 
The latest version of the Code was published in 1994 and Appendix A reproduces this 
code. 
The Code establishes two tests which have to be applied to decide whether a 
prosecution should be brought.^ The first test is the evidential test^  and the second is 
Because representatives of health, social welfare, education etc. would be present 
^ See Working Together (1991) pp. 41-51 for further details on the purpose of a conference. 
* See Ashworth, A. Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and the State (1986) 6 
O.J.LS. 86 and see below for further arguments as to public policy 
' Paragraph 4 of the Code 
* As defined in paragraph 5 
the public interest test. 
Evidential Test 
The evidential test is largely uncontroversial. The purpose of the test is to ensure that 
only cases that have a reasonable chance of success are brought. Barbara Mills Q.C., 
the former Director of Public Prosecutions,'° states that this is not a mathematical test 
but an objective one: 
There must be enough evidence for the tribunal, properly directed in 
accordance with the law, to be more likely than not to convict the defendant of 
the offence alleged.'' 
It must be correct that only cases which stand a reasonable chance of success are 
brought. Rose'^ notes that formerly the police would, on occasion, prosecute on a 
''wing and a prayer ...often the evidence was incredibly weak."^^ The reason Rose 
gives is that the police hoped that guilty pleas would be forthcoming. However, he 
notes that the police now accept that the costs of abortive court proceedings requires 
that cases should only be brought when there is a reasonable prospect of a 
conviction.'"* 
The consequence for child abuse proceedings is that the CPS cannot say it will always 
prosecute persons suspected of child abuse. The Code ensures that the evidential test 
must always be passed. 
Public Interest Test 
The public interest test takes as its justification a statement by Lord Shawcross, a 
' As defined in paragraph 6 
"> Mills. B. The Code for Crown Prosecutors (1994) 144 NLJ 899 
" Ibid., at 900 
Rose, D. (1996) In the Name of the Law: The Collapse of Criminal Justice. Vintage. London. 
" Ibid., at 142 
Ibid., at 143 
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former Attorney-General, who said: 
// has never been the rule in this country... I hope it never will be - that 
suspected criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution. 
The Code lists factors in favour of a prosecution'^ and those factors which would 
militate against a prosecution.'^ Although these factors are not unexceptionable, some 
have particular relevance for child abuse cases: 
For 
(a) the defendant was in a position of authority or trust 
(b) the victim of the offence was vulnerable 
Against 
(e) a prosecution is likely to have a very bad effect on the victim's physical 
or mental health, always bearing in mind the seriousness of the offence. 
On that basis it is likely that for a crime of child abuse the public interest may well be 
satisfied. The 1992 version of the Code stated that: 
a prosecution is almost always considered to be in the public interest in the 
case of sexual assaults against children. '^ 
This has been dropped from the 1994 version'^ but given factor (b) it is likely that a 
prosecution will almost always be considered to be in the public interest.'^ " 
Use of the Code 
The Code is published under the authority of statute but it does not have any direct 
legal effect, although the courts have, on some occasions, taken the code into 
Paragraph 6.1 of the Code. 
Paragraph 6.4 
" Paragraph 6.5 
Paragraph 8 of the 1992 Code. 
" The reason for this is discussed below. 
°^ As children, by definition, would be "vulnerable." 
8-
account.'^ ' There is doubt as to how often the Code is used by the CPS. Hoyano et al.'^ ^ 
state: 
Most prosecutors regard the Code as a very basic document to which they saw 
no need to refer to on a regular or even occasional basis... The Code is a 
Noddy's guide to the principles on which the CPS operates. 
Rose agrees: 
although the Code for Crown Prosecutors is publicly available, the CPS 
makes most of its day-to-day operational decisions on the basis of its 
voluminous "manuals", which are said to contain much more detailed 
guidance...^'^ 
The difficulty is that these manuals are restricted.'^ ^ Accordingly, it is difficult to 
discover which factors or considerations are taken into account by prosecutors when 
deciding whether to prosecute. 
T H E CHILD VICTIM 
The Code for Crown Prosecutors does not make any express reference to child abuse 
cases. How does the CPS make a decision in such cases? The CPS consider 
themselves bound by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child.'^^ 
Article 3(1) of this Convention states: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be primary 
consideration. 
21 
22 
23 
In R V D.P.P.. ex parte C (1997) 159 J.P. 227 the court held that a failure to act within the Code is 
capable of being judicially reviewed. 
Hoyana et al. A study of the Impact of the Revised Code for Crown Prosecutors [1993] Crim. 
L.R. 556 
Ibid., at 558 
Rose (1996) p. 145 
Ashworth, A. The 'Public Interest' Element in Prosecutions [1987] Crim L.R. 595 at 596 
See Flotnikoff, J. and Woolfson, R. (1995) Prosecuting Child Abuse Blackstone Press Ltd. 
London, p. 55 See pp.28-30 below as to the binding effect of the United Nations Convention in 
circumstances where an authority does not accept it is bound. 
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Given that the CPS consider themselves bound by the Convention this would appear 
to suggest that the "best interests of the child" shall be a primary consideration. 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson argue that this was why the commitment expressed in the 
1992 Code to always prosecute suspected cases abuse was dropped.^^ 
Using the best interests of the child as the primary considerations in the decision to 
prosecute, however, can involve a difficuh balancing of interests where the wishes of 
the child, the needs of the child and the requirements for effective law enforcement 
may pull in different directions. Cretney and Davis^^ summed up the difficulty when 
discussing domestic violence, where similar difficulties arise: 
The public interest is seen to demand the prosecution of "domestic " assault. 
But the interest of the victim may be much harder to discern, her wishes in the 
matter directly equivocal [SIC]... One cannot assume that a "successful" 
outcome, that is to say conviction and sentence, is in the woman's interests. 
Similarly, Cobley^° states: 
It may well be safe to assume that it is in the public interest that child abusers 
should be prosecuted... Yet, in many cases, once the child's protection has 
been assured, there may be a conflict between the public interest in pursuing a 
prosecution and, the child's best interests in having the case dealt with in a 
manner which causes the least stress anddisruption.^^ 
As the United Nations Convention makes the interests of the child the primary and not 
the exclusive concern, the CPS should, as a matter of best practice, take into account 
the "interests of the victim"^^ and Fenwick^^ argues the CPS are under a "duty" to 
consult the victim^'' to ascertain their interests and wishes. The Memorandum of Good 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
See Plotnikoff & Woolfson (1995) p.55 
Cretney, A. and Davis, G. Prosecuting "Domestic" Assault [1996] Crim. L.R. 162 
Ibid., at 172 
Cobley, C. (1995) Child Abuse and the Law Cavendish Publishing Ltd. London 
Ibid., at 160 
Paragraph 6.7 of the Code 
Fenwick, H.M. Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime (1997) 60 M.L.R. 317 
Ibid., at 325. The "duty" arises under the Victim's Charter. Fenwick notes that this has an 
uncertain legal standing, whereby it has, at best, a quasi-legal basis, and at worst no legal standing 
at all. (See Ibid., at pp. 323-324) 
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Practice appears to confirm that both the interests and wishes of a child are a relevant 
consideration: 
In deciding whether... it is in the public interest that a case should be brought 
to trial... the Crown Prosecution Service will take into account the interests 
and wishes of the child.^^ 
How does the CPS receive information on the child's best interests? Is it through 
direct consultation or through intermediaries? The Memorandum states that the police 
should provide this information'^^ but Plotnikoff and Woolfson noted that in over 50% 
of cases the police failed to provide the data.^ ^ The CPS Inspectorate's report-^ ^ 
showed that such failures now occur in over 70% of cases.^ ^ The Inspectorate rightly 
labelled this as "unsatisfactory".''" Sadly no reason is given for this lack of 
compliance. Unless police practice is altered, it cannot be said tha the CPS takes into 
account the wishes of the victim on any consistent basis. 
Even when this information is brought to the attention of the CPS, it does not follow 
that i f the child does not want to be involved in court proceedings the CPS will 
automatically drop the prosecution. No victim, including a child victim, has a veto 
over a prosecution. It is still necessary to balance the factors for and against a 
prosecution. Fortin"" argues: 
a decision not to prosecute may indicate to the abuser that, so far as the 
community is concerned, he did not commit the offence.^^ 
" Memorandum, para. 2.15. The Memorandum is technically just that, a Memorandum and also has 
no legal standing. However, the courts have been willing to attach great significance to the 
Memorandum and as such this may have greater standing than the "Victim's Charter. 
Ibid. 
" Plotnikoff and Woolfson (1995) p.39 
Thematic Review 1/98 The Inspectorate's Report on Cases Involving Child Witnesses (1998) 
CPS. London. 
Ibid., at para 7.18 
Ibid., at 7.23 
Fortin, J. (1998) Children's Rights and the Developing Law. Butterworths. London. 
Ibid., at 424 
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Yet Cobley - although acknowledging society's interests - states that there can be 
disadvantages in going ahead with a prosecution: 
If the abuser is acquitted, the child inevitably feels that he or she was not 
believed or that he or she was responsible... Even if the abuser is convicted, 
the child may feel responsible for the break-up of the family...'^^ 
Given these difficuhies exist, it is submitted that there is no easy solution to the 
problem of when to prosecute. Sir William Utting'*'' criticised the decrease in the 
number of prosecutions and stated this was failing children.''^ His report suggests that 
the CPS should prosecute in more cases. However this does not help the individual 
victim. It will be seen that testifying in court can be a harmful experience to children''^ 
but this is not to say a veto should exist. It is important that the child's interests are 
taken into consideration but i f necessary the public interest should be able to "trump" 
them and allow a prosecution to proceed.'*^ 
PROSECUTORIAL REVIEW AND THE E.C.H.R. 
It was noted in the previous section that the victim has no control over prosecution 
decisions. Would the implementation of the E.C.H.R. make any difference? It is 
beyond doubt that the CPS will be bound to act in accordance with the convention''^ 
and so i f an argument could be made out whereby a prosecution decision would 
infringe a victim's rights under the Convention, it is likely that the CPS would have to 
alter their approach to the case. 
43 
45 
46 
Cobley (1995) p. 161 
Utting, Sir William (1996) People Like Us HMSO. London 
Ibid., at paras 20.3,20.10 
See chapter 7 below 
See also the arguments relating to the compellability of children outlined below (pp.79-90) which 
have similar principles. 
See s.6(l). Human Rights Act 1998 and see R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte 
Kebilene and others [1999] 3 W.L.R. 175, DC; [1999] 3 W.L.R. 972, HL 
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Harris et al."^ believe that Article 8 could be used to force a state to use criminal 
sanctions to protect an individual's private or family life.^'' To support this theory they 
rely on the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in X and Y v 
Netherlands.^' Y was a 16 year old mentally handicapped girl who lived in a 
privately-owned home for mentally handicapped persons. The day after Y's sixteenth 
birthday, the son-in-law of the governess of the home forced Y to attend his room, 
undress and have sexual intercourse with him. Y suffered serious psychological 
consequences as a result of this act and X, Y's father complained to the police. The 
public prosecutor decided not to prosecute the offender unless he committed a similar 
offence within two years. X appealed to the Court of Appeal against this decision. The 
Court rejected the appeal stating that it was impossible to institute proceedings 
because a complaint was required from the actual victim: exceptions to this were 
where the complainant is under 16 or under guardianship. A person could only be 
placed under guardianship where they had reached the age of majority.^^ There 
existed, therefore, a procedural gap in the legislation whereby no person could act on 
behalf of a person aged 16 or over but below the age of majority and who was 
incapable of submitting a complaint. 
X, acting on behalf of himself and Y, appealed to the European Court of Human 
Rights alleging, inter alia, that this procedural gap was contrary to Article 8 of the 
European Convention. The European Court agreed stating: 
This is a case where fundamental values and essential objects of private life 
are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be 
achieved only by criminal law provisions.. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Harris et al. (1995) Law of the E.C.H.R. Butterworths. London. 
Ibid., pp. 321-324 
(1995) 8 E.H.R.R.235 
In the Netherlands this age is 21. See Ibid, at 238. 
Ibid., at 241 
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It should be noted at the outset that this was clearly a very serious and obvious breach 
of human rights: there was a complete gap in the legislation which prevented 
proceedings being instituted on behalf of mentally-incapable persons between the 
ages of 16 and 21. However, it is submitted that X and 7 could potentially be of wider 
significance. The European Court is stating that everyone has the right to be protected 
from abuse, and that this right should have criminal protection. Where this right is 
neglected then there will be a breach of Article 8. 
The question that this raises is does the ratio of X and Y apply only to those cases 
where there is an obvious and serious breach (such as that which occurred in X and Y 
itself) or can there be a more general application? I f it is possible to make out an 
argument that the State has, by applying its rules and regulations, failed to respect the 
right to be protected from undue harm, then this may amount to a breach of Article 8. 
It should be noted at the outset that in the absence of a legislative gap of the manner 
found in X and Y it would be relatively rare for such a challenge to be brought, but it 
is argued here that it would not be impossible. I f one relates this to the English 
prosecutorial review, it could be argued that the decision could be used to challenge a 
decision not to prosecute.^'' The key words in the ratio of X and Y were, it is 
submitted, "effective deterrence." I f it could be argued that a decision not to 
prosecute^^ fails to achieve effective deterrence, then this could amount to a breach of 
Article 8. 
n.b. Any possible argument would apply only where the decision not to prosecute was made on 
the public interest test. Where the prosecution was halted because of a lack of evidence, then the 
decision is unimpeachable. 
" For example, if the CPS invoked the public interest criteria and decided to abandon a prosecution 
because the ages of the victim and offender were similar, or for non-sexual offences because of 
the impact it would have on other children of the family, or the offender himself 
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Deterrence in this context has two meanings: individual deterrence - i.e. deterring the 
subject from harming the victim, or indeed anyone else again, and general deterrence 
- i.e. discouraging others to commit the offence. The concept of deterrence is quite 
important when dealing with child abuse as there could be a risk either that the victim 
could be abused again or that the offender will then go on to abuse another child. It 
should be remembered that the majority of the protection protocols put in place to 
safeguard society from abusers (e.g. sex offenders register^^. Schedule I , " Protection 
of Children Act 1999 etc.) all rely on a conviction. The European Court placed great 
emphasis on this point by noting that although the principal concern must be the 
C O 
victim, the ''need for protection [exists] erga omnes" 
Assuming, therefore, that it is possible - in exceptional circumstances - to make out 
an argument whereby a failure to exercise a discretion is found to be a failure to 
provide effective deterrence, then it may be possible that prima facie this amounts to a 
breach of Article 8 as defined by the ratio mX and Y. I f that is so, then the next task is 
to decide whether the CPS would be required to reconsider its decision. One of the 
arguments put forward by the Dutch government was that the child was still protected 
because she had the right to pursue civil remedies. The Court, however, rejected this 
argument and agreed with the submission of the girl's counsel that: 
the absence of any criminal investigation made it harder to furnish evidence 
[to prove] a wrongful act, fault, damage and a casual link between the act and 
damage. 
This would be true in English law too: a civil court is bound to accept a criminal 
Set up under the premises of the Sexual Offenders Act 1997 
" Schedule I, Children and Young Persons Act 1933. For a discussion on the use of Schedule I see 
Gillespie, A.A. Reforming Schedule I [1998] Fam. Law 690. 
^WX,op.cit . ,at241 
'^ Ibid., at 240 
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conviction as evidence of the facts^° and so a conviction makes the task of the victim 
- as plaintiff - considerably easier. The European Court also doubted whether a civil 
injunction would be able to provide "effective deterrence" especially when they are 
usually drafted to protect an individual rather than society.^' 
However, assuming that the courts accept that civil proceedings would not offer 
adequate protection, the CPS has one last argument. In English law there remains the 
possibility of a private prosecution. The CPS could argue that the criminal law 
provisions exist and that just because they will not prosecute does not mean the victim 
is not protected because the victim could instigate a private prosecution. 
Although it is technically possible to still bring a public prosecution there are 
numerous difficuhies in the way of doing so^ ^ and Fenwick argues that most victims 
would find them "too costly and bur dens ome"^^ and the Court of Appeal has said of 
the process: 
...only the most sardonic could regard the launching of a private prosecution 
(a process which, incidentally, is becoming regarded with increasing 
disfavour in this country) as being equally convenient, beneficial and 
appropriate [as judicial review]^'^ 
As apparent from the last sentence in that quote, that case concerned judicial review. 
It is well-known that where there is an alternative to judicial review, the courts will 
not exercise their discretionary p o w e r s . I t is submitted that this is a position 
analogous to the arguments put forward by the Dutch government in X and Y: that 
°^ CivilEvidence Act 1968, s.l 1(1) 
'^ A'a«(fy,op.cit., at24I 
62 
63 
See Saunders, E . Private Prosecutions and the Victims of Violent Crime (1995) 145 N.L.J. 1423 
Fenwick (1997) p.326 
R V Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 at 777 per 
Edmund Davies L.J. 
" Leyland, P. et al. (1994) Textbook on Administrative Law Blackstone Press. London, pp.304-305 
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where a suitable alternative exists whereby "effective deterrence" is provided. Article 
8(1) will not apply. However the comments of Edmund Davies L.J. cast doubt over 
whether such a procedure could be said to be effective. One difficulty with private 
prosecutions are their cost^ ^ and this is particularly salient with child victims where it 
will be very unlikely that a child would have sufficient resources to launch such an 
action. Given that the European Court held that civil remedies were not sufficientiy 
effective partly because of the inconvenience factor involved^^ it is submitted that a 
similar approach would be taken in respect of private prosecutions. 
I f it is possible, therefore, to formulate an argument that a refiasal to prosecute is 
capable of being a breach of the right to respect for private and family life, then this 
may mean that the CPS would be forced to prosecute. I f this is the case then it would 
mean a considerable departure from the current position whereby the "demands" of a 
victim count for very little. In child abuse cases the additional complication would be 
who should the CPS consuh with? In the majority of cases the child will not be 
mature enough to make this decision and so presumably the parent or guardian would 
need to be consulted. The difficulty with asking the parent or guardian is that their 
view may not necessarily be in the "best interests of the child." This could potentially 
cause a conflict between Article 3(1), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and Article 8 of the E.C.H.R. This conflict would be exacerbated somewhat by 
the fact that the United Nations Convention has not been incorporated into English 
law in the same way as the European Convention has, although this does not 
68 
necessarily mean that it is not binding. 
See Saunders (1995) p. 146 
" SzeXand Y, op.cit., at 239-241 
See pp. 28-30 below. 
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Chapter 3 
Delay 
We now turn to the issue of pre-trial delay. The Pigot Committee said of this: 
the most substantial [difficulty] faced by children... is the extraordinary and, 
in our view, quite unacceptable delay which they must often endure before 
cases come to court.' 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess how effective the criminal justice system is at 
reducing unnecessary delay for child abuse cases. 
The problem of delay is not new. Plotnikoff and Woolfson report that over 30 years 
ago, the Magistrates' Association was concerned at the length of time it took for a 
child abuse case to reach court.'^  Since that time delays have increased, and successive 
government have attempted to speed up child abuse cases, eventually settling on the 
notice of transfer procedure. 
Notice of Transfer Procedure 
The nofice of transfer procedure was created by s.53(l). Criminal Justice Act 1991, 
and allows the CPS to issue a notice of transfer to the magistrates which has the effect 
of transferring the case to the Crown Court, bypassing normal committal 
proceedings.Wasik and Taylor'' argue that the main reason for the introduction of the 
Ibid., at para. 1.20 
Plotnikoff & Woolfson (1995) p.5 
Currently the only types of cases this scheme may be used for is serious fraud cases and offences 
against children.(see s.4, Criminal Justice Act 1988 and s.53, Criminal Justice Act 1991) It had 
been intended to extend this scheme to all criminal matters triable on indictment, but the scheme 
was aborted after a very short time. It is not the place of this thesis to discuss the merits of this 
decision but it should be noted that the scheme still exists for matters of child abuse. 
Wasik, M. and Taylor, R.D. (1994) Blackstone's Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (2"'' Ed) 
Blackstone Press. London. 
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scheme was to reduce delay. We must now assess whether the procedure has been 
able to achieve a reduction in delay. 
Time to Disposition 
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Figure 3.1 
Figure 3.1, above, shows the average total time of disposition for cases transferred to 
the Crown Court and those committed to the Crown Court.^ It can be seen that those 
transferred to the Crown Court are disposed of significantly quicker. I f one looks at 
the individual stages represented on the chart^ it can be seen that the greatest 
discrepancy between the two procedures relates to stage I proceedings the stage for 
which the notice of transfer procedure were designed to tackle. Plotnikoff and 
Woolfson reported that their research showed some cases where the notice of transfer 
procedure involved more delay than committal proceedings. It would appear from the 
more recent data recorded by the CPS Inspectorate - upon which Figures 3.1 to 3.4 
are based - that the findings of Plotnikoff and Woolfson are no longer valid. The CPS 
Inspectorate examined 6 individual CPS branches (named A to F) and figures 3.2 to 
3.4 shown overleaf break down the CPS figures into these 
Ibid., at 143 
It should be noted that the study uses a like-for-like comparison model so that the cases 
committed are child abuse cases that could have used the notice of transfer scheme. 
Stage I relates to the period between charge and either transfer or committal, and stage II relates to 
the period from entry into the Crown Court to final disposition. 
Plotnikoff & Woolfson (1995) p.48 
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individual branches. In this way it is possible to conduct a more detailed analysis of 
the trends shown. 
I f one examines figure 3.4 first, this gives the total time of disposition for each of the 
six branches. It can be seen that in two of the branches (E and F) the notice of transfer 
procedure took longer than committal proceedings. In a third branch (B) the 
difference between the two procedures was insignificant. This would seem to indicate 
that Plotnikoff and Woolfson's research may remain credible. However, i f we look at 
the figures for each individual stage of a trial, a different picture can be seen. Figure 
3.2 shows the comparative figures for stage I proceedings, i.e. the period between 
charge and either transfer or committal. It can be seen that in all six branches the 
notice of transfer procedure was significantly quicker than committals. Given that this 
20 
is the stage for which the transfer procedure was designed to tackle, it would appear 
that it is effective. However the question then needs to be asked why this success is 
not reflected in the general figures? The answer lies in Stage II (transfer or committal 
to final disposition). Figure 3.3 shows the figures in relation Stage II and it can be 
seen that in three of the branches (B, E and F) notice of transfer proceedings took 
longer to dispose of than had they proceeded under committals. No reason was given 
as to why stage I I proceedings take longer, the CPS Inspectorate does, however, note 
this discrepancy: 
[the data] shows that in many instances, corresponding improvements in the 
length of time between transfer and disposal have yet to materialise^ 
This would seem to indicate that there was an expectation that stage I I proceedings 
would be somewhat quicker. That this has not happened is very disappointing: there is 
little or no point in speeding up the time it takes a case to reach the Crown Court, i f 
the delay is then re-introduced at the next stage. A prime example of this is branch F 
where notice of transfer proceedings led to cases reaching the Crown Court quicker 
than had they been dealt with under the committal system, yet because of delay once 
at the Crown Court, the total effect was that there was no advantage in electing for 
notice of transfer. It is unacceptable for delay to be re-introduced in this way: notice 
of transfer procedures could reduce delay, but for this to happen, it is necessary to 
keep a tight grip on what happens to the case once it reaches the Crown Court. 
Reform of Transfer 
The notice of transfer procedure can only be used for offences against children or 
serious fraud cases. However, recent legislation may be of further assistance in the 
Thematic Review 1/98, para. 8.11 
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quest to reduce delay. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has introduced a new scheme 
for reducing delay. Under section 51, when a defendant is presented to the 
Magistrates' Court for an indictable-only offence, the case should be sent directly to 
the Crown Court, i.e. bypassing notice of transfer or committal proceedings. Where 
the defendant is also facing either-way or summary offences which the Magistrates' 
Court believe "to be related to the indictable offence" then these charges are sent 
directly to the Crown Court too.'" When implemented, this scheme should reduce pre-
trial delay, but this will require the courts to keep track of cases to ensure that delay is 
not re-introduced at Crown Court level. 
Pre-Trial Hearings 
One proposed solution to the problem of delay was pre-trial hearings. The first 
measure to be introduced was the plea and directions hearing." Plea and Directions 
hearings apply to all Crown Court trials except for serious fraud c a s e s . A 
questionnaire was created to help courts deal with all the matters covered by the 
hearing''' and this is reproduced at Appendix B. 
The first matter to be dealt with at the pre-trial hearing is plea.''* After plea has been 
taken then the judge may make a ruling as to the admissibility of evidence or a matter 
12 
13 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s.51(l)(b) when read in conjunction with sub-section (11) 
Introduced by Practice Direction: Crown Court (Plea and Directions Hearing) [1995] 1 W L R 
1318 
Ibid. 
Ibid., at 1321 
In an attempt to reduce delay, there is now in existence a scheme known as "plea before venue" 
(Introduced by s.49, Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act 1996) For the purposes of either-
way offences, this scheme would mean the defendant would have to indicate at the committal 
hearing which way he intends to plead. If he intends to plead guilty then the Magistrates would 
then go on to sentence him. Alternatively, i f he intends to plead not guilty then the mode of trial 
decision is taken and the actual plea is not recorded until the defendant has reached the Crown 
Court. See Bavidge, G. and Kerrigan, K . Plea before Venue (1998) 148 N L J 62 and Home Office 
Circular 45/1997 Plea before venue. Also note that if a notice of transfer procedure is served then 
the plea before venue scheme would not apply as the Magistrates' hearing would be bypassed. 
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of law in connection to the case.'^  The questionnaire expressly states that applications 
for special measures should be made at the hearing. Deciding these issues pre-trial 
should help prevent delays at the time of the trial. Plotnikoff & Woolfson, however, 
argue that the hearings did not work: 
judges at pre-trial hearings are often reluctant to make decisions which bind 
the trial judge.. }^ 
The Practice Direction governing plea and direction hearings states that the trial judge 
should normally conduct the hearing'^ but that where the case is to be heard by a High 
Court judge other provisions may be made. McConville and Bridges'^ note that under 
the scheme, trial counsel were expected to appear at the hearing'^ but agree with 
Professor Zander - a then member of the Royal Commission - that this would be 
unlikely to succeed.'^ ^ Spencer argues that the procedure has not been as effective as it 
could be, and blames a tendency to "slip back into the old ways" as the reason.'^ ' This 
would seem to be confirmed by policy statements made by the Home Office which 
show that delay continues. 
Listing 
The problem of delay is shown most acutely by the listing process. As is well-known, 
there are three ways of listing a trial; fixed (where a specific date is given), warned 
(where the parties are given a 7-14 day period and 24 hours nofice of trial) and 
floaters (Where the parties are not given a specific court or judge and the trial it is not 
Section 40(1), Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
Plotnikoff& Woolfson (1995) p. 88 
Practice Direction, op.cit., at 1319; para 7 
McConvilie, M. and Bridges, L . Keeping faith with their own convictions: the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice in McConviile and Bridges (1994) Criminal Justice In Crisis Edward Algar 
Publishing. Aidershot. 
Ibid., p.20 
°^ Ibid. 
'^ Spencer and Flin (1993) p.32 
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reached on a particular day, relisting occurs).It should be obvious that a floater is the 
least desirable method of listing a case and a fixed date is to be preferred. Plotnikoff 
and Woolfson note: 
CPS clerks sometimes voiced frustration that their requests to the Crown 
Court for fixtures, or their observation that cases were "unsuitable for the 
warned list" were ignored... 
The implications of this could be quite serious. Morgan and Williams^^ argue that 
forcing a child to attend court, wait for hours and then not be called because the case 
is put back can cause considerable stress.^ '' This is an important point and a reason for 
suggesting that child abuse cases should be given only a fixed listing. With warned 
listings, the parties and those involved are given a date when the trial should begin. 
However, i f the preceding trial goes beyond its esfimated length, this, inevitably, 
further delays the trial. 
Where a case has been transferred to the Crown Court it is suggested that it should be 
assigned a fixed listing. At the pre-trial review, counsel for the defence and 
prosecution should be asked to give an estimate as to how long the case will take. The 
listing officer should take that into account and give a fixed date lisfing. For this to be 
effective, it requires judges to be strict when ruling on requests for adjournments, 
although there is evidence to suggest that judges already take such an approach.^ ^ If it 
is feasible to introduce such a scheme, its introduction would be of great benefit for 
abused children. 
" Plomikoff & Woolfson (1995) p.73 
" Morgan, J . and Williams, J . Child Witnesses and the Legal Process (1992) 6 J S W F L 484 
Ibid., at p.487 
" Hoon (Hoon, G . Reshaping the Criminal Courts in Crawford, A. and Walker, C . (Eds) (1998) The 
Renewal of Criminal Justice. Centre for Criminal Justice Studies. Leeds) states that 1 in 3 Crown 
Court cases are adjourned (p.3) whereas the CPS Inspectorate reports that for child abuse cases 
the figure is 1 in 5 
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EFFECT OF DELAY 
While delay remains a problem within the criminal justice system, there will be 
adverse effects upon children. Morgan and Williams reasonably assume that it must 
increase the child's ''anxiety and apprehension."^^ Spencer & Flin speculate that there 
may be a link between delay and the quality of the child's testimony,^^ with increased 
stress^ ^ which may make them appear less convincing witnesses."^ ^ These problems by 
themselves demonstrate the importance of reducing delay. There is, however, yet 
another concern, a matter of crucial importance for abused children. 
Therapy 
Therapy is a controversial subject. We will not consider the various forms of therapy 
or decide on its merits. Our concern is that therapy required by a child may well be 
delayed until after the trial. Why is this necessary? The Memorandum of Good 
Practice gives the following guidance: 
Once the video recorded statement is complete, it should be possible for 
appropriate counselling and therapy to take place?'^ 
Lyon and de Cruz^' take issue with this however: 
Case-law suggests that a child's evidence will be excluded altogether if 
therapy takes place after the interview.^'^ 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson argue that there is no reason why therapy should not take 
place before trial, although they note that prosecuting authorities are nervous about 
Ibid., at 491 
Spencer & Flin (1993) pp. 299-301 
Ibid., pp 363-367 
Ibid., at pp. 373-374 
°^ Ibid., at para. 3.44 
'^ Lyon, C . and de Cruz, P. (1993) Child Abuse (2"'' Ed) Family Law. Bristol 
Ibid., at p.305 
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permitting it.'^ ^ Fortin, moreover, notes that: 
CPS lawyers continue to argue that therapy undermines a child's ability to 
provide uncontaminated evidence when and if cross-examined at the trial 
itself^' 
and continues by stating that this attitude is preventing children from receiving 
"urgently needed" therapeutic treatment.^ ^ 
The CPS have recently issued a new draft good practice guidance on therapy^^ which 
recognises the problem but suggests that the question of therapy is not one for the 
CPS but for those involved with the child (i.e. social services and/or the family) .The 
guidance states that i f the therapy might prejudice the case then the CPS should 
38 
consider dropping the proceedings. This does not address the issue of delaying 
therapy but merely advises consideration be given to whether an effective prosecution 
remains possible is therapy occurs. I f CPS lawyers actively discourage therapy it is 
difficult to see how an effective balance between the needs of the child and the public 
interest in effective prosecution can be resolved.The CPS, in consultation with other 
agencies, should decide which cases do require immediate therapy, and allow theraoy 
to proceed, even i f this risks prejudicing the trial. 
A RIGHT TO THERAPY 
I f the CPS acfively discourage access to therapy the question arises whether a child 
could assert a right to timely therapeutic treatment. Before turning to this question, it 
" Plotnikoff& Woolfson (1995) p.50 
Fortin (1998) p.421 
Ibid. 
C P S (1999) Pre-trial therapy and child witnesses: current good practice guidance CPS. London 
" Ibid., para. 4.2 
Ibid., para. 4.4 
Thematic Review 1/98, para. .7.26 
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should be noted that recent legislative amendments have provided for pre-trial cross-
examination.'"' This allows a child to receive therapy pre-trial as soon as the cross-
examination has been completed. The problem, however, is that considerable doubt 
exists as to the effectiveness of the scheme, and how often it will be used,"" and so the 
problem of deferred therapy may well continue for some considerable time. 
Accordingly, resolving whether there is a right to immediate therapy remains a live 
issue. 
Whether to take a child for therapy is a matter of parental responsibility and for this 
reason it is necessary to examine the position of children in the care of their parents, 
and then those children in the care of the local authority. 
Children in Care of Parents 
Where the child is under the care of his or her parents then it is the responsibility of 
the parents to take the child for therapy. Where the therapy is to be given by the 
N.H.S., or some private body, then it is unlikely that the CPS or anyone else could 
prevent that therapy from taking place. The CPS might ask the parents not to give the 
child any therapy, because of likely prejudice to any prosecution, but i f the parents 
choose to insist on therapy it is highly unlikely that the CPS could prevent therapy 
from taking place. 
A possible complication would be i f the therapy is to be provided by a therapist 
employed by the local authority. I f the CPS ask the local authority not to make the 
therapist available until after the trial, then it is possible that they may agree to this 
°^ Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s.21 (6) 
See chapter 7 for further details on this. 
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request. In this situation it is likely that any challenge would have to be brought 
42 against the local authority. 
Child in Care of Local Authority 
The more controversial situafion is where the child is under the care of a local 
authority, either through an interim care order'*^  or a final care order.'*'* In these 
circumstances the local authority has parental responsibility for the child'*^ and as such 
they could - i f the CPS make a request - decide to defer the therapy. Any challenge 
brought against this decision would be made against the local authority. 
Local authorities have a general duty to ''safeguard and promote'' the welfare of 
children in their care.'*^  It could be argued that in order to safeguard the welfare of the 
child, or at the very least to promote their welfare, it would be necessary to provide 
therapy when needed. How far does this duty go? 
Although there is a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child, there is 
nothing in s.22 which states that the welfare of the child should be the paramount 
consideration of the local authority.''^ Indeed, when making a decision about a child in 
care, the local authority must ascertain the wishes and feelings of, inter alia, the child, 
the child's parents and ''any other person whose wishes and feelings the authority 
consider to be relevant.'"'^^ It is highly likely that when the local authority decide on 
the issue of therapy, they would consider the wishes and feelings of the CPS to be 
Probably based on an argument alleging that the decision contravenes the E . C . H . R . See pp. 30-34 
below. 
Children Act 1989, S.38 
Ibid., SS.31,33 
''^  Ibid., ss.33(3)(a) when read in conjunction with s.31(11) 
Ibid., s.22(3) 
c.f the court's paramount principle under s . l ( l ) 
s.22(4) 
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relevant. The quesfion then becomes what weight should be given to the respective 
persons consulted? Sub-section (4) does not rank any preference, and although sub-
section (5) states that the local authority should have due regard to the wishes of the 
child (subject to age and understanding)'*^ it also states that due regard be had to the 
wishes and feelings of the other persons named in sub-section (4).^ *^ It would seem 
that so long as the local authority actually consults the relevant persons '^ it is for it to 
decide i f and when the child should receive therapy. 
However, this may conflict with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. Article 3(1) of this Convention states that the "best interests of the child" shall 
be the "primary consideration." It was noted in the previous chapter that the CPS 
consider themselves bound by the Convention^^ but it should be noted that the 
Convention has not been incorporated into English law in the same way that, for 
example, the E.C.H.R. has. What happens i f the local authority do not consider 
themselves bound by the Convention? In R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte 
Kebilene and others^^ an argument was raised that could be of assistance here. 
One of the arguments put forward in Kebilene was that the applicants had a legitimate 
expectation that they were entitled to certain rights. They argued that this expectation 
arose from the ratification of international treaties and statements by ministers. To 
strengthen their argument the applicants used the dicta from an Australian case: 
...ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the Executive 
Government of this country to the world and to [its] people that the Executive 
Government and its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention. That 
49 
50 
s.22(5)(a) 
s.22(5)(b) 
In R V Devon County Council, ex parte O [1997] 3 F .C .R . 411 it was confirmed that the 
consultation required by ss.22(4) and (5) is mandatory. 
See p.8 above. 
[1999] 3 W . L . R . 175, D C 
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positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, 
absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that administrative 
decision-makers will act in conformity of the Convention.^'^ 
The Divisional Court implicitly approved of this quotation although in the specific 
case of Kebilene they noted that no legitimate expectation could arise in relation to the 
E.C.H.R. because rafificafion: 
took place nearly half a century ago [and when it] was generally assumed at 
the time that ratification would have no practical effect on British law or 
practice... 
However the same problems may not exist with the United Nafions Convention. That 
Convention was ratified in 1991 and it has always been the intention of the 
government to be bound by it.^^ This may therefore mean that an applicant could have 
a legitimate expectation to the rights expressed in the Convention, specifically that 
under Article 3(1). Normally it is pre-requisite to a legitimate expectation claim, that 
the applicant knows of the circumstances which gives rise to the expectation^' but in 
Teoh, implicitly approved in Kebilene it was said: 
It is not necessary that a person seeking to set up such a legitimate expectation 
should be aware of the Convention or should personally entertain the 
expectation; it is enough that the expectation is reasonable in the sense that 
there are adequate materials to support it.^^ 
Adequate materials do support such a legitimate expectation: not least because the 
government has produced two reports to the United Nations in which they agreed they 
54 
55 
56 
58 
Minister for the Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 A . L . R . 353 at 365 per Mason 
C.J . 
ex parte Kebilene, op.cit., at 184 per Lord Bingham of Comhill L . C . J . 
See DoH (1994) The U K ' s First Report of the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child HMSO. 
London, para. 1.3. However, upon ratification, the United Kingdom entered reservations in 
respect of young offenders, immigration and employment regulations. See Fortin (1998) p.37 
See Leyland, P. et al.(1994) Administrative Law. Blackstone Press. London., pp.202-207 
Minister for Immigration v Teoh, op.cit., in Kebilene, op.cit. p. 184. Note, Kebilene was 
succesfully appealed to the House of Lords by the D.P.P. ([1999] 3 W.L.R. 972) Their Lordships, 
however, were silent as to legitimate expectation and accordingly it remains a live issue. 
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were bound.Assuming, therefore, that local authorities are directly bound by the 
Convention, this would mean that for any decision on whether or not to defer therapy, 
the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration. 
However, that would not necessarily ensure that therapy could continue immediately. 
The United Nations Convention talks of the "primary consideration" and not the 
"paramount consideration." This may mean that a rebuttable presumption is created, 
so that therapy (which would be in the best interests of the child) would continue 
unless there were good reasons for it not to. The CPS - who it will be remembered 
would be entitled to make representations over this decision - could argue that the 
need to protect society by prosecuting, and convicting, a child abuser may be of 
greater significance in particular circumstances than the child's best interests. I f the 
local authority accept this then, arguably, they would not be acting unreasonably 
because although the child's best interests were their primary consideration - i.e. their 
main consideration - other considerations were more pressing. Had the United 
Nations Convention talked of the paramount consideration^" then a different result 
may have arisen because paramount suggests a different order of priority than 
primary. 
Does this mean that the child would be required to accept a deferral of therapy? It 
may be possible for a child to argue that such a deferral is contrary to Article 8 of the 
E.C.H.R. It should be stated at the outset that Article 8 does not expressly mention 
either medical treatment or therapeutic treatment. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that claims to treatment cannot be sustained because article 8 encompasses a 
DoH (1994), op.cit., and DoH (1999) Convention on the Rights of the Child: Second Report to the 
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child by the United Kingdom HMSO. London 
*° i.e. In terms analogous to s.1(1) 
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variety of rights that make up the "right to respect for private and family life."^' The 
European Court has suggested that Article 8 concerns the "physical and moral 
integrity of the person.''^^ In Stubbings and others v U.K.^^ the Court, although 
rejecting an application by the applicants, commented that cases of child abuse quite 
clearly fall within the remit of Article 8.^ '' For an argument under Article 8 to be 
sustained in relation to therapy, the applicant must show that therapy is a matter of 
"physical or moral" integrity. This has been made somewhat easier by the European 
Court who, on at least one occasion, has interpreted "physical and moral integrity" to 
mean "physical and psychological integrity"^^ and also stated: 
Article 8...is primarily intended to ensure the development... of the personality 
of each individual in relations with other human beings.^^ 
This is perhaps the key to an argument relating to therapy. Arguably i f a child requires 
immediate therapy but does not receive it, he or she may well suffer psychological 
harm, and this harm, i f not addressed, may lead to permanent psychological damage 
and developmental harm which may prevent the victim from making adequate social 
and, possibly even, sexual relationships.^' I f such an argument could be sustained -
and it should be noted that the European Court will not hear theoretical violations of 
treaty rights:^^ the applicant must demonstrate a need for therapy - then the question 
arises as to how the complaint can be brought before the courts? 
Fortin^^ notes that most children have little understanding about the law and 
62 
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66 
67 
68 
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See the comments of the European Court of Human Rights in Niemietz v Germanv (1993) 16 
E .H.R .R . 97, particularly at 111. 
X and Y v Netherlands (1995) 8 E.H.R.R. 235 at 306 
(1997) 23 E . H . R . R . 213 
Ibid., at 235 
Botta V Italy (1998) 26 E .H.R .R . 241 at 257 
Ibid. 
See, for example, Lyon and de Cruz (1993) pp.12-16 for the psychological effects of child abuse. 
See Colder v U . K . A 18 para 28 (1975) 
Fortin, J . The H R A ' s impact on litigation involving children and their families [1999] C .F .L .Q. 
237 
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"rights"^" although she concedes that i f an adult^' aids them in discovering their rights 
then they could have a powerful case in establishing a human rights question.Could 
these same adults bring an action on behalf of the child, i f the child cannot understand 
the concepts himself ?^ ^ Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 states that a person 
has locus standi, inter alia, " i f he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act." 
Coppel^ '* notes that this is the same as the locus standi required for an action in the 
Strasbourg courts.^^ However, an adult bringing an action on behalf of a child would 
not be a victim within the meaning of s.7. Where children are concerned though, the 
Court recognises that a minor needs a representative^^ and so that person would, 
presumably, be given locus standi for the purposes of the application and the case 
could proceed to court. 
However, proving a prima facie breach of Article 8 is not enough as the right to 
respect for private and family life is not an unfettered right: Article 8(2) permits the 
right established in Article 8(1) to be abrogated under certain circumstances, namely 
that any interference must be "zn accordance with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society...''' Thus the first stage is to decide whether the interference is in 
accordance with the law. 
72 
73 
Ibid., at 240 
Examples would be family members, those with parental responsibility for the child, guardian ad 
litems, local authority visitors etc. 
Fortin(1999) p.241 
Note that there is no definitive age at which a child can be said to be capable of understanding 
concepts. The courts look at each case individually and decide whether they are of sufficient "age 
and understanding." See Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] A . C . 
112 
Coppel, J . (1999) The Human Rights Act 1998: Enforcing the European Convention in the 
Domestic Courts. John Wiley & Sons. Chichester. 
Ibid., p. 12: note that locus standi is set out under Article 34 of the Convention. 
In Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 E . H . R . R . 293 the European Court permitted 
a claim brought by a child's parents on behalf of the child, and in SD. DP and T v United 
Kingdom (1996) 22 E .H.R .R . C D . 148 a claim was permitted by a solicitor who was also the 
guardian ad litem of the child. 
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For something to be in accordance with the law it requires something more than the 
absence of illegality'' - it requires an identifiable person or body to be responsible for 
the decision and for them to follow defined criteria. It may be thought that there is, at 
present, no identifiable criteria as there is no statute governing the decision, nor is any 
criteria contained in the CPS draft guidance. However, the process of decision-making 
must also be considered. The local authority may decide to convene a case 
conference'^. I f a case conference is convened, and a decision made to defer therapy, 
then this may be considered an identifiable body applying defined criteria because of 
the procedures governing the conduct of case conferences. 
The second part of Article 8(2) requires the interference to be necessary in a 
democratic society. Article 8(2) gives a number of examples of what may be 
necessary, and one of these is "for the prevention of disorder or crime." This is likely 
to be the one which the authorities rely on since their justification for deferring 
therapy is that it is necessary to obtain a conviction, i.e. to help prevent crime. To 
decide on this issue it is necessary to examine whether the interference is proportional 
to the need to protect society. 
In Soering v United Kingdom'^ the European Court defined proportionality as the: 
search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's 
fundamental rights^^ 
This is, arguably, the most important part of this Article 8 question. This is where the 
interests of society must be balanced against the rights of the individual victim. 
" See Malone v United Kingdom A 82 para 79 (1984) 
See p.4, Fn 3 for further details on the case conference. 
A 161, para 89 (1989) 
Ibid. 
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Society obviously has important interests in this decision: i f therapy was not deferred 
then the prosecution would almost certainly collapse. It was noted in the previous 
chapter that crimes of sex or violence are considered to be crimes against society 
Q 1 
along with crimes against the individual. Where the crime is one of child abuse then 
society's interests are even more pressing. I f the case conference concludes that the 
alleged abuser is a danger to society, and should the prosecution not go ahead other 
vulnerable children may be harmed, they may well decide that the interests of society 
outweigh the individual interests of the victim. It is unlikely that this decision would 
be considered to be a breach of the E.C.H.R. because in such circumstances a fair 
balance may well mean that society's interests must come first. However, i f there is 
not this clear and present danger posed by an individual; i.e. there is no clear evidence 
that the abuser would offend again, then the balance may well come down in favour 
of the child, and the decision to defer therapy would be over-ruled.The balancing 
exercise must relate to the individual: balancing the needs of the individual child 
victim against the benefits to society of prosecuting the individual defendant. 
It is therefore not possible to conclude in general terms whether a child victim of 
abuse could force a local authority to provide him with immediate therapy. It may be 
possible to bring an action with the aim of doing so, but each case will have to be 
considered on its own facts. 
81 
82 
See pp.5, 10-11 above. 
The actual process for doing so would be for the child, via his next friend to bring an action 
alleging that the local authority has acted illegally by breaching their duty to act in accordance 
with the E . C . H . R . imposed on them by s.6(l). Human Rights Act 1998. 
Although it should be noted that the principle of deterrence is also an important factor in the 
balancing exercise. (See X and Y v Netherlands (1995) 8 E.H.R.R. 235 at 241) 
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PREFACE TO CHAPTERS 4 AND 5 
The issue of the interaction between civil and criminal proceedings, and its impact on 
effective responses to child abuse, is a very important concept. There are two 
principal factors involved in this interaction; the timing of the two trials, and the 
sharing of evidence. It will be necessary to consider these two factors separately but it 
should be noted that they are closely related, entailing a substantial amount of cross-
referencing. The final section of chapter 5 brings the two areas together, highlighting 
some of the problems that the interaction creates. 
Chapter 4 
Disclosure of Material 
Where civil proceedings take place before the criminal proceedings (and in most cases 
they wi l l ' ) it is possible that the material used in the civil proceedings^ may be of 
relevance to the criminal proceedings. We must examine how those involved in the 
criminal proceedings can gain access to these documents. 
The starting point is that documents in civil proceedings are confidential. No-one 
other than a party, the legal representative of a party, the guardian ad litem, the legal 
aid board, or a welfare officer may be given access to the documents without the leave 
of the appropriate judge.^ Where a person who is not a party to the case wishes access 
See Chapter 5 below 
Note, in this context "civil proceedings" mean protection proceedings instigated under s.31, 
Children Act 1989 
Family proceedings Rules 1991 (S.I. 1991/1247), rule 4.23 and Family Proceedings Court 
(Children Act 1989) Rules 1991 (S.l. 1991/1395), rule 23. Note, in this thesis a reference to rule 
4.23 should be taken as also referring to rule 23. 
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to the documents then they must apply for leave to be joined as a party to the 
proceedings."* Where a party (which would include a recently joined party) wishes to 
disclose the documents for another purpose (e.g. in criminal proceedings the 
defendant may wish to give the documents to the lawyers dealing with his defence, or 
the police may wish to disclose the documents to the CPS) then leave must be sought 
from the court under rule 4.23.^ 
It is necessary when examining this issue to draw a distinction between general 
evidence and incriminating confessions or admissions. 
G E N E R A L E V I D E N C E 
The ambit of rule 4.23 needs to be discussed initially: the rule only concerns 
documents filed with the court. Black et al.^ states: 
no...duty [of confidentiality] applies to documents which are only in their 
preparatory stages to being filed... it is to be hoped that no one will take 
advantage of this lacuna by disclosing documents which are clearly intended 
to be confidential at all times. ^  
Confidential to whom though? An early approach suggested that there should be total 
confidentiality. In Cleveland County Council v F Hale J. followed an earlier ruling of 
Ward J. in Oxfordshire County Council v deciding that rule 4.23 should cover 
statements made to social workers, although she limited it to cases where proceedings 
had already been commenced.'° However both the Oxfordshire and the Cleveland 
4 Family Proceedings Rules 1991, rule 4.7(2) and Family Proceedings Court (Children Act 1989) 
Rules 1991, rule 7(4) 
See the comments of Booth J., in Re K and others ('Minors)(Disclosure of Privileged Materian 
[1994] 3 All E.R. 230 at 232 
Black QC, J. et al. (1998) A Practical Approach to Family Law 5* Ed. Blackstone Press. London 
Ibid., at pp. 409-410 
[1995] 2 All E.R. 236 
[1995] I F.L.R. 552 
See [1995] 2 All E.R. 236 at 239 
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cases were effectively over-ruled by the Court of Appeal in Re G (A Minor)(Social 
Worker: Disclosure)" where Butler-Sloss L.J. said she thought that Ward and Hale JJ. 
were in error when deciding the previous cases.Ward and Hale JJ. had believed that 
expanding the protection to documents before they were filed was necessary to keep 
the names of the children confidential'•^ and because it was in line with the rulings 
made under the previous regime of wardship.'"* However Butler-Sloss L.J., when 
rejecting this approach, argued that the regime under the Children Act is different, and 
that barriers to inter-agency co-operation should not be set up.'^ In Re W (Disclosure 
to Police)'^ this change of emphasis was explained more clearly. Butler-Sloss L.J., 
again giving judgment, held that documents not held by the court were outside the 
remit of rule 4.23'^ The comments Black et al. make relating to confidentiality'^ tie in 
with the rulings made by Ward and Hale JJ. but Butler-Sloss L.J. addressed this issue 
head-on and stated that confidentiality remains: 
The effect of disclosure to the police by social services is for two agencies, 
each bound at that stage by confidentiality, to share information and disclose 
documents to each other in the spirit of Working Together. '^ 
Working Together introduced the concept of inter-agency co-operation into child 
protection investigations. The Children Act is based on such co-operation and it is 
obviously sensible for the courts not to place any unnecessary barriers in the way of 
such co-operation. 
Thus, information not filed with the court may be disclosed without recourse to the 
" [1996] 2 All E.R. 65 
'2 Ibid., at 73 
See Cleveland County Council v F, op.cit., at 239 
See Ibid., at 240 
Re G, op.cit., at 73 
[1998]2F.L.R. 135 
" See Ibid., at 139 
Supra, Fn 7 
Ibid., at 142 
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court, but where documents are filed with the court, then the leave of a judge must be 
obtained. What criteria does the judge use though? In Re EC (Disclosure of 
Material)^" Swinton Thomas L.J. set out, in clear terms, the criteria for the discretion. 
They are: 
(1) The welfare and interests of the child or children concerned in the care 
proceedings. I f the child is likely to be adversely affected by the order in 
any serious way, this will be a very important factor. 
(2) The welfare and interests of other children generally. 
(3) The maintenance of confidentiality in children cases 
(4) The importance of encouraging frankness in children's cases 
(5) The public interest in the administration of justice. Barriers should not 
be erected between one branch of the judicature and another because this 
may be inimical to the overall interests of justice. 
(6) The public interest in the prosecution of serious crime and the 
punishment of offenders, including the public interest in convicting 
those who have been guilty of violent or sexual offences against 
children. There is a strong public interest in convicting those who have 
been guilty of violent or sexual offences against children. There is a 
strong public interest in making available material to the police which is 
relevant to a criminal trial. In many cases this is likely to be a very 
important factor. 
(7) The gravity of the alleged offence and the relevance of the evidence to it. 
I f the evidence has little or no bearing on the investigation or the trial, 
this will mitigate [SIC] against a disclosure order. 
(8) The desirability of co-operation between various agencies concerned 
with the welfare of children, including the social services departments, 
the police service, medical practitioners, health visitors, schools etc. This 
is particularly important in cases concerning children. 
(10) Any other material disclosure which has already taken place.^' 
Many of these factors are relatively straight-forward. The points concerning welfare 
°^ [1996J2 F.L.R. 725 
'^ Ibid., at 733 
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need some expansion. It should be noted that the welfare of the child is not paramount 
in the exercise of this discretion^^ because it is not a matter concerning the upbringing 
of children. That said, however, the comments of Swinton Thomas L.J., above, show 
that it clearly remains important. His Lordship then argued that a prosecution could 
actually further the child's interests: 
if the father is guilty of the unlawful killing of a child then EC's best 
interests... are served by him being prosecuted and punished... 
This suggestion that a prosecution will automatically be in a child's best interests was 
rejected by Stuart White J. in Oxfordshire County Council v L and F^ "*: 
It is said that in future [the child] would benefit from being able to be told that 
the individual who caused his injuries had been prosecuted. I have been shown 
no psychiatric or other evidence to support this submission?^ 
It is submitted that it is more likely that the approach taken by Stuart White J is more 
appropriate and realistic than that of Swinton Thomas L.J.: there is no evidence which 
suggests a child will benefit from a prosecution, indeed there is evidence to suggest 
that given the trauma which arises from testifying in criminal proceedings^^ it could 
even be harmful to a child's welfare.'^ ^ In addition, there is evidence to suggest that a 
prosecution may be a no-win situation for a child. Cobley notes that i f the abuser is 
convicted the child may well feel guilty at breaking up the family^^ and yet Fortin 
argues that i f the abuser is acquitted the child may feel that he or she was not believed 
which could radically increase their stress.'^ ^ Given that this evidence exists, h is 
22 
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28 
See the comments of Bracewell J. giving judgment in the Family Division hearing of Re L (Police 
Investigation: Privilege) [1995] 1 F.L.R. 999 at 1007 
Re EC, op. cit., at 733 
[1997] 1 F.L.R. 235 
Ibid., at 244 
See chapter 7 below. 
See also Fortin (1998) pp. 428-431 
Cobley (1995) p.l61 
Fortin (1998) p.433 
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difficult to see how it can be argued that a prosecution will automatically be in the 
interests of the child. 
Perhaps the most important factors are those which are based upon a presumption of 
not interfering with the criminal process^" and that which relates to co-operation 
between agencies.^' 
CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS 
Although rule 4.23 does not make any express reference to confessions or admissions, 
secfion 98 of the Children Act 1989 needs to be read in conjunction with the rule. 
Scope of Section 98 
Section 98, Children Act 1989 states: 
(1) In any proceedings in which a court is hearing an application for an 
order under Part IV or V, no person shall be excused from-
(a) giving evidence on any matter; or 
(b) answering any question put to him in the course of his giving 
evidence, 
on the ground that doing so might incriminate him or his spouse of an 
offence. 
(2) A statement or admission made in such proceedings shall not be 
admissible in evidence against the person making it or his spouse in 
proceedings for an offence other than perjury. 
This section relates to the privilege against self-incrimination. Section 98(1) abolishes 
the privilege for Part IV or V matters. Part IV covers care and supervision orders. 
°^ Factors 5 to 7: and see the comments of Sir Stephen Brown P. in Re D('Minors)("Wardship: 
Disclosure) [1994] I F.L.R. 346 
Factor 8. The ethos of inter-agency co-operation was put into effect after the Cleveland crisis 
(Report of the Cleveland Inquiry (1989) p.248). The production of Working Together (Home 
Office, 1991) significantly furthered this principle. 
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including interim orders. Part V covers the protection of children, including 
emergency protection orders, child assessment orders and police protection. Section 
98(2) should, theoretically, protect a person from the admissions and statements that 
are made when giving evidence required under s.98(l) by limiting their admissibility 
to offences of perjury. Bainham^^ argues that the intention behind s.98 was to ensure a 
court hears all relevant evidence in respect of the child.^^ He continues by stating that 
s.98(2) is the "trade-off to s.98(l): that the privilege should only be removed on 
condition that the evidence is used only for the offence of perjury." '^' 
However case law has developed a different attitude towards s.98. In Re EC 
(Disclosure of Material)^^ the Court of Appeal decided that s.98 only protected a 
person in court proceedings, and that where the police sought the information for 
investigative purposes, s.98(2) was no bar to disclosure. In the Journal of Criminal 
Law, an anonymous case note on Re C (A Minor)^^ makes the point that this can have 
a major effect on a prosecution. In Re C the police had decided that there was 
insufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, and yet after the civil proceedings - and 
as a result of a successful application for disclosure - the police were able to think 
again about bringing a prosecution. However the author notes that although s.98(2) 
permits such disclosure, there may be further protection under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984: 
the [criminal] trial judge in those proceedings may also hold that any further 
admissions made (to the police) following their receipt of the original 
confession (which they cannot use as evidence), may be excluded by the trial 
judge in the exercise of his discretion... 
32 
33 
34 
37 
Bainham, A. (1993) Children - The Modem Law. Family Law. Bristol 
Ibid., at 467 
Ibid. 
[1996] 2 F.L.R. 725 
(1997)6 J.C.L. 294 
Ibid., at 295 
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McEwan arrives at a similar conclusion by noting that: 
The interviewing officer surely would be tempted to remind them that they 
have already admitted the event and might well do so again. Whether or not a 
criminal trial judge would allow a later admission made in such 
circumstances to be used as evidence is a matter of speculation?'^ 
Thus, although the police - and ultimately the CPS - may gain access to the 
information, their use of it is limited. They cannot adduce the evidence at trial as this 
is prohibited under s.98(2), neither can they ask the same questions during an 
interview as the judge may well rule this inadmissible.'"^ 
Does it make any difference i f a party wishes to use the evidence for credibility rather 
than proving facts? In Re K and others (Minors)(Disclosure of Privileged Material)'" 
the father of three children - who had been charged with the abuse of them - applied 
to the civil court for the disclosure of a transcript of the mother's evidence taken in 
the civil proceedings. The father wished to use this evidence to show that the mother -
who was also the main prosecution witness - had made significantly inconsistent 
statements. Booth J. rejected the mother's assertions that s.98(2) protected her, and 
held that disclosure could take place because attacking credibility was not using 
statements "against" a person."*^  The problem is even more profound when the parents 
are co-defendants and they use a "cut-throat" defence. Such a dilemma was presented 
in Re L (Care: Confidentiality)'*^ where two parents accepted that care orders were 
needed in respect of their children because of neglect. Criminal proceedings were also 
pending and because of this they declined to give evidence in the civil proceedings as 
McFwan. J. Privilege and the Children Act 1989 - Confusion Compounded? [1995] C.F.L.Q. 236 
Ibid., at 242 
Under s.78, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. And see Farrar Q.C., D. and Langdale, R. Re 
EC and Criminal Trials [1997] Fam. Law 480 
[1994]3 AllE.R. 230 
« Ibid., at 235 
[1999] 1 F.L.R. 165 
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s.98(2) would not protect them against cross-examination by the Crown or each other. 
Johnson J. considered making an injunction preventing any party using any 
information in the case outside of the care proceedings.'*'' However his Lordship 
decided: 
a co-defendant [may be] able to show that there was a substantial risk of 
injustice without modification of the prohibition. Indeed such an injunction, 
and possibly s.98(2) itself might fall foul of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.'*^ 
Johnson J. did not explain his hypothesis concerning the European Convention but his 
reference to a "substantial risk of injustice" would appear to suggest that it is linked to 
the fair trial aspect of Article 6. It is beyond doubt that the "fair trial" concept is an 
important part of Article 6. Harris et al. note that: 
In cases not involving a breach of a specific [Article 6] right, the Court may 
none the less find a breach of the right to a fair hearing on a "trial as a whole 
basis.''''' 
It could perhaps be argued that the injunction and/or s.98(2) when read in that context, 
could breach this concept, which may prove that the fears of Johnson J. are well 
founded. However could a human rights argument be directed towards s.98 generally? 
Section 98(1) effectively abolishes the privilege of self-incrimination and it has been 
seen from the above that s.98(2) does not necessarily provide any absolute safeguards 
concerning the use of incriminating statements. Does the European Convention 
provide for a privilege against self-incrimination? and i f so, would this mean that s.98 
in its entirety could be deemed a breach? 
Ibid., at 168 
Ibid. 
Harris etal. (1995) p.203 
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In Funke v France''^  the applicant had been convicted of an offence of not co-
operating with an inquiry. No charges were brought as a result of the inquiry but 
under French law a person had to give full co-operation. The European Court of 
Human Rights held that where disclosures are made through a compulsory inquiry, 
and these disclosures formed a significant part of the prosecution case, this breached 
the right to a fair trial under Article 6. This was followed by the Court in Saunders v 
U.K."*^ where the applicant was forced to co-operate with an inquiry and the disclosure 
made as a result of this inquiry formed a significant part of the prosecution case. This 
was similarly deemed a breach of Article 6. 
Another relevant case may be K v Austria'*^ where the applicant was fined for refusing 
to give evidence in a trial on the basis that his evidence may incriminate himself in his 
forthcoming criminal trial. The Commission held that there had not been a breach of 
Article 6 because the fine imposed on him did not arise from a criminal charge within 
the meaning of Article 6. This ratio was not applied by the Court in Saunders but it 
could be argued that the circumstances of K v Austria are directly applicable to s.98 
cases: in that they relate to a refusal to give testimony rather than a refusal to co-
operate in an investigation. It may, however, be possible to distinguish K v Austria 
because in that case the applicant was a mere witness, and not the subject of 
proceedings. With the Children Act 1989, the parents are arguably the subject of both 
the care proceedings and the criminal trial. 
48 
50 
(1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 297 
(1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 313 
A 255-6 (1993) 
Of course technically it is the child who is the subject of care proceedings but given that the 
standard of parental care given to the child will usually be questioned during the proceedings (see 
s.31(2)(b), Children Act 1989) it could legitimately be argued that it is the parents who are the 
"subjects" of such proceedings. 
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Even by distinguishing K v Austria, it will not be possible to argue that s.98 by itself 
amounts to a breach of the privilege against self-incrimination because although 
s.98(l) forces a parent to testify, unlike in Saunders, this testimony cannot be adduced 
directly. In Saunders any answers that were given to the investigators could, i f they 
proved useful to the prosecution, be adduced directly in court. Section 98(2), 
however, would prevent the material from being directly adduced at trial. Accordingly 
it would seem that section 98 does not by itself amount to a breach of Article 6, 
although that is not to say that on the facts of individual cases, a different result may 
occur. 
Discretion to Disclose 
Given that it has been shown that s.98 is not automatically a breach of the privilege 
against self-incrimination, it will be necessary to examine the judge's discretion to 
disclose evidence in care proceedings. 
It will be remembered that the criteria for the discretion was established in Re EC 
(Disclosure of Material)^' Swinton Thomas L.J. gave a list of factors to be considered 
and one of these relates solely to section 98 cases: 
(9) In a case to which s.98(2) applies, the terms of the section itself, namely 
that the witness was not excused from answering incriminating 
questions, and that any statement of admission would not be admissible 
against him in criminal proceedings. Fairness to the person who has 
incriminated himself and any others affected by the incriminating 
statement and any danger of oppression would also be relevant 
considerations.^^ 
In other words, the court must consider that it may be unjust to permit the statement to 
[1996] 2 F.L.R. 725 
Ibid., at 733 
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be disclosed since had section 98 not applied, the person could have refused to answer 
questions on the basis that it would have incriminated him.^"' Farrer and Longdale note 
that it would be rare for the courts to reftise to order disclosure on the basis of 
unfairness, and as such the only protection available would be section 78, Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984. '^' Ormerod^^ agrees that it would be rare for a court to 
refuse disclosure: 
There is no doubt that the Family Division is anxious not to trespass upon the 
jurisdiction of the Criminal Division.^^ 
This concept has been repeatedly given judicial backing, perhaps most forcefiilly by 
Butler-Sloss L.J. in Re W (Disclosure to Police)^^: 
[F]amily judges ought not to frustrate the investigation of potential crimes... 
without good reason.^^ 
It would seem therefore that in all but exceptional cases, the family courts adopt a 
subservient position and grant disclosure to the police. After disclosure the police and 
the criminal courts will then decide what the information could be used for. The actual 
admission cannot be adduced in court as evidence of the facts, and neither could it be 
used directly to gain a fresh admission^^ but McEwan argues that the police would 
make indirect use of it: 
The method of investigation very likely will include questioning by the police 
of those parents in order to obtain fresh admissions which would be 
admissible in a criminal trial.^^ 
55 
56 
See Murphy, P. (1995) Murphy on Evidence (5"" Ed) Blackstone Press. London, pp. 386-391 for 
further details on the freedom from self-incrimination. 
Farrer & Langdale (1997) p. 480 
Ormerod, D. Confidentiality in Children Cases [1995] C.F.L.Q. I 
Ibid., at 11 
[1998] 2 F.L.R. 135 
Ibid., at 145 
As this would almost certainly be liable to a ruling under section 78, Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 
McEwan (1995) p.242 
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Thus it is likely that the police would, in the majority of cases, seek disclosure i f they 
believe it would be of benefit to their investigafion. Hay ward Smith^' argues that 
given this is the situation, lawyers cannot advise their clients to testify freely in civil 
proceedings without incriminafing themselves.^ ^ He then poses the question whether 
restricting co-operation is "in the best interests of the child?" The answer must 
arguably be "no" since it is in the best interests of the child that the facts that led to 
either the significant harm, or the risk of significant harm, which triggered the care 
proceedings should be discussed frankly. Parliament must have intended such 
frankness when s.98(2) was drafted, but the courts interpretation has led to this being 
frustrated. 
BENEFIT TO THE DEFENCE 
The majority of applications for the disclosure of documents from the civil 
proceedings are likely to be made by the prosecution because they believe it will aid 
their case. However this does not mean that the defence can not apply for disclosure 
as in many cases they wil l . There are, it is submitted, two aspects of disclosure to 
examine here; section 98 and public interest immunity. 
Section 98, Children Act 1989 
It may appear peculiar that the defence may wish to use documents to which section 
98 applies but there are circumstances when they will . Such a situation developed in 
Re K and others (Minors)(Disclosure of Material).^^ The facts of this case were 
Hayward Smith Q.C., R Should confessions of child abuse be encouraged in Children Act 
proceedings? (1998) 11 P.C.L.B. 73 
Ibid., at 74 
[1994] 3 All E.R. 230 
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discussed in an earlier section of this chapter '^' but it is worth repeating that a father -
who was being prosecuted for the abuse of his daughter - sought disclosure of the 
statements of the mother, and a transcript of her evidence because he believed that it 
would help him. Booth J. permitted disclosure saying: 
In this case the statements on which the father seeks to rely do not incriminate 
him but, on the contrary, assist him in his defence to the charges already made 
against him... I therefore consider that it is likely that the statements will be 
admissible in criminal proceedings.^^ 
This point concerning admissibility highlights an additional advantage such disclosure 
has for the defence. It was seen from the above that one problem when the police seek 
disclosure is that they may fall foul of section 78, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 but this does not apply to the defence,^ ^ and as such it is more likely to be 
admissible in evidence at trial. 
Public Interest Immunity 
We have considered the situation where the defence seeks access to documents held 
by the court. However it is possible that the defence may wish to gain access to 
documents held by the local authority and others which have not been filed with the 
court. It was noted earlier that where the prosecution wished to gain access to these 
types of documents, rule 4.23 does not prevent the sharing of evidence under the 
principles of inter-agency co-operation. Where it is the defence who wish access to 
these documents and not the prosecution, however, it is unlikely that the public body 
wil l voluntarily give access to the files and so the defence must apply for access. 
See supra, Fn 41 and associated main body text. 
" Re K and others, o^.ciUdXl'iS 
As section 78 relates to the evidence brought by the prosecution: see sub-section (1) 
'^ Especially where, as in Re K, the evidence is to be used to attack the credibility of the witness. 
See pp. 36-37 above 
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An application to gain access to documents is normally made by witness summons. 
The summons is sent to an officer of the relevant body and it must normally be 
complied with. If, however, a public body decides that a document is so confidential 
that it should not be disclosed then they may apply for public interest immunity. 
Before briefly analysing the principles of public interest immunity it will be necessary 
to take one step back. Before the defence can gain disclosure of a document - or 
indeed obtain an order for disclosure - they must prove that a document is relevant to 
their case. Local authorities will have a significant number of papers that may appear 
relevant but the question is who decides relevance? There are effectively only four 
options: 
(1) the prosecufion 
(2) the defence 
(3) the court (i. e. the j udge) 
(4) the local authority 
Options (1) and (2) can be rejected easily: the defence would not be happy having the 
prosecution decide relevance as this could lead to the appearance of bias.^° There is 
little point in letting the defence decide relevance because this would mean they were 
given access to all the documents thus rendering any arguments concerning public 
interest immunity moot. This leaves either the judge or the local authority. In R v 
Whittle''' the Court of Appeal held that either the local authority or the judge should 
'^ See Seabrooke, S and Sprack, J. (1999) Criminal Evidence & Procedure: The Essential Procedure 
(2"'' Ed) Blackstone Press. London, pp.259-61 for further details on this process. 
™ However cf s.3, Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 which obliges the prosecutor to 
disclose all material which in his opinion might undermine the prosecution case; and s.7 which 
obliges the prosecution to disclose relevant material which might be expected to assist the 
defence. 
" [1996] Crim. L.R. 904 
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decide on relevance. The Court held that where there are a large number of documents 
it would not be possible for the judge to decide relevance^^ so independent counsel 
could be appointed by the local authority to decide the matter. The independent 
counsel could decide which documents are relevant and the local authority could then 
decide which, i f any, of the documents the authority believe should be the subject of 
public interest immunity. 
Public interest immunity has been permitted in child abuse cases for a considerable 
amount of time - arguably since the doctrine was first formed. The House of Lords in 
D V N.S.P.C.C.^^ held that the N.S.P.C.C. had immunity over the names of those 
people who reported suspected child abuse to them. May '^* argues that D v N.S.P.C.C. 
set a trend and that public interest immunity eventually spread to cover social services 
files and hospital records, including therapeutic interviews.'^ What then is the 
procedure for deciding on public interest immunity? May reports that when the matter 
is to be decided the possessor of the documents may be represented before the court 
so that they may explain their reasons for seeking immunity.'^ Obviously the defence 
will be represented as they wish access to the documents, and it has been held that the 
prosecution should also be represented.In Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte 
Osman the Court of Appeal held that to decide whether immunity should be granted 
it is necessary to undertake a balancing exercise: 
[A] judge is balancing on the one hand the desirability of preserving the 
public interest in the absence of disclosure against, on the other hand, the 
Due to the large number of judge-hours this would take, which could have an impact on trial times 
etc. 
[1978] A.C. 171 
May, R. (1999) Criminal Evidence (4"' Ed) Sweet & Maxwell. London. 
" Ibid., at 14-16 to 14-17 
Ibid., at 14-18 
See R V KCDTVEvidence) 119931 2 F.L.R. 181 at 183 
[1991] 1 W.L.R. 281 
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interests of justice...^^ 
on 
What is the public interest in child cases? Niblett states that: 
the welfare of the child is par amount... in cases where the future well-being of 
the child is to be determined in care or wardship proceedings.. 
he continues by arguing: 
there are, however, real conflicts which arise in criminal proceedings when 
this public interest is balanced against the principle of the defendant having a 
fair trial 
Given the seriousness of offences against children, the balancing exercise is not an 
easy task to perform. In ex parte Osman this point was addressed: 
Where the interests of justice arise in a criminal case touching and concerning 
liberty or conceivably on occasion life, the weight to be attached to the 
interests of justice is plainly very great indeed. 
This was supported by the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, who gave judgment 
in R V Keane '^' and stated that i f the material could help prove innocence or prevent a 
miscarriage of justice, then the balance must come down in favour of disclosure. In 
order to decide whether the material is capable of doing this the judge must examine 
the documents himself*^ 
Given that much of the material a local authority possesses could potentially be used 
to attack the credibility of a child, it is likely that the material would be useful and so 
should be disclosed. Niblett argues that this could have a profound impact on the trial: 
An order for disclosure will place a heavy responsibility on the Crown to 
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decide whether the public interest is both served by continuing the prosecution 
or by abandoning the case and saving the child from an ordeal which is 
perhaps just as great as the abuse alleged}^ 
This is an appropriate conclusion to be drawn: the prosecution should always decide 
whether the case should continue. I f the defence gain access to a document which 
could significantly damage the child's credibility, the prosecution should think very 
carefully before letting the case proceed as this could mean that the child's cross-
examination could be very intense. The prosecution should only continue where it is 
in the public interest to do so and where there is a reasonable prospect of conviction. 
I f this prospect reduces then, it is submitted, that the prosecution should reconsider 
their decision to proceed by referring back to the prosecution t e s t s . I f necessary, the 
prosecution may have to be halted either because the evidential test is no longer 
SO 
satisfied , or because the prosecution decide that it is not in the public interest for the 
child witness to be subjected to such pressures. This, however, could be better for the 
child's welfare in the long-term. 
" Niblett(1997)p. 152 
See chapter 2 above 
As the disclosed material may alter this balance 
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Chapter 5 
Timing of Civil Proceedings 
One of the major aspects of the civil/criminal interaction is the timing of the two 
systems. Where both civil and criminal trials are pending the timing becomes 
essential. In non-Children Act matters, the delays inherent in the civil system would 
normally result in the criminal matter being heard first. The outcome of the criminal 
proceedings would have a critical impact on the civil proceedings because of the 
different standards of proof: where the allegations are the same a conviction would 
virtually guarantee success in the civil proceedings yet an acquittal would not lead to 
dismissal of any civil action on proceedings. 
However, with protection proceedings the situation is not as straight forward. 
Although the courts are bound to accept a criminal conviction as evidence of the 
facts,' the main question is not the facts but whether the parents are suitable to look 
after the child. The conviction, by itself, would not necessarily have an impact on this, 
although a sentence could.^ Another marked difference is delay. Under normal civil 
proceedings there is a considerable delay before the matter is heard^ but under the 
Children Act 1989 delay has to be avoided because it is prejudicial to the welfare of 
the child.'' This means that the civil case should proceed relatively quickly, and it is 
possible that it could be heard before the criminal proceedings. 
The question then becomes should the protection proceedings be delayed until after 
' CivilEvidence Act 1968,3.11(1) 
^ For example, the civil courts decide that the child could remain with the parents, but the criminal 
courts decide to imprison them, thus ensuring that the child would have to be removed. 
^ This is likely to continue even though the Woolf reforms have been put into effect, principally 
because of the sheer number of civil cases. 
" See Children Act 1989, s. 1(2) 
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the criminal proceedings? The arguments for delaying them would be that it would 
help with regard to the statutory presumption, it could also help a judge decide 
whether to remove a child from the parents because the civil judge would have the 
knowledge of what the sentence would be, and finally it could be argued that it would 
mean the parents would not need to prejudice their defence. It was seen from the 
previous chapter that section 98 of the Children Act 1989 does not give adequate 
protection from self-incrimination, and as such the parents would, i f the civil 
proceedings took place first, probably have to disclose their defence. However, none 
of these reasons necessarily relate to the child's welfare. Section 1(2), Children Act 
1989 states that delay is prejudicial to the welfare of the child, and section 1(1) states 
that the welfare of the child has to be the paramount consideration for the courts.^ 
Thus, on a basic analysis, it would appear that s.l should "trump" the other 
considerations, and that civil matters should take place first. Of course, a more 
detailed analysis is required to reach a more definitive answer. 
The issue of timing has been the subject of discussion for some time. Home Office 
Circular 88/1972 states that where there are concurrent civil and criminal proceedings, 
the Crown Court should be advised of the situation so that the listing of the criminal 
trial can be expedited. The circular does not expressly state that the criminal trial 
should be heard before the civil trial, but, it is submitted that is the implication. 
Deferring the civil trial was approved of in Re S (Care Order: Criminal Proceedings).^ 
Here, the parents of S were charged with the murder of S's sister. The local authority 
instigated care proceedings in respect of S, and obtained an interim care order. The 
Section 1(1) would apply here because this is a matter relating to the upbringing of the child. Any 
application relating to the timing would be made under the premises of a pending application 
under section 31, Children Act 1989 
[1995] 1 F.L.R. 151 
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hearing for the final order was fixed before the Crown Court trial and the parents 
sought an adjournment arguing that it would be unfair for the proceedings to proceed 
before the resolution of the criminal proceedings. The judge at first instance refused to 
grant an adjournment and the parents appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court 
allowed the appeal saying: 
In a case as serious as this it would seem to me often it would be preferable 
for the criminal trial to come first and the care proceedings to come second. ^ 
The judge presiding over the criminal trial had remarked that he would prefer an 
adjournment of the care proceedings. His preference seemed to prioritise the 
concerns of the defence as to whether a fair trial was possible, over the statutory duty 
to avoid delay prejudicial to the welfare of the child.^ Butler-Sloss L.J. addressed this: 
/ see no advantage whatever in this particular case to the child, whose welfare 
is paramount, as to whether the bit of paper that keeps him in care is a full 
care order or an interim care order; really the wording is academic. 
In other words, Butler-Sloss L.J. is stating that because the child has been removed 
from the parents, and that such a removal is clearly appropriate, it makes no 
difference that the child is there under a "temporary" order. There are significant 
differences between a care order and an interim care order but it is not the place of 
this thesis to detail them," and so the question is whether her Ladyship is arguing that 
in general there is no difference over a short period of time'^ or whether her 
comments relate solely to the facts of this case. I f it is the former then this would 
Ibid., at 153 per Butler-Sloss L.J. 
Ibid., at 151, although note this was not an issue over which he had any direct control. 
Even though as an application to adjourn care proceedings must be a Part IV matter so the welfare 
of the child should be the court's paramount consideration, (see s.l(l). Children Act 1989) 
Ibid., at 153 
See Black et ai.(1998) pp.444-449, 452-456 and see Hayes, M. The Poper Role of Courts in Child 
Care Cases [19961 C.F.L.Q. 201 at 204-210 
i.e. Whilst the criminal trial proceeds 
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be very surprising, and a significant departure from settled child law under the 
Children Act 1989.'^ 
Thus, Re S appeared to follow Home Office Circular 88/1972 by postponing the civil 
proceedings until after the criminal trial. However, months later the issue arose again 
in the Court of Appeal in Re TB (Care Proceedings: Criminal Trial).''' In Re TB the 
criminal charges related to criminal neglect.'^ Surprisingly, Butler-Sloss L.J. - who 
was again giving judgment - decided that she had erred in Re S}^ She had not, she 
concluded, taken account of an earlier case, R v Exeter Juvenile Court, ex parte H and 
H , ' ' where the President of the Family Division had held that: 
...there is no bar to the hearing of...care proceedings because criminal 
proceedings are pending...the mere fact that criminal proceedings are 
pending and may affect the party or a party who is involved in the family 
proceedings ...cannot form a basis for an almost automatic adjournment of the 
care proceedings.^^ 
Although ex parte H and H was decided before the Children Act 1989 had been 
implemented, Butler-Sloss L.J. argued that they were bound to consider carefully 
what the President had said.'^ After taking account of the President's comments, 
Butler-Sloss L.J. said: 
One starts with the fact that the criminal proceedings of themselves are not a 
reason to adjourn proceedings. There must be some detriment to the children 
for not bringing on the care proceedings because delay is detrimental to 
children...! think we do have to hold the line that in the majority of cases, 
unless there are circumstances which warrant taking a different course, that 
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See, for example, Hampshire County Council v S [1993] 1 F.L.R. 559. Although the main point of 
contention between a full and interim care order is where the courts attempt to use interim care 
orders as final orders. (See Buckinghamshire County Council v M [1994] 2 F.L.R. 506) Butler-
Sloss L.J. has not attempted to argue this, so perhaps her comments may remain valid. 
[1995] 2 F.L.R. 801 
Cruelty under section 1, Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
See [1995] 2 F.L.R. 801 at 804 
[1988] 2 F.L.R. 214 
Ibid., at 222 per Sir Stephen Brown P. 
Re TB, op.cit., at 804: although it should be noted that they were not bound in precedent by it 
because the President was sitting in the High Court (QBD) which is inferior to the Court of 
Appeal. 
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the care proceedings should come on, even if they are to be heard before the 
criminal proceedings.^'^ 
This is a complete about-turn. Whereas in Re S, Butler-Sloss L.J. decided that it 
would make no difference to the child i f proceedings were delayed, presumably the 
ruling in Re TB must mean it could. Indeed in Re TB her Ladyship said: 
There are real problems for these children in being held in limbo, as 
inevitably they are during a criminal trial. 
It is difficult to reconcile this with her Ladyship's comments in Re S, where she 
argued there was no difference between a care order and an interim care order. It is 
likely that her Ladyship's comments in Re S are more likely to be true: although there 
are differences between the orders, there may not be any significant differences with 
the treatment of the child on a short-term basis whilst the criminal trial went ahead. 
Hearing the civil matters before the criminal matters could have significant 
implications. Where the care proceedings are heard first this would, in the majority of 
cases, mean that the parent wil l need to disclose his or her defence prior to the trial. 
Given that s.98. Children Act 1989 offers no real protection,^^ this means that the 
prosecution wil l almost certainly be given details of the defence which could help 
them in the preparafion and conduct of the prosecution. This point was recognised by 
Butler-Sloss L.J. in Re S where her Ladyship said: 
/ can see grave disadvantages to the parents in the full care order being made 
at a time when they cannot really fight it.^'^ 
Her Ladyship made no mention of this in Re TB. The implicafions where there are 
Ibid., at 805-806 
Ibid., at 805 
See supra, Fn 9 and associated main body text. 
" See pp.40-45 
y?e5.,op.cit., p.l53 
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more than one defendant, and the defence is cut-throat, is even more serious. In Re L 
(Care: Confidentiality)^^ Johnson J. held that section 98 offered no protection in such 
circumstances but said: 
...this problem only arises if the care proceedings are heard before the final 
criminal trial. I hope that the submissions made in the present case will not be 
used as a basis for seeking postponement of care proceedings until the 
conclusion of related criminal proceedings^^ 
His Lordship would appear, therefore, to suggest that he agrees with Butler-Sloss 
L.J.'s comments in Re S but that this is not enough for a postponement to be granted. 
However what is the impact of these cases? It now appears settled law that civil 
protection proceedings should take place before the criminal proceedings. This means 
that the parents wil l have to run the risk that they need to disclose their defence and 
take the consequences. Johnson J. argued that this would not matter i f they told the 
truth^^ but even telling the truth can lead to an appearance of inconsistency. Also, the 
fact that a child needs an element of protection does not necessarily mean that a 
prosecution is required. There may well be instances when a parent can, and should, 
admit that their standard of parental care was below that which could be expected of 
them, and yet deny specific allegations which amounts to criminal conduct. I f they 
disclose their defence, however, they may appear inconsistent which could undermine 
their defence to a criminal charge. 
That said, the position as the law stands at present is true to the Children Act 1989. 
Whether to defer civil proceedings is a matter solely for the civil courts and as it is a 
Part IV matter the welfare of the child - and not the interests of those who may face 
ancillary charges - are paramount. However this creates an inevitable tension as the 
" [1999] 1 F.L.R. 165 
Ibid., at 169 
" Ibid. 
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criminal courts should act on the basis that everyone must have the right to a fair trial. 
I f the parents are to have a fair trial then they should not be required to disclose their 
defence in advance.^ ^ However the criminal courts carmot do anything about this 
position other than to make their views known and hope this may influence the civil 
courts in individual cases.'^ ^ 
E F F E C T I V E I N T E R A C T I O N ? 
Does the interaction between the criminal and civil processes cause a conflict and i f 
so can it be resolved? It was seen that one of the biggest conflicts between the two 
processes is in connection with the testimony given during protection proceedings. In 
the previous chapter it was shown that the police are able to obtain evidence from the 
civil proceedings, including a complete record of the testimony. This chapter showed 
that, notwithstanding this, the civil process inevitably goes first because of the 
statutory presumpfion that delay prejudices the welfare of the child.^° The main 
objective of civil protection proceedings is to safeguard the welfare of the child by 
deciding whether the child has suffered, or been placed at risk of suffering, significant 
harm, and then deciding what, i f any, protection measures are required. In order to 
complete its task, it has been said that the court adopts an inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial approach to trials.^' Parliament intended to aid this process by 
withdrawing the freedom from self-incrimination from those who testify during 
30 
31 
Note disclosure in this context means by giving evidence in the civil proceedings and not 
disclosure within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as the 
disclosure under the latter is only partial. 
And given that some civil courts have accepted that a prosecution may be in a child's best 
interests (see, for example, Re E C (Disclosure of Material) [1996] 2 F.L.R. 725 at 733) this may 
mean an adjournment would not be contrary to the s. 1(1) principle as the argument would be that 
if the civil proceedings are heard first then the criminal prosecution would collapse which would 
be contrary to the best interests of the child. 
Section 1(5), Children Act 1989 
See Re D and M (Minors) (1993) 8 B.M.L.R. 69 
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protection proceedings, but also intended that the use of incriminating evidence 
should be restricted The courts have, however, interpreted s.98(2) in such a way that 
has diminished the protection intended. This has led some to comment that parents 
cannot be expected to co-operate with the civil proceedings without incriminating 
themselves for the purposes of subsequent criminal proceedings.^^ This cannot be in 
the best interests of the child and increases the tension between the two systems. 
How can this situation be resolved? There are two potential options: reversing the 
order of the proceedings - so that the civil proceedings occur first - or rule 4.23 needs 
to be tightened up considerably.'^ ^ 
I f the criminal proceedings take place first then this would cause concern to the civil 
courts. The principle enshrined in the Children Act 1989 that delay is prejudicial to 
the welfare of the child is an important factor and one that should not be set aside 
lightly. Thus reversing the procedure would not be acceptable to the civil courts. It 
would, however, appear be acceptable to the criminal justice system as it would help 
ensure that the defence obtains a fair trial. I f the civil proceedings were heard second, 
the defendant(s) would not need to disclose their defence ahead of the criminal trial. It 
could be argued that it carries advantages for the civil system in that matters such as 
sentence, repentance etc. would be decided by the time the civil courts came to make 
the decision on care and control. However, it has already been noted that a conviction 
is not necessarily a binding consideration on the civil courts^ "* and so the usefulness of 
-^ Hayward Smith Q.C., R Should confessions of child abuse be encouraged in Children Act 
proceedings? (1998) 11 P.C.L.B. 73 
" So that the matters heard in the civil proceedings remain confidential at all times, and that nothing 
may be disclosed. 
As the civil courts are assessing whether the parents are capable of retaining care and control for 
the child. 
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this is somewhat questionable. Reversing the order may not necessarily be a good 
thing for the criminal justice system either. When deciding whether to prosecute, it 
was noted above that the prosecution must take into account the interests of the child 
victim,'^^ the prosecution may decide that deferring the protection proceedings would 
not be in the best interests of the child (because it prevents long-term planning etc.) 
and as such decide to "drop" the prosecution.^^ Any reduction in prosecutions could 
raise problems for the punishment of child abusers, and the deterrent factor this 
brings. 
This leaves the second possibility: re-drafting rule 4.23. I f one were to redraft rule 
4.23 to prevent disclosure of any documents, this could prevent the situation whereby 
a parent feels it is necessary to decline to give evidence as the protection conferred by 
s.98 would be absolute. There would sfill, however, be a number of problems to iron 
out. 
One immediate problem would be what would rule 4.23 cover? i f the rule was to be 
re-drafted would its scope be left as it is, or would an attempt be made to widen it, 
possibly to the extent suggested by Ward and Hale JJ. in Cleveland County Council v 
F '^' and Oxfordshire County Council v P^ ^ i.e. by stating that documents or statements 
made in the preparatory stages are similarly covered by the section? I f the rule was 
widened to such an extent then this would have a considerable impact on inter-agency 
co-operation. Not only would it prevent any direct sharing of evidence, it could harm 
See pp.8-II 
Indeed as a deferral could affect matters such as adoption, fostering, rehabilitative treatment etc. it 
is possible that the child victim could argue that such a deferral was a breach of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in a way analogous to the argument developed in relation 
to therapy. See pp. 11-16 above 
" [I995]2 AilE.R. 236 
[1995] I F.L.R. 552 
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dual investigations because each agency would be frustrated by the other's lack of co-
operation. Inter-agency co-operation is one of the building blocks upon which the 
Children Act 1989 was built. Accordingly it is difficult to see how a wider scope -
which would strain inter-agency co-operation - could be justified. 
I f the scope of the rule is left as it is, however, then the re-drafted rule could result in a 
parent refusing to co-operate with the social services, and only discuss matters in front 
of a judge during care proceedings. This could cause severe confusion and frustration 
within the civil system. Protection proceedings should only be brought when 
necessary, and when they are brought careful consideration needs to be given as to 
which order to apply for. I f the parents have not co-operated with the social services 
then it is difficult to see how they could apply for a supervision order. The change 
would not be welcomed by the criminal justice system as it would cut off an avenue 
of investigation to all parties in the criminal justice system. Al l the cases concerning 
disclosure have always placed great emphasis on not erecting any barriers between the 
different branches of the judicature^^, and yet a revised rule 4.23 would do just that. 
In addition, revising rule 4.23 would offer no assistance where there are more than 
one defendant as the civil proceedings would still be heard first and during those 
proceedings the parents would have to disclose their defence to each other, possibly 
leaving themselves open to attack at the criminal trial. 
The arguments outlined above illustrate that there is no solution to the problem of 
tension existing between the civil and criminal systems. Tension exists now, but i f any 
change is made it is likely that the tension will intensify. 
'^ See for example, Re E C (Disclosure of Material) [19961 2 F.L.R. 725 at 733 
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If, therefore, the tension cannot be eradicated, what can the systems do to help 
alleviate it? One possibility would be for them to establish a better working 
relafionship. The tension can be at its strongest when one set of proceedings attempts 
to bind or interfere with the other. For the tension to be reduced, it will be necessary 
for the two systems to co-operate more. Where judges have knowledge of both arenas, 
it is possible that they will have a greater understanding of the dilemma each faces, 
and as such they may act more carefully. Lord Justice Thorpe''^ outlined a scheme 
whereby the same judge would preside over both the civil and criminal trials."" The 
hope for such a trial was that this would help reduce the tension as the judge could 
control the timetabling of each case to obtain the opfimum result. However, his 
Lordship noted that the senior judiciary were against the pilot''^ and in R v A"*^  the 
Court of Appeal quashed a conviction when a judge sat on both the civil and criminal 
trials. Waller L.J., giving judgment, described the decision of the judge to sit on both 
trials as "unfortunate."'*'' The decision in Rv A must have brought to an end the pilot 
scheme despite the fact that its aims were worthy. 
With the demise of the pilot scheme another solution must be proposed to help reduce 
the tension. There are two possibilities: restricting the type of judge who can hear 
child abuse trials to those who sit on both civil and criminal child abuse cases,"*^  or 
Thorpe, Rt.Hon. Lord Justice Crime in the Family [1995] Fam. Law 555 
Ibid., at 556 
Ibid. 
(1998) The Times, April 13 
Ibid. 
"•^  Although given the ruling inRvA not on the same trial. 
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increasing the awareness of the judiciary. It was seen that much of the tension is 
created because the two trials pull in different directions, and the judiciary may make 
decisions that exasperate this. I f the judiciary were made aware of the competing 
interests, and took into account the consequences for the other proceedings when 
making their rulings, this may well reduce the inevitable tension which exists between 
the two systems. 
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Chapter 6 
Reforming the Preliminaries of Testifying 
This chapter crifically assesses the proposals for reforming the preliminaries of 
testifying in a criminal case. There are four aspects to be examined; at what age a 
child ceases to become a "child", the competence of children, whether children should 
take the oath and the compellability of child witnesses. 
A G E 
When does a child cease to be a child? The age of majority in England and Wales is 
18, yet a child is criminally responsible at the age of 10.' Pigot recommended that the 
age limit should differ depending on the offence: 
in our opinion... the measures should apply in respect of violent offences to all 
witnesses under 14. Where sexual offences are concerned we believe there are 
obvious different and special considerations and we think the measures should 
be available to witnesses under 17^ 
The government accepted this recommendation and legislation set the age limits in 
that way.^ However, neither Pigot nor the government ever explained why there 
should be a difference between sexual abuse and physical abuse. Testifying in court is 
traumatic regardless of the type of offence, and yet the disparity created by the age 
difference appeared to suggest that a child who is the victim of physical abuse or 
neglect does not experience a similar level of trauma. The interdepartmental working 
group on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses recognised this inconsistency: 
Section 34, Crime and Disorder Act 1998 abolished the principle of doli incapax. Prior to this, 
there was a rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of 10 and 14 could not commit a 
crime. 
Pigot Report, para. 2.36 
See Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss. 32, 34 and Criminal Justice Act 1991, s.53 
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It is difficult to see why a young person under 17 should be regarded as less 
vulnerable in the case of offences of violence, compared with a sexual offence. 
Therefore the Working Group considers that a uniform age limit should be 
applied to the definition of a child... this uniform limit should be 17 years.'^ 
Section 16(l)(a) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 will enact this 
proposal. This change is to be welcomed because it was wrong to assume that a child 
who has been physically or emotionally abused would be less traumafised by court 
proceedings than someone who is sexually abused. Those who suffer abuse are all 
likely to be traumatised and as such all should be entitled to special measures. 
COMPETENCY 
To understand the rules conceming the competency of a child, it is necessary to 
examine whether children are capable of giving intelligible testimony. The starting 
point in any discussion is R v Wallwork^ where Lord Goddard C.J. said of a five-year-
old witness: 
The court deprecates the calling of a child of this age as a witness...The jury 
could not attach any value to the evidence of a child of five: it is ridiculous to 
suppose they could. ^ 
This case is no longer considered authority^ but can a child of such a young age give 
testimony that would be useful to a trial? 
R E L I A B I L I T Y O F C H I L D R E N 
The reason why very young children were considered to be incompetent was that they 
were deemed to be unreliable.^ Pigot noted that this was no longer true and that 
children were "«o more likely to give inaccurate or untruthful evidence than other 
^ Speaking up for Justice, para. 10.8 
^ (1958)42 Cr. App.R. 153 
Ibid, at p. 161 
The court expressly distanced itself from Wallwork in R v Z [1990] 2 Q.B. 355 
See Spencer & Flin (1993) pp. 46-50 
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witnesses. 
We must assess the arguments surrounding the reliability of children to determine 
whether they are any different, as witnesses, from adults. The main aspects that need 
to be considered are: 
(a) whether children have a propensity to lie or invent allegafions, 
(b) whether a child's aptitude at recalling events is less than an adults, 
(c) whether children are liable to suggestions 
Each of these aspects will be examined, albeit briefly, to help decide on the reliability 
of child witnesses. 
Lying 
One of the criticisms levelled at children is that they may lie. McEwan'° notes that 
this is a difficult question to answer: 
Whether or not children would invent stories of abuse of their own accord is 
[a] vexed question. The law has been influenced by an instinctive feeling that 
the temptation to lie might be stronger for children than adults. 
Spencer & Flin argue that children are unlikely to lie: 
One could...suggest that children are actually more truthful than adults. 
Certainly, the research on children's beliefs about court implies that children 
may be more cautious about lying in the witness box than adult witnesses. 
Spencer and Flin base this argument on their literature review of the psychology of 
children's reliability.'^ The literature they discuss does appear to show that there is 
' Pigot Report, para. 5.10 ^ , , 
'0 McEwan, J. (1992) Evidence and the Adversarial Process Blackstone Press, London. 
" Ibid., at 120 
'2 Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 329 
" See Ibid., pp. 284-335 
-68 -
now a greater understanding as to the reliability of children and that this has led to a 
belief that children may be reliable. That is not to say, however, that there is complete 
agreement in this area, as clearly there is not and controversy remains. For example, 
there are claims that children do not invent a false allegation of abuse''' and yet the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists disagree with this contention.'^ 
The conflict is likely to continue but Birch'^ makes the important point that even i f 
children do lie, that is not a characteristic which only children possess: 
[it is pointed out] that witnesses of all ages may be prone to lying and 
deliberate self-delusion: an adult's superior knowledge of how he is supposed 
to behave in court is no guarantee of moral behaviour. '^ 
This is most salient and in the absence of definitive evidence to show that children are 
more likely to lie than adults, children's evidence should be heard. 
Recalling Events 
Another criticism is that children cannot recall past events and that their memories 
may fade with time. McEwan argues: 
Unprompted, children of under 10 recall five or six times less than adults and 
furnish accounts which are more fragmentary and selective than older 
children or adults^^ 
although she recognises this may not necessarily be the child's fault: 
Very young children can show impressive levels of recall about past 
experiences. Whether lay persons can understand their descriptions is another 
matter. '^ 
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What McEwan appears to suggest is that children can recall events but in their own 
way. An adult may not understand their recollections but they are present. Birch 
suggests: 
a child who can find a context is likely to be a no less accurate witness than an 
adult counterpart, and may well be better. 
Placing acts into a context has long been recognised as necessary. Sattar and Bull^' 
argue advocates should alter their terminology: 
For example, if a date needs to be referred to, the date should be described in 
terms of relevant dates to the child such as 'before Christmas', 'after your 
birthday'... Similarly, when referring to a specific day of the week, the child 
could be asked 'was it a school day?', 'what was on the television that 
night...'^^ 
I f this is correct, then so long as advocates adapt their language this would seem to be 
no bar to hearing the evidence of a child. It would be unrealistic to expect a child to 
have to testify in an adult way and yet there is research to suggest this is exactly what 
is expected: 
The system of examination and cross-examination... [is] specifically designed 
to make it impossible for all but the remarkably robust of children to excel.^^ 
In addition to this problem with their language skills, there is also concern as to how 
delay operates on a child's ability to recall events. Spencer & Flin believe that 
although there is a problem, it is not child specific: 
Both adults' and children's memories are highly sensitive to the passage of 
time. Although some knowledge and experiences are stored for decades, a 
great deal of information is lost or becomes inaccessible due to decay or 
interference. 
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McEwan, however, disagrees: 
Children are quicker to forget than adults, and so the younger they are, the 
faster the memory fades... 
Whichever theory is correct, it could be argued that this may well become less of a 
problem because of the proposal for all of a child's testimony to be taken pre-trial.'^^ 
However it is unlikely that in all cases this procedure will be used and so the debate 
will continue. Given that there is no evidence to suggest that children lie to cover 
"gaps" in their memory, there would appear no reason to argue that a delay before 
trial should prevent a child from testifying. 
Suggestibility 
The last main objection to the reliability of children's evidence is that children may be 
more suggestible than aduhs. 
Lawyers seem to believe that children are particularly suggestible witnesses, 
in the sense that their testimony can easily become distorted by leading 
questions or by misinformation introduced deliberately or unwittingly during 
an interview. 
McEwan suggests: 
Children are easier to lead over issues they regard as peripheral, where there 
has been a lapse of time, and where they regard the interviewer as 
authoritative.^^ 
but in a later publication she stressed that this could be limited solely to peripheral 
matters: 
more depends upon the strength of the impression created by the event than 
the child's age; it is much harder to get a child to accept 'planted' information 
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where he or she had central as opposed to peripheral involvement in it.^^ 
This is an interesting point. In effect McEwan is stating that a child may be led on 
matters which they consider to be peripheral but i f the matter is fundamental they 
would appear less likely to be led. Yet realistically any witness can be led to say 
something they did not want to say - some suggest that this is the very purpose of 
cross-examination.^^ Some may argue that the danger is not just from advocates 
asking leading questions but from people "coaching" the witness. Spencer & Flin 
argue that although there is clear evidence that children can be coached, it happens 
only rarely.^' 
Are children reliable? 
It can be seen from the above that there is conflict as to whether or not a child can be 
reliable. It is a difficuh decision to make and rather unsurprisingly academics are 
divided as to what it means. McEwan argues that: 
it appears that serious risk could attach to the admission of evidence from 
children below the ages of seven or eight, although the degree of that risk 
varies accordingly to the nature of the information sought. 
but McEwan has always called for the ending of the adversarial approach to children's 
testimony^^ and perhaps her conclusions are intended to strengthen that argument. 
Spencer & Flin state: 
We think it is safe to say two things. First, the reliability of children's evidence 
depends crucially on how they are questioned. Secondly, if this has been done 
properly, there is no reason why their evidence should not be regarded as 
competent and evaluated by the court like that of any other witness.^ 
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which supports a previous argument of Birch: 
the court's time would be better taken up in sifting the testimony of all 
witnesses in the light of what is now known [about reliability] rather than in 
removing young witnesses from the courtroom altogether. 
Their argument is that everyone knows the difficulties that might arise in relation to 
children's evidence, but that it would be wrong to stop listening to their evidence. It 
has been seen that even very young children can give testimony so their evidence 
should be heard so long as they are fit to be witnesses. Where their evidence is 
unreliable it is open to the court to exclude it i f they so wish.^^ 
L A W OF COMPETENCE 
Secfion 52(1), Criminal Justice Act 1991 repealed the earlier law of competence^^ 
stating: 
...the power of the court in any criminal proceedings to determine that a 
particular person is not competent to give evidence shall apply to children of 
tender years as it applies to other persons. 
This is rather an unhelpful statement as it gives no clue as to what the competency 
requirement is, other than to state that any special requirement for children is 
abolished. Birch argued that the posifion under section 52 is: 
The court no longer has a duty to inquire into the competence of child 
witnesses as a class, but retains the power to declare an individual child 
incompetent. 
The Court of Appeal in R v Hampshire^^ confirmed that this is the position.''^ 
However in that case the Court did not define what the competency requirement was 
Birch (1992) p. 265 
Exercising their discretion under s.78, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
" Set out in s.38(l), Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
Birch (1992) p. 268 
" [1995]3 W.L.R. 260 
See Ibid., at 265 
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other than to say that a judge may rule a child incompetent because '''the child is very 
young or has difficulty in expression or understanding."'^^ The Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 inserted a new sub-section into the Criminal Justice Act 1988''^  
which says: 
A child's evidence shall be received unless it appears to the court that the 
child is incapable of giving intelligible testimony. 
Murphy'*'* is fiercely critical of this change as he believes it waters down the concept 
of truthfulness: 
Subsection 2A requires the court to accept the evidence unless the child is 
incapable of giving 'intelligible testimony', which appears to be a less 
stringent test than ascertaining whether or not the child understands the duty 
to speak the truth. A child may be intelligible and, at the same time, appear to 
the court to lack that understanding.'*^ 
Murphy is concerned that there is no need to decide whether a child is capable of 
distinguishing between truth and fiction which was often a fundamental part of the 
competence assessment.'*^ Childs"^ argues, however, truth and competency are 
separate: 
Intelligibility is, of course, not necessarily connected to truthfulness; that, one 
presumes, is a matter for the jury to assess for themselves when deciding what 
weight to give the testimony.'*^ 
What Childs argues is correct - whether a witness is telling the truth is clearly a 
matter of fact for the jury - but Murphy's point goes further than that. It is not 
whether a child is lying which concerns competence, but whether the child is capable 
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of telling the truth, i.e. differentiating between truth and lies. In R v P''^  the Court of 
Appeal stated that although the test for competency was whether they could give 
intelligible tesfimony, the ability to differentiate between truth and fiction was an 
inherent part of that test. Pigot recommended that the competence requirement should 
be abolished^° although he recommended that a judge should impress upon the child 
the importance of telling the truth. He suggested a model direction: 
Tell us all you can remember of what happened. Don Y make anything up or 
leave anything out. This is very important. ^  
The use of such a caution is a useful idea and has received judicial approval. 
However impressing upon a child the need to tell the truth is of no use i f the child 
does not understand the difference between truth and lie. This is the flaw in the 
current system and it is submitted that the judge should be required to assess whether 
the child understands this difference. 
Section 50 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 will reform the law 
of competence. The relevant parts of this section are: 
(1) At every stage in criminal proceedings all persons are (whatever their 
age) competent to give evidence. 
(3) A person is not competent to give evidence in criminal proceedings i f it 
appears to the court that he is not able to -
(a) understand questions put to him as a witness; and 
(b) give answers to them which can be understood. 
49 
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This section does not make any real changes to the existing rules. Sub-section (1) 
confirms that not only has the test for competence been abolished, but that the simple 
fact of age cannot stop a child from being competent. This had been stated previously 
by the Court of Appeal in D.P.P. v M^^ In that case a five-year-old girl was ruled to be 
incompetent by age alone. The Court of Appeal said this was not a valid ruling in law 
but noted age could be relevant: 
The extreme youth of the complainant was a matter which properly raised 
concern as to whether she was competent to give evidence. What it did not do 
was to demonstrate, of itself, that she was not. 
Sub-section (1) has ensured that this position remains. Sub-section (3), in effect, 
enacts the first half of R v D^^ which decided that the test of competence was whether 
the child could understand questions and give intelligible replies. 
The section is, however, completely silent as to the need to understand the difference 
between truth and lie and this is a regrettable omission. Given that the warning 
approved of in Hampshire^^ would only partially cure this omission since if, the child 
does not understand the difference between truth and fiction," a direction to tell the 
truth is meaningless. 
OATH 
CO 
Where a person does testify, he or she must usually give their evidence on oath. 
However section 52(1), Criminal Justice Act 1991 inserted a new section into the 
" [1997]2 AIIE.R. 749 
54 Ibid., at 754 per Phillips L.J. 
op.cit. 
" op.cit. 
" See Supra Fn. 45 and associated main body text 
See Murphy (1995) p. 431 
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Criminal Justice Act 1988^^ which states: 
(1) A child's evidence in criminal proceedings shall be given unsworn. 
(2) A deposifion of a child's unsworn evidence may be taken for the 
purposes of criminal proceedings as i f that evidence had been given on 
oath. 
(3) In this section 'child' means a person under 14 years of age. 
Thus the current position is that a child under the age of 14 gives evidence unsworn 
but a child over that age gives sworn evidence. This section was enacted to solve a 
difficulty which arose under previous legislation. That legislation^" called for the 
judge to decide whether a child was capable of understanding the purpose of an 
oath.^' Presumably it was thought that there could be children who may be competent 
yet not fully appreciate the oath. 
Section 52 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act keeps the age limit of 14 
but links it to a ''significant appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion."^^ However 
the section continues by stating that there is a rebuttable presumption that a person 
who has attained the age of 14 and who is competent, has sufficient appreciation of 
the solemnity. This can be rebutted by a party adducing evidence showing - on the 
balance of probabilities - that the child does not have this appreciation. 
It could be argued that this section is re-establishing a need to differenfiate between 
truth and lie for a child to be capable of testifying. I f this is the position then why not 
put it in the test for competence rather than the obligation to take the oath? 
Section 33A 
°^ s.38(l). Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
See Spencer & Flin (1993) pp. 48-51 
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" Section 52(2)(b) 
Additionally, it does not say what should happen i f the person cannot differentiate 
between truth and lie. Presumably they cannot take the oath but this does not mean 
their evidence will not be heard, indeed the reverse is true because section 53 
specifically permits unsworn testimony to be heard. 
It is neither new nor controversial to suggest that the evidence of a child under the age 
of 14 should be received without the need for the witness to take the oath. However, 
this section goes beyond this and states the that evidence of a child who is over the 
age of 14 and who does not understand the difference between truth and lie should 
still be heard. Indeed, by removing the ability to differentiate between truth and lie 
from the test of competence and placing it in the test for taking the oath, this creates 
the situation whereby the evidence of a child of any age who does not understand the 
difference between truth and fiction will still be heard. It could be argued that this 
section is merely following the proposition put forward by Childs - that competence 
and truth are separate, and that it is for the jury to decide whether a witness is telling 
the truth '^^  - but this would be a misrepresentation. Although it would be true to say 
that one can never be sure that witnesses tell the truth, and that a jury is normally 
required to decide whether a person is telling the truth or not, this is not the same 
issue as deciding whether a child is capable of telling the truth. Where a child simply 
does not comprehend the difference between truth and lie it is difficult to see how this 
evidence could be considered valid. Where the witness is also the victim and 
accordingly much of their evidence is likely to be contested, it would be highly 
prejudicial to allow this evidence to be heard. Indeed, it is submitted that it would be 
so prejudicial that its probative value would be far diminished and i f the statute fails 
" See Fn 48 above 
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to prevent its introduction, trial judges should exercise their powers under section 78, 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to rule it inadmissible. 
However a more welcome change is introduced by section 53(5) of the Act. This 
section states that no appeal shall lie on the fact that a witness should have taken the 
oath but did not. This expressly overrules the earlier case ofRvSharman.^" This case 
concerned the sexual abuse of a girl. At the age of 13 the victim made a 
videorecording for the purposes of S.32A, Criminal Justice Act 1988. At the time of 
trial she was 14. By the leave of the court she gave additional live examination-in-
chief followed by cross-examination. She was never asked to take the oath or affirm. 
The defendant was convicted and appealed on the basis that the evidence was 
inadmissible since she should have been sworn. The Court of Appeal ordered a re-trial 
saying that evidence not given on oath - when it should have been - is effectively not 
evidence.This judgment was technically correct but manifestly harsh. Unsworn 
evidence is treated the same as sworn evidence^^ and a direct lie is punished in a way 
similar to that of pe r ju ry .By ordering a re-trial the court has forced the child victim 
to go through the trauma of testifying again. By this time a considerable gap will have 
arisen since the commissioning of the offence which would substantially increase 
the pressure and trauma suffered.Section 53(5) will ensure that this situation is not 
repeated. It is unlikely to make any significant difference to the defence because of 
the rule that the evidence is to be treated the same: it is a matter for the jury to decide 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
[1998] 1 F.L.R. 785 
See Ibid, at 788 
S.33A, Criminal Justice Act 1988 and see section 53(3), Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
s.38(2), Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and see section 54, Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 
As there would have been the original delay between charge and trial. There would then be an 
additional delay between conviction and appeal, and then a further delay between appeal and re-
trial. 
See chapter 3 for the effect of delay on a child victim. 
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what weight to put on the evidence. 
A final point should be made in relation to untruthful unsworn evidence. Section 
54(2) makes it an offence for a witness to ''wilfully give false evidence" when 
testifying in the absence of the oath. The offence is triable summarily only and is 
punishable by six months imprisonment and/or a £1,000 fine.^° Given that the age of 
criminal responsibility is 10, a child under that age who wilfully lies would be subject 
to no penalty. 
COMPELLABILITY OF A CHILD VICTIM 
Separate from, although allied to, the issue of competence is compellability. Murphy 
sets out the general principle of compellability: 
Apart from the accused and the accused's spouse in criminal cases, the 
general rule [is] that all competent witnesses are compellable to give 
evidence. 
Establishing the problem 
When one says that a witness is compellable it means that the witness can be 
summoned to court to give testimony. There is the ultimate sanction of committal for 
contempt to back up this witness summons i f the witness fails to appear. This 
applies equally to children although Spencer & Flin note that for certain children this 
is a theoretical possibility rather than one used in practice: 
...a witness is only "compellable" in the limited sense, that, once brought to 
court, his refusal to answer questions is punishable as a criminal offence. If 
the child is below the age of criminal responsibility....no sanction exists to 
punish his refusal.^^ 
™ When the witness is under 14 the maximum penalty is a £250 fine. See section 54(3) 
" Ibid., at 431 
See, Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965, ss. 3 and 4. 
" Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 72 
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This is a good point although its continuing relevance could be questioned because 
since the quote pre-dated the abolition of the presumption of doli incapax. '^' It can be 
argued that the abolition of this presumption ensured that the age of criminal 
responsibility was reduced to 10^ ^ but Walker''^ argues it is not that simple. He argues 
that all S.34 did was to abolish the presumption of doli incapax and it therefore 
follows that the substantive defence remains.This, it is submitted, must be correct: 
the statute merely talks about abolishing the presumption of doli incapax and not of 
abolishing the defence. I f the defence continues to exist then this may mean that a 
child victim over the age of 10 yet under the age of 14 - of which there are many^^ -
may not, in certain circumstances, be convicted of the crime of contempt. 
Without the presumption, the defence would have to raise some evidence that the 
child could not differentiate between right and v^ong^^ and once that evidence has 
been raised, it would be for the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that 
the child could, in fact, make such a distinction.^" 
In all probability, however, it will be quite rare for the defence to seek to rely on doli 
incapax. This means that in the majority of situations, a child over the age of 10 will 
be criminally liable for a failure to testify. 
Abolished by s.34. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
" See Home Office Press Release 375/98: New Powers to Tackle Youth Crime Available from 
today., para. 18. 
Walker. N. The end of an old song? (1999) 149 N.L.J. 64 
" Ibid. 
The research of Plotnikoff & Woolfson showed that 64% of victims were over the age of 10 (See 
Plotnikoff & Woolfson (1995) p. 17) and the CPS Inspectorate found that 68% were above that 
age. (See Thematic Review 1/98, p.49) 
Which is the test for this defence: see Murphy, P. (ed)(1997) Blackstone's Criminal Practice 
Blackstone Press. London, para. F3.32 
*° For more details on the burden of proof in relation to defences, see Dennis, l.H. (1999) The Law 
of Evidence Sweet & Maxwell. London, pp. 347-348. 
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It may be argued that no court would force a child to testify or punish a child for a 
failure to testify but Spencer & Flin describe a case where a 15 year-old boy was 
Q 1 
conditionally discharged after refusing to testify. Although it could be argued that a 
conditional discharge is, in effect, no punishment^^ it is still a conviction. The child 
would have a criminal conviction for the rest of his life, and although the conviction 
would normally become automatically spent there are occasions when even spent 
convictions count. Can it be right for the courts to demand that a child testify and 
label that child a criminal i f he does not? The courts have traditionally said that a 
child has a duty to testify: 
Children...are citizens owing duties to society as a whole (including other 
children) which are appropriate to their age and under standing... it is not for 
the wardship court... to use that jurisdiction to interfere with the performance 
by the criminal courts of their lawful duties.^^ 
Re R concerned a ward of court but the dicta of the Master of the Rolls must apply to 
children generally. It could be argued that this is manifestiy harsh. Children do not 
have all the rights that adult members of society are entitled to so why should they 
owe the same duties? One possible answer is that they are entitled to the fundamental 
right of protection and as such society should be able to demand they achieve 
protection by testifying. 
Pigot thought that compellability for children should be abolished 
JVe have concluded that children who come within the ambit of our 
Bl Spencer & Flin (1993) p.72 and see Independent (1992) March, 29 
See the comments of Clarkson & Keating (1998) Criminal Law: Text and Materials 4th Ed. Sweet 
& Maxwell. London., p.89 
Under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, a conditional discharge is rehabilitated when it 
lapses or one year after being imposed, whichever is the longer. See Murphy (1997) para E21.3 
See the schedules to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. For example, court proceedings, 
jobs involving the law, work with children etc. 
Re R (Minors)(Wardship: Criminal Proceedings) [1991] 2 All E.R. 193 at 198 per Lord 
Donaldson M.R. 
For example the right to vote 
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proposals...ought never be required to appear in public as witnesses in the 
Crown Court, whether in open court or protected by screens or closed circuit 
television, unless they wish to do so. 
This proposal was not taken up by the government but since that time academics have 
called for it to be implemented: 
The current practice of suggesting to already traumatised children that it is 
their duty to relive their experiences in court...is totally out of keeping with the 
views of the Pigot committee and difficult to justify. Until...better 
arrangements can be made to ensure that acting as witnesses in court is less 
traumatic, they should not be forced to give evidence. 
This call was repeated by Sir William Utting^^ but the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act which has reformed many aspects of the law relating to the testimony of 
young persons and vulnerable witnesses' does not contain a section implementing it. 
However, should compellability be abolished? 
It is clear that abolishing compellability would have the effect of not forcing a child to 
testify. Given that children find the process stressful it could be argued that forcing 
the child is adding an extra degree of stress onto the child. The child victim is usually 
the main prosecution witness so i f the child refuses to testify, the case may collapse. 
Indeed, i f compellability were removed the CPS would, presumably, have to contact 
the child at an early stage to ask whether they would be prepared to testify.'" Even i f 
the child said yes at that stage, it would be open to him to say no at any stage. At that 
point counsel would need to review the decision to proceed. I f compellability were to 
be abolished it would perhaps be necessary to redraft the Code for Crown Prosecutors 
to ensure that proceedings are not dragged on in the hope of obtaining a plea bargain'' 
" Pigot Report, para 2.26 
Fortin(l998)p. 428 
Utting, Sir William (1997) People Like Us Department of Health. London., para 20.17 
'° See chapter 2 for more information on the decision to prosecute. 
" i.e. Waiting to the day of trial and suggesting to the defence that the prosecution would be 
prepared to accept a plea of guilt to a lesser charge. 
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as this would not be an ethical method of obtaining a conviction.^^ 
However does the fact that it may cause stress to the child justify removing 
compellability. Ashworth has argued that crimes of violence and sex are not just 
crimes against the victim but also crimes against society.^ ^ I f this is correct then 
should society not be justified in seeking the punishment of one who breaks their 
rules? In a previous publication^'* I argued that society would not demand a child is 
subjected to harm for the sake of vengeance.^ ^ However that applied to the actual 
sentence and not to the decision as to whether to proceed with a prosecution. It could 
be argued that society is willing to show compassion as to a sentence i f it will help a 
child, but they may be more reluctant to see an offender go unpunished. Such an 
approach would follow the public retributive model for criminal justice: 
it is asserted that there is a public model for vengeance. It is argued that there 
is an instinctive demand which is active in every human being to retaliate -
just as an animal strikes back with hate at those who attack it.^^ 
Such an approach is becoming more popular; Clarkson & Keating argue that the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 is based on this theory.^^ This does not just apply to 
sentencing but also to a trial. In the trial of Peter Sutcliffe - "the Yorkshire Ripper" -
the judge refused to accept a manslaughter plea (acceptable to the prosecution) and 
demanded a trial for murder.'^ Manslaughter carries the same maximum sentence as 
murder^' so Clarkson & Keating ask the question why did the judge do this? 
See McConville and Mirsh Redefining and Structuring Guilt in Systematic Terms: The Royal 
Commission's Recommendations Regarding Guilty Pleas in McConville and Briges (1994) 
Criminal Justice Under Stress Edward Elgar Publishing. London. 264 at 271 
" Ashworth. A. Punishment and Compensation: Victims. Offenders and the State (1986) 6 O.J.L.S. 
86 
Gillespie, A. A. Victims and Sentencing (1998) 148 N.L.J. 1263 
Ibid., at 1265 
Clarkson & Keating (1998) p.27 
" Ibid., at 28 
Ibid., at 34 
Namely life imprisonment 
- 8 4 -
99 
Presumably he believed that society has the right to demand a person is tried for an 
offence appropriate to his actions. I f we apply this to child abuse trials, it could be 
argued that society could demand that an alleged perpetrator is tried: which would 
mean a child could be compelled to testify. 
Hearsay 
Could there be an alternative to compelling a child to testify however? McEwan'°° 
argues that section 23, Criminal Justice Act 1988 could be used: 
The answer could lie in the existing, but in this context comparatively 
neglected, rules for the admissibility of documentary hearsay evidence... 
recently entertained... in the criminal sphere. 
Section 23 permits hearsay evidence to be permitted in certain circumstances. The 
main circumstance applicable here is where the person does not give oral evidence 
through fear.'°^ Spencer & Flin believe that "fear" would include a fear of 
testifying,however Zuckerman'"'' notes the section was: 
designed to discourage intimidation of prosecution witnesses by the accused 
or his henchmen. '"^ 
I f this was the reason for implementing section 23(3) then it would appear that 
McEwan and Spencer & Flin's arguments would extend the scope of this section, 
possibly too far. However, that is not to say that the section could not be amended to 
permit the videorecorded interview of a child who is too traumatised to testify in 
court. This could be coupled with a requirement to produce medical evidence that the 
"'° McEwan, J. Documentary Hearsay Evidence - Refuge for the Vulnerable Witness? [1989] Crim 
L.R. 629 
Ibid, 
102 Section 23(3) 
'"^  Spencer & Flin (1993) p.l35 
Zuckerman, A. A. S. (1992) The Principles of Criminal Evidence Clarendon Law. London 
'"^  Ibid.,p.219 
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child would suffer significant harm i f forced to testify. However would this be a 
suitable alternative? 
The most obvious disadvantage that the use of s.23 would bring is that it would not be 
possible to cross-examine the child. Murphy uses this to criticise the section: 
it remains a legitimate concern in any criminal case that oral evidence, which 
can be tested by cross-examination before the tribunal of fact, should not be 
replaced by documentary evidence. 
However McEwan notes that cross-examination is not necessarily the most suitable 
alternative: 
it is not clear why it is impossible to get across by other means to the jury that 
the absent witness may have had motives for lying or be generally unreliable. 
The traditional view is that cross-examination is an instrument for the truth; 
another is that it merely demonstrates the power of a skilful cross-examiner to 
make an honest witness appear at best confused and at worst a liar. "^^ 
McEwan is assuming that in many cross-examinations the sole purpose is to suggest 
that the witness is lying. She suggests that there are more appropriate ways of making 
such a suggestion to the jury. Her point that the purpose of cross-examination is to 
confuse the witness is a good one and others have commented how the use of adult 
language and reference to intricate details can easily confuse a child and lead to their 
credibility being reduced. However not all cross-examination follows this format: 
there may be legitimate reasons why cross-examination is necessary. 
The fact that the information in the document is relevant, however, is not enough for it 
to become automatically admissible. Section 26 states that where a statement is 
admissible under section 23 or 24 and has been made for the purpose of criminal 
Murphy, P. (1995) p.293 
'°' McEwan (1989) p.631 
See in particular: Sattar G, and Bull, R. Child Witnesses in Court: Psycho-legal Issues (1996) S.J. 
4 at 5. and Butler, T. Spare the Child [1993] Police Review (Dec) p. 14 
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proceedings, the court must grant leave for the evidence to be admitted. This is not a 
mere discretion but an active analysis of whether it would be "in the interests of 
justice" for such evidence to be admi t ted .Murphy argues that where some 
testimony has been given""' this evidence should not be admitted: 
The weight of a hearsay statement must be affected by the fact that the witness 
has already given some oral evidence. There is a corresponding difficulty 
facing the other side in attempting to contravert the evidence. It is submitted 
that in such a case, the court should be ready to exclude the hearsay evidence 
in the exercise of its discretion.''' 
McEwan argues that i f the facts contained in the statement are relevant then: 
the loss of the opportunity to cross-examine... is a disadvantage [but] this may 
appear... to be of marginal importance when set against the relevance of the 
facts stated.^ 
I f McEwan is correct then an amended section 23 would permit the video-evidence of 
a child - who would be harmed by testifying at trial - to be placed before the jury yet 
the defence would not have the opportunity to test that evidence. Following the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 a major factor to take into account would be 
whether it is possible to amend s.23, or whether this would fall foul of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
In Unterpertinger v Austria"^ the European Court of Human Rights held that where 
the prosecution case is composed "mainly" of statements by persons whom the 
defence cannot cross-examine, this was a breach of Articles 6 ( 1 ) ' a n d 6(3)(d)."^ 
See Murphy (1997) paras F16.15, F16.16 
And a pre-recorded video admitted under S.32A, Criminal Justice Act 1988 must surely be 
regarded as testimony. 
"' Murphy (1995) p.289 
McEwan (1989) p.640 
(1986) 13 E.H.R.R. 175 
Right to public trial 
'" Right to examine witnesses 
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This was confirmed by the later case of Liidi v Switzerland"^ which stated that i f such 
statements composed a "significant" part of the prosecution. Article 6 would be 
breached. 
Given that this is the situation it is unlikely that section 23 could be amended in a 
manner compliant with the Convention. In child abuse trials it is submitted that it 
would be rare for the pre-recorded video not to form a significant part of the 
prosecution case. As such any application to admit such evidence under s.23 would 
contravene Article 6 and so should be refused. 
S.80 P A C E 1984 
It could be argued that compellability could be abolished by amending section 80, 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Section 80 states that the spouse of a 
defendant is not compellable as a witness for the prosecution. Zuckerman states that 
the justification for this was that forcing a spouse to testify would cause marital 
discord."'' I f this is correct, then could it not be argued that forcing a child to testify 
would cause family turmoil? The argument is somewhat weaker when s.80(3) is taken 
into account which states that i f the offence for which the spouse is to be called 
against the defendant, is one of sex or violence against a child, the spouse is 
compellable. I f the legislature believed that protecting children was important enough 
to justify an exception to the long-established rule that a spouse was not 
compellable"^ it is unlikely that an offence against a child would justify abolishing 
compellability for the child. 
A 238 (1992) 
See Zuckerman (1992) p. 290 
The rule was enshrined in the common law prior to s.80 being enacted. See Zuci<erman (1992) 
pp.287-289 
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Even i f this was not the case, Zuckerman argues that exceptions to compellability 
should not be permitted: 
One may perhaps be able to defend a failure to initiate a complaint but it 
could hardly be maintained that without incriminating evidence from the 
court, once the accused has been charged, [this] is morally acceptable, 
especially where the offence is a grave one. "^ 
Zuckerman is stating that a victim should perhaps have the right to stop an 
investigation beginning, but that once court proceedings have begun it is for all 
members of society to co-operate. Fortin, however, argues that the child's welfare 
should be taken into account: 
...the interests of child witnesses are too often sacrificed to protecting the 
public against child abusers, with little tangible benefit to the children 
themselves. 
This position assumes that the child should play a significant role in the proceedings: 
that the victim is not a mere witness but that the criminal justice system should be 
based around the victim and the defendant. This is a significant step from the 
traditional role of the system. Clarkson & Keating state that the system could operate 
on a personal retributive method.'^' This would be where the system is based upon the 
need to help the victim gain revenge for the crime committed against them.'^^ On that 
basis i f a victim did not wish to seek retribution (ie by not testifying) this would be 
the end of the legal proceedings. 
This is in direct contrast to the conventional theory highlighted by Zuckerman above, 
which supports the argument that a crime is an action against society and that society 
has the right to demand retribution. This demand would also mean they would have 
Ibid., at 291-292 
Fortin (1998) p. 428 
Clarkson & Keating (1998) p. 26 
'^ ^ Ibid, at p. 27 
89 
the right to compel a person (including a child) testifies. 
The conventional theory is supported by the effects of victims not testifying. I f the 
child does not testify then it is highly unlikely that the case can proceed. Without a 
prosecution there can be no conviction and this could have an effect on child 
protection. A conviction will label the offender a Schedule I offender'^^ or, i f 
appropriate, he will be required to register under the Sex Offenders Act 1997. The use 
of these Acts can help local authorities track an offender, whereas it has recently been 
held that local authorities do not have a similar ability with regard to suspected abuse. 
In Re L (Sexual Abuse: Disclosure)'^'' the Court of Appeal stated that neither section 
17 nor section 47 of the Children Act 1989 places upon a local authority a duty to 
inform another authority about a person suspected of abusing children. Butler-Sloss 
L.J. said: 
/ have great sympathy with the judge's wish to protect other children who may 
be at risk from a man whom he has found to be an abuser. But it is important 
to recognise that Parliament has not thought it appropriate to include cases of 
this nature... within the statutory and regulatory framework under which there 
is now widespread dissemination of information specifically for the protection 
ofchildren.^^^ 
This case can be criticised for a number of reasons but it sets a precedent by which 
disclosure can realistically only take place after a conviction. I f this is correct then 
children can only be protected once a conviction has been obtained.'^^ This 
strengthens the argument that society has the right to seek a conviction where 
appropriate which means society can demand the compelling of a child to testify. 
'^ ^ Schedule I, Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
[1999] 1 W.L.R. 299 
Ibid., at 305 
'^ ^ Given that the majority of abuse is intrafamilial, it is unlikely that the provision contained in the 
Protection of Children Act 1999 would be of any assistance in situations such as this. 
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The issue of the compellability of a child is a thorny one. It is quite clear that forcing a 
child to testify can cause harm to the child. This harm has led many to call for 
compellability to be removed. However there are reasons why it should stay, not least 
that society has the right to see a person convicted. 
Fortin, Spencer & Flin and McEwan want what is best for the child but ultimately the 
child can only be one part of the criminal justice system. The fauh is not with 
compellability but with the process of testifying. I f it were not for the fact that the 
current approach to cross-examination causes harm, compellability would be fine. It is 
presumably for this reason that Fortin only gave a conditional call for compellability 
to be removed'^^ - for it to be removed until better arrangement are made. 
However this failure by society to make testimony less harmful cannot by itself justify 
the ending of compellability. Vulnerable members of society need protection and 
society needs to see those who breach its rules caught and tried. Without 
compellability neither of these tasks are possible. 
See Fortin (1998) p.428 and see Supra Fn 88 and associated text. 
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Chapter 7 
The Testimony of a Child 
We now turn to the question of child testimony. The testimony of witnesses is vital to 
the outcome of a trial. In child abuse cases, the main witness wil l , where the child is 
old enough, be the child itself Controversy exists over how a child should give his 
testimony in an adult court. There appears to be a consensus that special procedures 
are required to help the child, but considerable disagreement over what these special 
procedures should be. We must first, therefore, illustrate how a child testifies under 
the present law, and show why this is unsatisfactory; then critically examine the 
proposals put forward in recent legislation to help a child testify in an aduh court. The 
analysis of these reforms will test whether they will not only help the child, but do so 
without harming the interests of justice, or undermining the defendant's rights to due 
process. 
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF 
Traditionally the first testimony a person will give is his or her examination-in-chief 
This is where the witness gives evidence on behalf of the party that called him. Where 
the witness is a child there are two possible ways for their examination-in-chief to be 
taken: 
(1) the traditional 'live' examination-in-chief 
(2) through a pre-recorded video interview 
These two options wil l be examined in order to see whether they are adequate in 
presenting the child's testimony. 
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P R E - R E C O R D E D I N T E R V I E W 
Section 32A, Criminal Justice Act 1988' permits a court to allow a pre-recorded video 
interview to be admitted as the examination-in-chief The government had previously 
set up an Advisory Group on Video Evidence under the chair of H.H.J. Pigot Q.C. 
Their report recommended that pre-trial videos be permitted.'^ They argued that: 
most children are disturbed to a greater extent by giving evidence in 
court...these effects are generally agreed to be peculiarly injurious and very 
often long lasting...The admissibility of video-recorded interviews would 
relieve some of these pressures.^ 
Thus pre-trial testimony can be taken, but does it work and how often is it used? To 
decide whether the pre-recorded interview is helpful to the child victim it is necessary 
to examine closely the process of admitting such a tape as evidence. 
Who decides to make a tape and when? 
The first decision must be whether to make a tape, but who makes this decision? The 
Memorandum of Good Practice was issued: 
to help those making a video recording of an interview with a child witness 
where it is intended that the result should be acceptable in criminal 
proceedings.'^ 
Pigot had suggested that a Code of Practice, similar to those contained in the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, should be drafted^ but the Memorandum is not such 
a code: 
The guidance is voluntary only, not having the binding statutory force of the 
kinds of Codes of Practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence 
As inserted by s.54, Criminal Justice Act 1991 
See Recommendation 1 of the Pigot report 
Ibid., paras 2.10-2.11 
Memorandum, p.l 
Pigot report, para. 4.8 
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Act.^ 
that said, however, the Memorandum is an important document and the courts have 
suggested that departure should be made from it only rarely.^ 
The Memorandum states that the decision to make a video, and indeed the actual 
making of the video, should follow the framework of inter-agency co-operation set 
out in Working Together. That is to say, all professionals - but especially the police 
and the social services - should co-operate on the making of a video and the decision 
should be a joint one. In the early years of video evidence, there was often a tension 
between the local authority and the police because most forces did not have an 
established relationship with other agencies.^ This appears to have been resolved and 
a recent report suggested that inter-agency co-operation had improved.'° 
The timing of the video is also controversial. Pigot stated that the video should be 
made as soon as possible: 
We recognise that several days may elapse after the initial complaint before 
an interview can be arranged but we do not think longer delays should be 
tolerated.'' 
The Memorandum is less precise: 
The video recorded interview which is to be admissible in court should 
broadly equate with a witness statement of the first detailed account given to 
the police and should be conducted as soon as is practicable. Sufficient time 
must, however, be allowed for proper inter-agency consultation and 
planning...^'^ 
10 
11 
12 
McEwan, J. Where the prosecution witness is a child: the Memorandum of Good Practice (1993) 
5 J.C.L. 16 
R v Naylor (1995) The Times, February 8 
See the Memorandum, p. 2 
See Davis and Wilson. The videotaping of children's evidence: issues of research and practice 
[1994] R C . L . B . 68 
Thematic Review 1/98 The Inspectorate's report on cases involving child witnesses CPS. London. 
Pigot Report, para 4.10 
Memorandum, para 1.7 
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It is submitted that the approach adopted by the Memorandum is the correct one. 
Although the video should be made as soon as possible, i f it is made prior to 
consultation and planning it is likely to be worthless and repeat videos would be 
necessary, something which could prejudice the welfare of the child or lead to the tape 
being declared inadmissible.'^ 
Conducting the Interview 
The Memorandum sets out guidance on how the interviewer should conduct the 
interview. Such guidance, i f followed, should hopefully lead to an acceptable video. 
However i f the interview does not follow the Memorandum this will not, by itself, 
necessarily lead to a ruling of inadmissibility: 
A video recording that does not strictly comply with the Memorandum will not 
automatically be ruled inadmissible. On the contrary, it was Parliament's 
clear intention that such video recordings of children's testimony should be 
admitted unless...it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so. ''^ 
The Courts have agreed with this approach'^ although cautiously. This must be 
correct. The Memorandum is not a binding document but it does give guidance and so 
i f it were not designed to be followed, why set it out in the first place? The 
Memorandum adopts a "phased approach" and this is set out (in summary) below. 
There are four phases: 
Phase one - Rapport 
Phase two - Free Narrative Account 
Phase three - Questioning; and 
14 
15 
See Ward, B. Interviewing child witnesses (1992) 143 NLJ 1547 
Memorandum, page 1. 
R V Naylor (1995), op.cit. 
Based upon the Memorandum, pp 22-23 
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Phase four - Closing the Interview' 
The rapport stage is merely allowing the child to be put at ease, get used to the 
questioner and the video equipment. Phase two is when the child is asked to give his 
or her account of what happened without interruption, but adopting "pro-active 
listening."'^ The third phase is where the questioner asks questions of the child. The 
Memorandum notes that there are four types of questions: 
(i) open-ended questions 
(ii) specific yet non-leading questions 
(iii) closed questions; and 
(iv) leading questions 
and that ideally open-ended questions should be used and leading questions avoided.'^ 
This approach has been the subject of criticism. Davies and Wilson state: 
One criticism which has been aired concerns what might be termed the 
implicit model of the child witness embodied in the Memorandum. It is said to 
be of a child who is ready to speak fully of their abuse and just requires skilled 
and tactful interviewing to tell the complete story. While such victims clearly 
exist, they are regarded as a minority 
Bentovim^' et al suggest: 
the Memorandum was not created to deal with emotionally disturbed or 
hesitant children and presumes a degree of spontaneity which is seldom seen 
in clinicalpractice.^^ 
17 
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19 
20 
22 
Ibid., at pp 15-21 
See Memorandum para 3.15 
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What makes these criticisms more tangible is that the Memorandum suggests that the 
interview should last a maximum of one hour.^ '^  This figure, although referred to as a 
"rule of thumb" has come under continual criticism. McEwan notes that: 
In the light of [the phased approach], the one-hour optimum seems 
unattainable. It might have been more sensible to suggest that the interview 
should be abandoned if no evidence of criminal behaviour emerges within that 
time.^'^ 
The Memorandum states: 
The video recorded interview which is to be admissible in court should 
broadly equate with a witness statement... given to the police^^ 
Yet McEwan asks: 
how long would an adult have to compile a witness statement describing not 
one but many offences taking place over years.^^ 
This is a salient point. Witness statements can take a considerable time to prepare and 
that is when the witness - an adult - is supposed to have a greater ability to 
communicate. Equally, adults giving witness statements can make numerous 
statements whereas the Memorandum suggests that it should be rare for a second 
interview to occur.^ ^ 
The problems of the phased approach together with the one-hour approach have led 
some to suggest that the Memorandum: 
[is] an ideal approach for a one-off event, particularly perpetrated by a 
stranger... 
It is easy to see why such criticism has been levelled at the Memorandum. There are 
" Memorandum, para 2.17 
McEwan (1993) p. 17 
Memorandum, para 1.7 
McEwan (1993) p. 17 
'^ Memorandum, para 3.41 
Spencer & Flin (1993) p.342 
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evidence. 
The prosecution should, at the pre-trial hearing, make an application under s.32A(2) 
of the 1988 Act for the video evidence to be admitted as the child's examination-in-
chief The judge hears any arguments as to admissibility and makes a decision. The 
video stands as the examination-in-chief and as such the child must be competent. The 
legal rules regarding competence were dealt with above^" but how does the judge 
decide whether a child is competent? This issue was addressed by the High Court in 
D.P.P. V M.^' The defendant, himself a youth, had been convicted of the indecent 
assault of a young girl by a youth court. He appealed to the Crovm Court. The 
recorder presiding decided that the victim, then aged 5, was not competent by age 
alone and refused to watch the video to decide competence. The defendant thus won 
the appeal but the prosecution appealed to the Divisional Court by way of case stated. 
The Court noted that the recorder made an error of law by deciding a child was not 
competent by age alone^^ but also stated: 
In order to determine, under section 32A(3)(c), whether the interests of justice 
require him to refuse [an application], the judge in most, if not all, cases must 
watch the video recording. ^ 
The ruling in D.P.P. v M i s helpful. By watching the video upon application, a judge 
should be able to make a decision as to competence at the outset of court proceedings. 
There had been some doubt as to frequently video evidence was used. Plontikoff & 
Woolfson suggested the figures were quite low^'' but their research was based upon 
29 Under section 78, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
°^ See pp.72-75 
'^ [1997] 2 F.L.R. 804 
Ibid, at 809 
" Ibid, at 808 per Philips L.J. 
Plontikoff & Woolfson (1995) pp 75, 79-81 
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the first year of implementation of the 1991 Act.^^ More recent studies have shown 
an improved situation.The table below shows a comparison of the data the two 
studies compiled 37 
Thematic 
Review 
(%) 
Plontikoff 
& Woolfson 
(%) 
Cases in which video evidence applied for 95.3 59 
Video applications granted 85.5 71 
Video evidence granted but not used 16.7 53 
It can be seen that the recent data shows a marked improvement since initial 
implementation, although there are some issues of concern raised. The first point to 
note is that although in 85.5% of cases the application to use a video was granted, this 
means in 14.5% of cases the video was considered by the judge to be inadmissible.^^ 
Although this figure is much improved from the earlier study when almost twice as 
many tapes were inadmissible, it is still unsatisfactory. One pleasing improvement is 
that the percentage of cases where the CPS has failed to apply for video evidence to 
be permitted has fallen from 40% of cases to just 5% Finally, although the percentage 
of cases where permission for video evidence had been granted but not taken up has 
fell from 53% to 16.7% this improved figure still appears relatively high. There will 
always be cases when it might not be appropriate to use the evidence^^ but a 
percentage as high as 16%o would appear to suggest that some trial counsel are 
choosing not to use this invaluable resource even though it must have been considered 
appropriate at the time of application. 
35 Ibid., at p. 13 
Thematic Review 1/98, op.cit., pp. 31-34 
Source: Figures from tables set out in Thematic Review 1/98, op.cit., at pp.32-33 
No details are given as to why they were unsuitable although the Inspectorate did note that the 
quality of some videos were questionable. See paras 8.38-8.40. 
For example the child witness may not want to give testimony that way. 39 
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Advantages of the Pre-recorded Interviews 
A number of advantages can be shown in respect of pre-trial examination-in-chief 
The main ones are as follows. 
Guilty pleas are induced 
Pigot noted that some suggest a pre-trial interview can adduce guilty pleas: 
...the availability and admissibility of video recordings is said by some to have 
led to a significant increase in guilty pleas... 
This argument is, presumably, based on the assumption that a defendant viewing the 
tape realises that his victim is capable of giving detailed evidence and so his chances 
of acquittal are reduced. Plontikoff & Woolfson felt unable to come to any conclusion 
on this: 
It has been anticipated that the admissibility of videotaped interviews will 
result in a higher rate of guilty pleas. It was too early for us to assess whether 
this is true... 
The latest research on child witnesses'*^ did not consider this issue but others have 
doubted whether such an assumption is valid."*^ Realistically, it is unlikely that a 
videotape by itself could precipitate a guilty plea as the defendant may believe his 
counsel will be able to undermine the child's credibility during cross-examination. 
This, however, may alter i f cross-examination is taken pre-trial also.'''* 
Reduced Stress 
The Pigot committee argued that permitting video-recorded examination-in-chief 
Pigot Report, para. 2.11 
Plontikoff & Woolfson (1993) p. 79 
Thematic Review 1/98, op.cit. 
See McEwan (1993) p. 18 and Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 197 
See pp. 124-130 
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would help alleviate the stress a victim suffers during testimony.''^ This belief has 
been supported by academics such as Childs'*^ who stated: 
[Videorecordings] were calculated to address the difficulty faced by those 
attempting to prosecute offences against children; the younger and more 
vulnerable the victim, the greater the likelihood that proceedings might fail... 
because the child was too traumatised to give evidence... 
Spencer, however, argues that there is a danger that it could cause additional stress."*^  
He suggests that because no live examination-in-chief is possible on issues covered in 
the tape'*^  this will mean in the majority of cases the child will be immediately cross-
examined. This, he suggests, is traumatic and he proposes that "regular" questions 
should be permitted. Although it is true that cross-examination will take place 
immediately, it is difficult to see how live examination-in-chief would alleviate this 
pressure. The style of questioning in cross-examination is considerably different and it 
is submitted that this is the cause of the trauma, rather than an absence of live 
examination-in-chief 
Fresh Evidence 
The main advantage pre-recorded testimony has is that it is fresh. 
Evidence which we received from practitioners, psychiatrists, social worker 
and the police suggested that if an interview takes place shortly after the 
child's first allegation or disclosure it will usually provide the freshest 
account least tainted by subsequent discussions and questioning.^'^ 
The reliability of children's testimony was discussed above '^ but this is a fair point 
45 
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and other commentators have agreed that this is the one big advantage pre-recorded 
interviews have.^ ^ 
Appropriate language 
Another advantage of pre-recorded interviews is it shows how the child speaks 
enabling the questioner to use appropriate language: 
Spencer & Flin note that: 
In the course of being questioned, little children often pick up the adult words 
for sexual acts. They then use these when giving examination-in-chief which 
often leads to the suggestion that they have been coached.^^ 
and emphasises this point by using an example: 
When an eight-year-old says, 'And then he ejaculated over me' defence 
counsel will immediately ask, 'Did your mummy teach you that word?', to 
which the answer will probably be yes - with the resulting suspicion that the 
child's knowledge of such things come from the mother rather than witnessing 
an indecent act. If when she first described the incident her words were 'And 
then he kind of flicked white wee from his willy', a videotape would often 
reveal that she originally used words appropriate to her age and 
understanding. 
This example is a particularly strong one: a child should not be disadvantaged for 
picking up language from adults. 
A related point is made by McEwan who notes that counsel are often unable to use 
suitable language when asking questions.This can cause problems in cross-
examination but when it occurs in examination-in-chief this could result in counsel 
destroying the credibility of his own witness. I f a child becomes confused because of 
" See McEwan (1993) p. 18 and Spencer & Flin (1993) pp. 196-197 
" Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 196 
Ibid. 
" See McEwan (1993) p. 18 
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the language used in the traditional style of questioning, it is likely that he will 
become flustered and appear to be changing his story. The consequences for his 
credibility would be somewhat serious. 
Disadvantages of video testimony 
Although there are some advantages to pre-recorded examination-in-chief, some 
disadvantages have also been identified. It is important to note that many of these 
relate to aspects other than the video testimony so many will be dealt with elsewhere. 
They are listed here, however, for completeness. 
Live Cross-examination remains 
The main problem with the existing law is that cross-examination remains live. The 
implications of live cross-examination will be discussed below^^ but this was a 
problem that Pigot noted: 
Video-recorded interviews [may] not relieve the pressure upon child witnesses 
since cross-examination would be necessary in any case and that the stress 
experienced by children might actually increase... 
The Group did not believe that this would be a continuing problem because they 
58 
recommended pre-trial cross-examination also. 
Evidential weight 
One of the disadvantages that has been levelled at video technology is the allegation 
that the weight of the evidence is compromised. There are two aspects to this; the 
reception by a jury to the child's presence and rehearing the evidence. The reception 
See pp.111-130 
" Pigot Report, para 2.20 
Ibid., paras 2.22, 2.25, 2.29-2.31 and see pp. 124-130 below 
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of evidence by the jury is considered when examining the use of CCTV links during 
cross-examination^' because the principles are very similar. 
Of particular concern, however, is the rehearing of evidence. By its very nature, pre-
recorded testimony is capable of being replayed, whereas traditional evidence cannot. 
The question of whether it is appropriate to replay the evidence was first examined in 
R V Rawlings; Broadbent (Practice Note).^° The jury in both cases wished to hear the 
videorecording of the complainant again after they had been sent to consider their 
verdict. The judge in each case permitted it and the defendants were convicted. They 
appealed alleging, inter alia, that the judge was wrong to replay the video. The Court 
began by noting that traditionally i f a jury wishes to be reminded about testimony the 
judge would read from his notes.^' The Court commented that: 
Even since shorthand writers became able to take a verbatim note of all 
questions and answers... the practice has remained the same.^^ 
The Court heard submissions as to whether a replay should be permissible and, not 
surprisingly, these submissions were diametrically opposed: 
In favour of allowing an "action replay, " it is submitted that, on request, the 
jury should be given the most accurate and complete reminder of the 
witnesses' evidence which is available. 
and 
For the appellants, it was argued that to replay the video after conclusion of 
evidence, speeches and summing up, would give undue prominence to the 
complainant's examination-in-chief. 
The Court of Appeal decided that the judge had a discretion to replay the video 
" see pp.114-120 
[1995] 1 W.L.R. 179 
Ibid., at 180 
Ibid, per Lord Taylor C.J. 
" Ibid, at 181 
Ibid. 
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although this discretion should be tempered by why the jury wish the replay: 
Usually, if the jury simply wish to be reminded of what the witness said, it 
would be sufficient and most expeditious to remind them from [the judge's] 
own note. I f , however, the circumstances suggest or the jury indicate how the 
words were spoken is of importance to them, the judge may in his discretion 
allow the video to be replayed.^^ 
The Court then stated that i f a replay did occur, three conditions need to be satisfied: 
(1) the replay should be in open court 
(2) the judge should warn the jury not to place undue weight on the replay 
(3) the judge should remind the jury of the cross-examination and re-
examination to ensure a fair balance. 
The judgment in Rawlings appears to strike the right balance. I f a jury simply wishes 
to be reminded of the testimony then there is no reason why a child complainant's 
evidence should be treated differently to other witnesses. Where they wish to see how 
that testimony has been given - ie the composure of the witness - then it seems 
sensible to permit such a request since it is possible to conform. That said, it is 
sensible so long as the safeguards set out in Rawlings are kept. Unfortunately those 
safeguards have already been weakened. 
In R V Sanders^^ a judge who had, admittedly, given a substantial summing up 
detailing the cross-examination, replayed the complainant's video and asked the jury 
whether they wished to hear his notes on the cross-examination. The jury stated they 
did not and the judge refused to do so on his own motion. The Court of Appeal 
dismissed the defendant's appeal stating: 
" Ibid, at 183 
Ibid. 
" [1995]2Cr. App. R. 313 
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We recognise and acknowledge the terms in which Lord Taylor C.J. expressed 
himself in passage (c) [of Rawlings] but we do not accept that the learned 
Lord Chief Justice could ever have intended to require a judge to remind the 
jury yet again of cross-examination after that judge had taken the care that 
[this judge] did... 
This ruling appears contrary to the third condition of Rawlings and it is unfortunate 
that the Court of Appeal permitted the irregularity to stand. It could be argued that 
juries are sensible and they know whether they wish to hear all the evidence, but it 
raises the appearance of unfairness. It is a fundamental part of the English legal 
system that justice must be seen to be done and not just done. It is submitted that 
where a jury hears the evidence without hearing the rebuttal of that evidence, there is 
the appearance of unfairness towards the defendant. Sanders should, therefore, stand 
only on its facts and not as an exception to Rawlings. 
Similar issues have arisen in relation to transcripts. Normally a jury listens to the 
testimony of a witness and make notes i f they so wish. However since the 
examination-in-chief is given by video it has been questioned whether the jury can 
have a transcript of the video. The leading case in this area is R v Welstead.^' The 
defendant was charged with the indecent assault of three boys aged 11-14. Al l three 
gave examination-in-chief through a pre-recorded interview. The jury requested a 
transcript and the judge, after consultation with counsel, permitted a transcript to be 
given. The next day the defence objected stating that some members of the jury were 
reading the words and not watching the screen. The judge overruled this objection and 
stated the jury could have the transcripts until they retired. The defendant appealed 
contending, inter alia, that this was a material irregularity in the trial. 
The Court of Appeal stated that the jury could receive transcripts but attached three 
Ibid., at 318 per Russell L.J. 
[1996] 1 Cr. App.R.59 
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provisos: 
(1) The transcripts must assist them in following the evidence of the 
witness. 
(2) The judge should direct the jury that the transcript is purely to aid them 
and that the witnesses' evidence is what they see and hear on the tape 
and it is that which they must concentrate on. 
(3) The judge should warn the jury not to place disproportionate weight on 
the transcripts or evidence of the child. ^  
In giving the decision the Court stated they agreed with cases from other jurisdictions: 
In Maclean and Maclean (no. 1) (1979) 49 C.C.C. (2d) 399 Everett J. said 
"To deny the jury the benefit of reading with their eyes the same words as they 
heard with their ears seems to me to put the law into an ill-fitting 
straight] acket. "...We gratefully adopt that statement of general principle and 
we have no hesitation in [adopting] that same approach... 
In Welstead the transcripts were removed from the jury before retiring, but other cases 
have approached the issue of transcripts after retirement. In R v Boakes^^ the Court of 
Appeal permitted a transcript to be taken into the jury room so long as the judge gave 
a warning as to weight. There must be a real danger that by permitting a jury to take 
transcripts into their room they could give undue weight to the examination-in-chief, 
not least because they would not have details of the cross-examination before them. In 
R V McQuiston^^ the Court of Appeal stated that transcripts posed the same danger of 
undue weight as videorecordings and that the conditions in Rawlings should apply.^ "* 
Given that the first condition of Rawlings is that any replay should take place in open 
court it must be questioned whether Boakes should remain good law. It would perhaps 
be prudent to restrict transcripts to helping juries follow the evidence and not so they 
™ Ibid, at 69 
" Ibid, at 71-72 per Evans L.J. 
[1996] C.L.Y. 1393 
[1998] 1 Cr App. R. 139 
Ibid, at 141 
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can refresh their memories. The alternative is for the cross-examination to be 
transcribed too.^^ Giving the jury the complete transcript would mean that the defence 
can be assured that the jury are at least capable of refreshing their minds as to the 
cross-examination in the same way as with the examination-in-chief The present 
system has the appearance of bias or undue weight and this must be a cause for 
concern. 
Delay to Therapy 
Iv4cEwan suggests that a major disadvantage of pre-recorded testimony is that it may 
delay therapy.Therapy is a complex issue and was discussed in an earlier chapter^' 
but it was seen that there is a real danger that therapy may be delayed. However given 
that therapy is delayed until after the child is cross-examined, it must be questioned 
whether this is a disadvantage in relation to pre-recorded testimony or whether it is a 
general problem. I f the evidence was taken live, the child would presumably still be 
unable to receive therapy until after the cross-examination so it would appear to be a 
problem in relation to cross-examination rather than videorecorded testimony. 
LIVE EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF 
Not every case necessarily has a pre-recorded interview. Where a pre-recorded video 
is not used the child may have to be examined-in-chief at the t r i a l . I t is clear that the 
police do not seek to make a videorecorded interview in every case, a point noted by 
the CPS Inspectorate: 
[The police] may choose not to do so where the child is a witness, but not a 
victim; where the child is at the older end of the age range; or where the 
As noted in Rawlings, it is now possible to provide a verbatim transcript of a witnesses' 
testimony. See Supra Fn 63 and associated main body text. 
McEwan(1993)p.l8 
" See pp.25-34 
However the prosecution may decide that if the videorecording is not admissible they will not 
proceed with the prosecution. 
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victim and defendant are of a similar age. 
Where a video is not used it is likely that an ordinary witness statement will be taken 
rather than using the phased approach suggested by the Memorandum. In R v 
Naylor^" the normal manner of taking evidence was adopted in respect of an 
intelligent 12 year old boy. The defence argued that his testimony should be ruled 
inadmissible under s.78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 because it did not 
adhere to the Memorandum. The Court of Appeal stated the judge was correct to 
admit the evidence although the jury should be warned that the safeguards of the 
Memorandum are there for a reason: namely to protect the welfare of the child and yet 
to ensure the testimony is fair and not the subject of coaching etc. 
However even live examination-in-chief differs from adult witnesses in one major 
way. Section 32, Criminal Justice Act 1988 permits the use of a live TV link. This is 
usually used to cross-examine a child following the admission of a pre-recorded 
interview but can be used for examination-in-chief*' The use of a TV link is 
considered in the next section examining the cross-examination of a child witness. 
REFORM OF EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF 
We have seen that examination-in-chief is no longer too problematic, and this has 
been reflected in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 which seeks to 
make very minor changes in this area.*^ 
One important change, however, is the introduction of a presumption in favour of the 
use of pre-recorded examination-in-chief It was seen above that even though the 
™ Thematic Review 1/98, para. 8.37 
(1995)TheTimes, July 15 
See Spencer & Flin (1993) pp. 103-104 
Despite the Act being fairly radical in terms of other aspects. 
- 110-
position has been improving in recent years, there are still a number of cases where 
the police or CPS are choosing not to use a pre-recorded interview as the 
examination-in-chief Section 21 of the 1999 Act states that there shall be a 
presumption in favour of a pre-recorded tape.^ '^  The section provides two principal 
ways this presumption can be rebutted, although only one applies to cases of child 
abuse. The first way of rebutting the presumption is where the court is not equipped to 
deal with videorecordings.The second method is where the judge considers the 
video would not ''maximuse the quality of the witness's evidence."^^ However, given 
that there are rules as to the admissibility of pre-recorded tapes^ ^ there must be a third 
method of rebuttal: which would be where the tape cannot be adduced because it 
contravenes the rules set out. 
The report of the interdepartmental working group on vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses noted the advantages of pre-recorded examination-in-chief*^ but thought the 
88 
measures should be discretionary. It is submitted that a presumption is, however, 
more useful. Under the current regime a substantial number of videos were not used, 
O Q 
even when they had been authorised, a presumption will hopefully lead to this 
deficiency being corrected. 
The one drawback with this presumption, however, is the methods of rebutting it. 
Research has shown that a child can testify better i f he or she is given the choice as to 
83 
84 
87 
89 
Sub-sections (1) to (3) 
s.21(4)(a) when read in conjunction with s.l8(2) 
s.21(4)(c): but note that s.21(4)(c) does not apply where the witness is the victim of a sexual or 
violent offence or one of cruelty. (s.21(5)) 
s.27(2)-(7) 
See Speaking up for Justice, paras. 8.38-8.41 
Ibid., at para. 10.17 
See p.99 above. 
- I l l -
methodology.^" ft would thus make more sense to give the child - assuming he or she 
is of sufficient age and understanding - the right to decline the use of pre-recorded 
testimony.^' 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
After the examination-in-chief, the next stage of a child's testimony is the cross-
examination. Like examination-in-chief, the cross-examination of a child can differ 
between adult and child witnesses. This section will examine four aspects of the 
cross-examination: 
• live traditional cross-examination 
• use of screens 
. use ofl iveCCTV link 
• defendant personally cross-examining the child victim 
TRADITIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Under the traditional style of cross-examination the witness gives evidence from the 
witness stand. The witness is in ftill view of the judge, jury, counsel, the defendant 
and indeed members of the public. In addition, the witness can see all those persons 
too. However research has shown that children find the traditional style of cross-
examination problematic: 
Children (like many adults) can find the examination and cross-examination 
processes confusing and stressful. 
See Thematic Review 1/98, para. 8.46 
" It could have been argued that if a child would not wish the video to be used, this would not 
''maximise the evidence of the child' (s.21(4)(c)) but as noted above, this ground may not be used 
for offences of child abuse. 
Sattar & Bull. Child Witnesses in Court: Psycho-Legal Issues [19961 S.J. 401 
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and this was something Pigot recognised: 
All of the submissions which we received that addressed the matter indicated 
that most children are disturbed to a greater or lesser extent by giving 
evidence in court.'^^ 
When the Home Secretary set out the terms of reference to the Group he made it clear 
that cross-examination itself must remain, and this led to them considering possible 
alternative methods of conducting cross-examination. Two alternatives were 
implemented immediately and can be discussed now, whereas some recommendations 
were not implemented. These will be discussed at a later stage of this chapter. 
USE OF SCREENS 
The first option available to the courts is the use of a screen. The use of screens was 
developed on an ad hoc basis: 
The first judge to permit the use of screens when children were giving 
evidence was the Common Serjeant, Judge Pigot Q.C., when a group of men 
were tried at the Old Bailey for serious sexual offences involving children in 
the Autumn of1987.'^^ 
The defendants were convicted and appealed to the Court of Appeal contending, inter 
alia, that the use of screens prejudiced the trial.'^ The Lord Chief Justice, giving the 
judgment of the court, upheld the use of screens: 
We do not think... that any sensible jury could have been prejudiced against 
any defendant by the existence of this barrier between the witness and the 
dock.'^ 
and then continued by stating the common law would permit such measures: 
We take the view that we do not need authority to confirm us in the view that 
what the learned judge here did in his discretion was a perfectly proper, and 
PigotReport, para. 2.10 
Spencer &Flin (1993) p. 100 
R v X : Y : Z (1990) 91 Cr. App. R. 36 
Ibid., at 40 
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indeed a laudable attempt to see that this was a fair trial: fair to all, the 
defendants, the Crown and indeed the witnesses.'^^ 
However some have queried whether the court was right to dismiss the claims of the 
defence: 
Screens proliferate in courts around the country, yet the question of whether 
or not their introduction invariably sends messages to the jury about the need 
to protect the child witnesses from the baleful stare of the accused remains 
unanswered. 
The main complaint the appellants raised was that it was: 
an unfair and prejudicial act to erect this screen... that the jury might think 
that there was a suggestion that the person in the dock had already in some 
way intimidated the child... 
It is difficuh to know what a jury would think, but a physical block suggests the child 
needs protection from the defendant.'"^ The risk of this prejudice must be real yet it is 
readily accepted. The Court of Appeal has said that screens may be prejudicial 
although a different constitution of the Court of Appeal stated that so long as the 
judge warns the jury that the screen is not to be taken into account, and keeps in mind 
the need for a fair trial, the use of screens can be justified. "^ ^ 
Interestingly, the European Commission of Human Rights has considered that the use 
of screens is not a breach of human r i g h t s . T h e case concerned a Northern Ireland 
terrorist trial where screens were used to protect the identity of some witnesses. The 
defendants were convicted and applied to the European Court of Human Rights 
contending, inter alia, that the use of screens contravened Article 6(1) and/or Article 
" Ibid., at 41 
Zedner in Stockdale & Casale (1992) pp. 269-270 
RxX; V; Z,op.cit.,at4Q 
See Zedner in Stockdale & Casale (1992) p. 270 
R v Cooper and Schaub f 1994] Crim. T..R 531 
'"^  R v Foster [1995] Crim. L.R. 333 
X v United Kingdom (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. C D . 113 
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6(3)(d). The Commission rejected both of these arguments stating the interference 
was justified in the circumstances.It is submitted that such a decision would apply 
to child cases too. Accordingly although screens may cause an element of prejudice, 
so long as the trial judge maintains a fair trial by warning the jury, screens do not 
constitute a breach of human rights. 
LIVE CCTV LINKS 
The live CCTV link is a more "high-technology" solution to the problem of removing 
the child from the presence of the accused. Section 32, Criminal Justice Act 1988 
which permits the use of the link'°^ is as follows: 
(1) A person other than the accused may give evidence through a live 
television link on a trial in proceedings to which subsection lA below 
applies if -
(a) the witness is outside of the United Kingdom; or 
(b) the witness is a child, or is to be cross-examined following the 
admission under section 32A below of a videorecording of testimony 
from him... 
but evidence may not be so given without the leave of the court. 
Section 1A lists trials by indictment, appeals to the Court of Appeal, trials in the youth 
court and appeals to the Crown Court as a result of such a trial, as proceedings in 
which the link can be used. 
It is important to note that the words "without the leave of the court" are present. 
These words give to the judge a discretion to permh the evidence. Spencer & Flin 
Ibid., at 114 
'"^  Note s.23, Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 places the use of screens onto a 
statutory footing: they may be used whenever the trial judge believes they would be useful. 
However, it is to be hoped the use of CCTV links will replace the need for the use of screens in 
child witness cases. (See pp.119-120 below) 
'"^  As amended by s.55,CriminalJustice Act 1991 
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note that neither statute nor the rules of court give details as to how this discretion is 
to be exercised."'^ However a Crown Court judge sitting in Leeds set out some 
guidelines to help in this exercise: 
(a) a judge should not grant permission for the live link automatically, but 
should balance the risk of harm to the child against the risk of creating 
prejudice against the defendant by allowing the live link to be used. 
(b) in principle, i f the prosecution want the live links to be used it is up to 
them to produce some evidence that it is likely to be harmful to this 
particular child to give evidence in the traditional way. 
(c) in the case of a young child, however, 'there must come a time when the 
very fact of the child's age is almost sufficient in itself to show that it 
would be very detrimental for the child to have to give evidence in open 
court and to be cross-examined in the usual way.' '° 
This is a useful guide for judges, and it must be correct for the onus to be on the 
prosecution - who is calling the witness - to prove the need for the link. However 
controversy exists over how ready the courts are to grant leave. Spencer & Flin 
discuss research conducted by Davies and Noon soon after the implementation of the 
Act"" which suggested that 92-98% of applications to use the link were granted,'" 
although other studies have cast doubt on these figures. Plontikoff and Woolfson 
concluded that their research showed that approximately 70% of applications were 
granted"^ and the CPS Inspectorate found the success rate was 85%)"^ It is difficult to 
conclude which is the correct figure although the research conducted by the CPS 
Inspectorate was the most recent so their finding may reflect current practice. 
Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 105 
R v G u v (1989) December 21. and see Ibid. 
Ibid. 
"° SeeSpencer&Flin(1993)p.l05 
"' Ibid., at 106 
Plontikoff & Woolfson (1995) pp. 75-76 
Thematic Review 1/98, p.33 
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Use of the Link 
How does the link operate? I have had the opportunity to watch a trial in the Crown 
Court and examine the system both in operation and close-up. The Courtroom has 3 
sets of TV link systems. The judge has one, counsel for the prosecution and counsel 
for the defence have one each."'' The stations used by counsel have a monitor and a 
camera. The camera is "voice-activated", that is the picture automatically switches to 
whoever is speaking. 
The station operated by the judge has two monitors. The first is a duplicate to the one 
counsel has, and he sees whatever they do. The second is permanently watching the 
witness. The judge manually operates his camera, switching it on when he wishes to 
speak to the child. He also has what is known as a "panic" button. This button, when 
pressed, cuts the link so that no picture is seen nor sound heard. It can be used, for 
example, i f there is a disruption in court, i f the victim needs a break, i f an 
inappropriate question is being put, or i f a matter of law is discussed. In the case I 
viewed, it was used when the defence counsel "changed places.""^ 
The picture shov/n on the monitors is also sent to large monitors positioned in the 
court so that the defendant, the jury, all counsel and solicitors, and indeed many of the 
public can see the testimony. 
Impact of the Testimony 
There have been questions raised about what impact a CCTV link has. The first point 
Where there is more than one defendant represented by more than one counsel, the defence share 
a station, swapping after each examination. 
' There were several defendants, each represented separately. 
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to query is whether the removal of the child is prima facie prejudicial to the defence 
in the same way as screens are. Zedner argues they are: 
Clearly this innovation may imply to the jury that children are at some 
indefinable risk from physical proximity with the accused such that they must 
be kept at a distance... Yet again the potential damage done to the rights of the 
accused is apparently deemed less important than the imperative of protecting 
the witness. 
However it is easier to rebut this suggestion when discussing TV links. It is known 
that courts are considered by many to be strange or "awing" places which make 
people feel nervous, even when they are not on trial. I f a judge told the jury that the 
child was in less formal surrounding because it was felt children should not need to 
appear in court it is highly likely the jury would understand this and accept this 
statement without giving thought to whether the defendant has intimidated the 
witness. 
More controversial, however, is whether the jury treat the evidence with the same 
weight as live evidence. Spencer & Flin note that there are two arguments: 
Some commentators, apparently working on the theory that people tend to 
believe anything if it is on television, claim that it enhances the impact of the 
child's evidence, with the risk of making it more credible than it deserves to 
be.''' 
and 
Other commentators, working on the opposite theory that nobody ever believes 
a thing they see on television, argue that the live link has exactly the opposite 
effect... 
I f either proposition is correct it would be a cause for concern as it will either 
prejudice the defence or the prosecution. It would appear that it is mainly American 
' Zedner in Stockdale & Casale (1992) p.270 
Stephenson (1992) p. 175 
Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 109 
Ibid. 
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commentators who adopt this first approach.Indeed in one American case such an 
argument won judicial backing: 
It is recognised that the media bestows prestige and enhance the authority of 
an individual by legitimising his status... such considerations are of particular 
importance when, as here, the demeanour and credibility of the witnesses are 
crucial... 
Although it is possible to see why such an argument has been raised, it is to be 
questioned whether it is correct. It is submitted that it is not the presence on-screen 
that brings credibility, but presence on certain programmes such as the news or a 
documentary. It is likely that a jury can differentiate between a television programme 
and a CCTV link when they see the live interaction. Additionally, juries would be 
able to view counsel asking the questions which must show them they are witnessing 
court proceedings and not a television programme. 
The opposing argument - that the impact of the child's testimony is reduced - has 
attracted more commentary. Plontikoff & Woolfson showed that many lawyers hold 
this view: 
In our study, most CPS lawyers and law clerks... expressed the view that 
testimony over TV link lessens the impact of the child's evidence... '^^ 
Cobley states that Davies and Noon found 
that on occasions prosecution barristers, when faced with a particularly 
impressive and resilient witness, have quite deliberately opted for an in-court 
appearance on the grounds of its greater impact! [SIC]'^^ 
and this is something that Fortin also notes and condemns: 
research indicates that many CPS lawyers are still opposed to its use due to 
their conviction that juries are more convinced by the child's evidence given 
'^ ^ See Cobley (1995) p. 165 
Hochiester v Supreme Court (1984) 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 at 278. Also see Cobley (1995) p. 165 
Plontikoff & Woolfson (1995) p.77 
Cobley (1995) p. 165 
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live in court, particularly when the child shows emotion and tears. It is 
124 difficult to justify such an exploitation of the distress of a child witness. 
This last point is most salient. How can using a child's distress to secure a conviction 
possibly be justified? This is playing on a child's fear of court proceedings and fear of 
testifying. Spencer & Flin argue that: 
If it is true that with the live link emotional impact is reduced, it is not 
necessarily a bad thing if the emotional temperature of the courtroom is 
lowered. '^^ 
I f a person is to be convicted of an offence, he should be convicted on the facts and 
the law and not on emotion. It is clear that the use of the CCTV link is helpful in 
reducing the stress of a child'^^ and as such they should be used when appropriate. I f 
the emotional impact is reduced then so be it; using the emotion of a child to obtain a 
conviction is of questionable ethics. 
Reform of the use of C C T V links 
Section 21(3)(b) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 introduces a 
presumption on the use of CCTV links. Under the new regime, a child will usually 
given their evidence via a live link unless the judge decides one is not needed.'^ ^ The 
interdepartmental working group on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses said: 
[We] consider that, where the child is required to give oral evidence to [a] 
court, the use of [the] live CCTV link is an effective way of ensuring the child 
dos not have to be present in the court room when being questioned... '^^ 
This presumption is to be welcomed as it has been seen above that the link is a useful 
way of helping the child to cope with the testimony process. Another advantage that 
Fortin (1998) p. 429 
Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 110 
See Spencer & Flin (1993) p.l 11; Lyon & de Cruz (1993) p. 308 and Fortin (1998) p. 429 
'^ ^ ss. 19(1) and 20(5) set out the statutory basis on which the presumption can be rebutted. 
Speaking up for Justice, para. 10.21 
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this presumption brings is that the use of screens in child abuse trials should be phased 
out because the CCTV link is a more appropriate method of "seperating" the victim 
and the defendant. However, the link does not solve all the problems'^^ and in some 
situations pre-recorded cross-examination will be preferred. 
DEFENDANT CROSS-EXAMINING A CHILD 
Traditionally a defendant can conduct his own defence'^' but Pigot noted that this can 
cause problems for child victims of abuse. 
we believe that defendants should be specifically prohibited by statute from 
examining child witnesses in person or through a sound or video link. The 
limitation which this places upon the defence is, in our view, for less 
significant than the damage which can be inflicted upon the child... '•'^ 
The government responded by enacting s.34A, Criminal Justice Act 1988'^'' which 
prevents a defendant charged with an offence of violence, sex or cruelty from 
personally cross-examining the child victim. McEwan notes that this section is 
controversial but states: 
There is no constitutional right to confrontation in English law, and no 
problem is contemplated with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that a person has 
the right to "examine or have examined" witnesses against them. Article 6(3)(c) states 
a defendant has the right to "defend himself in person or through legal assistance of 
his own choosing." Both Articles therefore appear to suggest that someone other than 
the accused can put his case and this will still safeguard his rights. 
See pp.121-124 for the disadvantages of cross-examination. 
"° See pp. 124-130 
Zuckerman, A.A.S. (1989) The Principles of Criminal Evidence Clarendon Law. Oxford, at p.87 
'^ ^ Pigot Report, para 2.30 
As inserted by s.55(7), Criminal Justice Act 1991 
McEwan (1992) p. 129 
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In R V De Oliveira'^^ the Court of Appeal was asked to consider s.34A. The defendant 
was charged with gross indecency with a child and indecent assault. The case was 
listed as fasttrack. The defendant wanted a specific member of the Bar to be his 
counsel, but he was unavailable for some two months. The trial judge refused to delay 
the trial deciding fasttrack was appropriate. However he did offer to sign a legal aid 
certificate for two counsel but the offer was refused. The trial judge explained that i f 
he refused legal representation he could not cross-examine the complainant. At trial 
he represented himself The judge prevented him from cross-examining the child but 
the judge asked questions to exclude the possibility of collusion. The defendant was 
convicted and appealed contending, inter alia, that the trial should have been delayed 
until his chosen counsel was available. The Court of Appeal rejected this submission 
stating that normally a defendant was permitted counsel of his choice but this was 
subject to the availability of witnesses, availability of a suitably equipped court and 
the timescale appropriate to the case. Here the judge correctly balanced these issues 
and made a generous offer as to legal aid.'"^^ 
By refiasing the legal aid certificate the defendant prevented himself from having the 
main complainant's evidence subject to scrutiny. It is clearly not the role of the judge 
to conduct a cross-examination (although as in this case he can test matters such as a 
collusion) and so the witness's examination-in-chief is effectively entered as fact 
without contest. The Court was effectively stating that refusing legal representations 
meant the defendant was waiving his rights. Yet this means that he cannot defend 
himself which would appear contrary to Article 6(3 )(c) but Harris et al. state that the 
right to defend oneself is not an unfettered right: 
[1997] Crim. L.R. 600 
Ibid, at 601 
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The right of the accused to defend himself in person has not been interpreted 
as allowing the accused a completely free choice. As the law of Convention 
parties provides, the state may require that he be assisted by a lawyer in the 
interests of justice at the trial stage.... 
De Oliveira has adhered to this principle: h is in the interests of justice that the case 
was fasttracked and that the child should not be traumatised by the defendant 
personally cross-examining her. The Court offered alternative competent 
representation but this was refused; thus the defendant waived his rights under the 
Convention. 
GENERAL CRITICISMS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The main criticism levelled at CCTV is that of emotional impact considered above. 
The other criticisms are, in effect, general criticisms levelled at cross-examination of 
children and are considered below. 
Therapy 
It was noted from the previous section that one of the problems of pre-recorded 
examination-in-chief was that therapy continues to be delayed.'•^^ This is because 
cross-examination does not take place until trial because the defence could use the 
excuse of therapy to suggest coaching.''*" As was noted in the previous sections this 
continues to be a problem and whilst there is a significant delay between pre-recorded 
examination-in-chief and cross-examination this will remain a problem. 
Harris etal. (1995) p. 258 
See pp. 116-119 
See p. 108 above and chapter 3 
See Lyon & de Cruz (1993) p. 305 and Plontikoff & Woolfson (1995) p. 60 
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Style of questioning 
The style of questioning in cross-examination differs significantly from examination-
i n - c h i e f T h i s can cause problems for children. One of the main points to note is the 
use of leading questions. Leading questions are not normally permitted in an 
examination-in-chief and this was one of the reasons why, prior to being accepted, 
pre-trial examination-in-chief videos were criticised: 
the legal profession got so cross about psychiatrists asking children leading 
questions that some lawyers have used the risk of leading questions being put 
during interviews as an argument against... the use of videotapes as evidence 
in the criminal courts. '"^^ 
Yet, as Spencer & Flin comment, leading questions are positively encouraged in 
cross-examination.'''^ They point out that lawyers appear to either re-write the rules, 
or reconsider the effects of these rules, when attempting to justify cross-examination: 
If rule number one of the lawyers' manual of psychology seems to be that 
memory improves with the passage of time, and rule number two that stress 
improves recall, rule number three seems to be that suggestive questions 
produce unreliable information except [SIC] when asked by lawyers in cross-
examination.''^'* 
The comments of Spencer & Flin show that the justification for retaining the current 
form of cross-examination appears contrary to common sense. Virtually every reason 
given for not permitting something in examination-in-chief does not - according to 
lawyers - prevent the same style being employed in cross-examination. Presumably 
the argument is that when they are employed in examination-in-chief the danger is the 
child is not telling his or her own story but a recantation of allegations told by others. 
But i f a child is capable of being influenced in that way the same effect must arise 
"" See Murphy, P. (1995) Murphy on Evidence 5th Ed. Blackstone Press. London. p.470 
Spencer & Flin (1993) p. 271 
'« Ibid. 
Ibid., at 272 
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with cross-examination. By using leading questions counsel for the defence can get 
the child to agree to his version of the evidence rather than what the child actually 
wants to say. Stone, a writer of a leading evidence professional text'''^, states this is 
the very purpose of cross-examination: 
One form of cross-examination is to lead the witness forcefully on one point 
after another, keeping maximum control over him and his testimony... 
Restricting the witness by narrow questions and small steps, prevents him 
from dealing with the whole issue. '''^ 
Stone admits that this amounts to duplicity. He warns that i f it looks as though 
counsel is giving evidence the advantage would be lost. He therefore gives this 
advice: 
Thus, it is desirable to conceal the extent of control and leading, so far as 
possible, while maintaining it to the necessary extent [of controlling the 
testimony.] '''^ 
The danger of such an approach is obvious, but where it is employed against children 
this poses an additional chance that the child's evidence will be misrepresented. 
However it is unlikely that this problem can be eradicated because it is a feature 
inherent in the adversarial approach to trials. The job of counsel for the defence is to 
weaken the credibility of the victim, and to try and ensure that the evidence that the 
victim gives appears more favourable to his client. Whilst this continues the danger of 
misrepresentation will remain. 
REFORM OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
We have seen that live cross-examination carries many disadvantages. The Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 has accepted this and attempted to make 
Stone (1988) Cross-examination in Criminal Trials. Butterworths. London. 
Ibid., at 271 
'"^  Ibid., at 272 
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what appears to be a radical change to the system, by permitting pre-recorded cross-
examination. 
Availability 
Before examining the substantive reform it is necessary to discuss the availability of 
pre-recorded cross-examination. Section 28 of the Act labels pre-recorded cross-
examination a "special measure" within the meaning of section 19. This means that a 
judge can order the use of this measure under the powers given to him under section 
16. Of more importance, however, is section 21(6) which states that i f the witness is 
the victim of sexual abuse, then there is a presumption that the child's cross-
examination should be pre-recorded. 
This section was enacted at a late stage in Parliamentary proceedings."''^  The 
justification for including it was that child victims of sexual abuse should be given 
extra protection. However this section has created a divide between the different types 
of abuse: where the child is the victim of physical abuse or neglect, no presumption 
exists. The government would appear, therefore, to be suggesting that victims of these 
types of abuse do not experience the same trauma as those who have been sexually 
abused. There is no evidence to support this theory. Another part of the 1999 Act 
appears to appreciate this since it implements a uniform definition of the age of a 
child.'''^ The interdepartmental working group on vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses noted that there was no reason for any distinction to be made'^° and the 
'"•^  See Home Office Press Release 180/99 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill: New 
Amendments 
s.l6(l)(a) states that a child is anyone under the age of 17. Prior to this there was a distinction 
between the different categories of abuse. See pp.65-66 above. 
Speaking up for Justice, para. 10.8 
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government must have agreed with this conclusion when they enacted s.l6(l)(a). This 
makes the decision to re-introduce the divide on pre-recorded cross-examination 
somewhat illogical and it is submitted that the divide should be removed at the first 
available opportunity. 
Use of the Measure 
Section 28 will , when implemented, finally enact the main recommendation of the 
Pigot report which stated: 
We are...concerned that it is desirable to use video technology to alter the 
context in which [cross-examination] takes place so that it becomes a less 
oppressive experience for the child and [is] a more informative exercise for 
the court that at present}^' 
This proposal was rejected by the then government. According to Smith and Wilson'^^ 
the reasons for this were: 
First...cases involving child witnesses [would] be expedited...Secondly, that 
pre-trial hearings would unfairly shift the balance against the accused...by 
forcing the defence to disclose their case in advance. 
Spencer'^'' stated there was a third reason which was there would still have to be live 
cross-examination because new facts may arise between the pre-trial examination and 
the trial.'^^ These remains are, now, largely unconvincing and perhaps this is one of 
the reasons why the proposal has now been implemented. The hope for the fasttrack 
process to reduce delay has proved false'^^ and the argument that the defence would 
need to disclose their defence is considerably weakened when one notes there is now 
Pigot report, para. 2.22 
Smith, P. and Wilson, A. Children as witnesses: The Criminal Justice Act and the Pigot proposals 
[1991] Fam. Law 323 
Ibid., at 324 
Spencer. J. Pigot and Children's Evidence: The Criminal Justice Bill 1990 (1991) 3 J.C.L. 34 
Ibid., at 35 
156 See chapter 3 
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mandatory defence disclosure.'^^ This leaves the argument concerning supplementary 
cross-examination. The working group suggested that a possible solution would be a 
rebuttable presumption that no further cross-examination be permitted unless "new 
material comes to light which could not have been ascertained with due dilegence."^^^ 
This would be a useful solution to avoiding constant repeated cross-examination: it 
places the burden of proving the necessity of further cross-examination firmly on the 
party wishing the extra testimony. 
Neither the working group nor the Act explains how pre-recorded cross-examination 
will be taken but since it is based upon the Pigot proposals it is possible the same 
methodology proposed there could be used. Spencer & Flin set out the process 
envisaged by Pigot in diagramatic form'^^ and this is set out overleaf as figure 8.1. 
According to Spencer & Flin the initial interview would take place as soon as 
practicableand then shown to the suspect. At that point - or soon afterwards - the 
cross-examination would take place before a judge in chambers. There are two points 
of note here: first, the timing of cross-examination, and secondly, the methodology. 
Pigot expected the cross-examination to take place reasonably quickly, but after the 
judge had ruled on the admissibility of the initial interview.'^' This has the advantage 
of knowing before the cross-examination takes place whether live testimony will be 
required.'^^ However the working group highlighted the concerns of Sanders that the 
defence may wait until primary and secondary disclosure has taken place, and "this 
Introduced by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, ss.5 and 6 
Speaking up for Justice, para. 8.60 
Spencer & Flin (1993) p.89 
Ibid., at 88 
Pigot report, para.2.27 
Since if the initial interview is ruled inadmissible, the pre-recorded cross-examination cannot be 
adduced either, and all the testimony will be taken live. 
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The Pigot committee's proposal for taking a child's evidence 
Suspected offence 
comes to light 
Police and social services 
jointly interview child: 
videotape 1 made. 
Police show tape 1 
to suspect 
Judge views tape 1 and 
rules on admissibility 
Prelimina 
before judge 
defence pu 
to child; vide 
ry hearing 
in chambers; 
t questions 
Dtape 2 made. 
Supplementary interview before 
judge i f strictly necessary: 
videotape 3 made. 
L J 
Trial of defendant: 
tapes 1, 2 [and 3] replace 
live evidence of child. 
Source: Spencer & Flin (J 993) 89 
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might result in the defence only being in a position to cross-examine shortly before 
trial.-''' 
It would be disappointing i f cross-examination only took place shortly before trial as 
one of the main advantages that pre-trial brings is it permits therapy to begin earlier 
than would normally be the case.'^ "* However even i f cross-examination does not take 
place as soon as one might hope, it could still be a useful scheme. Trials are often 
adjourned with little or no notice'^^ and it is impossible to plan an exact timetable for 
a trial which means a child will not know exactly when he or she will testify. This will 
be solved by pre-trial examination as the child will know the exact date he or she must 
testify. This stability must arguably reduce the stress that testifying can cause to a 
child. 
The second point to consider is how the cross-examination would be conducted. 
According to Spencer & Flin, the cross-examination would: 
take place before a judge in chambers ...The only people present would be the 
judge, prosecution and defence counsel, the child, and the child's "support 
person. " The defendant would not be physically present, but would be able to 
watch the proceedings from an adjourning room by means of a one-way 
mirror or live video link. 
It is submitted that a more appropriate method would be to reverse the order; i.e. the 
child would be in a separate room and everyone else would be in a convenient place, 
probably the courtroom.'^' Given that CCTV links have become accepted practice it 
would be useful to use them. The child sits in a comfortable, relaxed room whilst 
Speaking up for Justice, para 8.57 
This was highlighted by the working group. (See ibid., at 8.57) but also see pp.25-34 for an 
argument relating to a right to immediate therapy. 
See Plotnikoff & Woolfson (1995) pp.71-74 
'^ ^ Spencer & Flin (1993) p.88 
Although the hearing would technically be "in chambers", i.e. sitting in camera. 
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counsel, the judge and the defendant sit in the court. It is likely that the equipment 
currently used'^ ^ could record the cross-examination whilst it is being conducted. 
Of course, pre-recorded examination means that the defence need to prepare and 
conduct a substantial proportion of their case early on. Article 6(3)(b) of the E.C.H.R. 
states that a person must have "adequate time and facilities for the preperation of his 
defence." Harris et al. state Article 6(3)(b) is designed to protect the defendant from 
an unduly hasty trial.'^^ Article 6(3)(b) is clearly an important consideration with pre-
recorded cross-examination. The courts when deciding whether to use this measure 
will have to ensure that the defence has had sufficient time to prepare. This does not 
mean that the defence should set the timetable as this would not be appropriate, but 
courts must clearly consider defence representations very seriously. 
The reform contained in s.28 is obviously a very significant step forward and must be 
warmly welcomed. The eventual implementation of the Pigot proposal is long 
overdue and should help reduce the trauma caused by a child testifying. 
TESTIFYING THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY 
Section 29 of the 1999 Act introduces what could be a controversial measure. The 
court will be permitted to make a direction stating that questions being put to the 
witness should be put through an intermediary rather than counsel. This was originally 
proposed in the Pigot report: 
[A majority] propose that the judge's discretion...should extend where 
necessary to allowing the relaying of questions from counsel through a 
paediatrician, child psychiatrist, social workers or person who enjoys the 
'^ ^ A station comprising a video-recorder, a camera and a monitor 
Harris etal. (1995) p.252 
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child's confidence. '^^ 
This was the sole recommendation that was proposed by a majority. Anne Rafferty, 
the representative from the Criminal Law Bar Association, disagreed with the 
recommendation. Her dissenting opinion was: 
the intervention of a specialist interlocutor would hinder rather than assist 
counsel in conducting the case. [Miss Rafferty] believes that the difficulty 
which has been explained should be overcome by allowing greater 
opportunities for counsel to establish a rapport with a child witness before the 
hearing took place. '^' 
The working group on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses considered that the use of 
an intermediary would carry some advantages, most notably that it could improve the 
quality of the evidence of a child witness.'^^ However the group also noted that unless 
the intermediary was skilled, there may be the danger of misrepresentation and 
bias.'^^ The group continued by stating this possibility of bias could be mitigated 
because: 
the court would hear the original answers and could disregard any attempt by 
the intermediary to present the answer in a different way.''''* 
This quote is particularly telling. There are, it is submitted, two possible forms of an 
intermediary. The first is a "pure" intermediary who would simply listen to the 
questions counsel wished to be put, and then "translate" them into "child-friendly" 
language. The second possible form is more of a communicator than an intermediary. 
The "communicator" would not only "translate" counsel's questions into "child-
friendly" language, but also explain what the child's answer means. The group 
appears to be recommending the latter form; this can be seen by their comment as to 
'™ Pigot Report, para. 2.32 
Ibid., at para 2.34 
Speaking up for Justice, para. 8.73 
" Ibid. i . 
Ibid. 
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an original answer'^ ^ and they also state: 
The proposed function or role of a communicator or intermediary to assist in 
criminal proceedings can be compared with that of an interpreter for those 
who do not speak English... '^^ 
I f the working group does wish to follow this format they could encounter some 
difficulties, not least from the appearance of bias they admit may exist. A court would 
have the benefit of hearing the original reply but unless the court is a Magistrates' 
court, this could lead to confusion.'^^ Indeed it could be argued that this confusion and 
appearance of bias should automatically rule out the use of an intermediary in the 
Crown Court. Even i f a judge directed the jury to listen to the child, the jury may be 
swayed by the "expert" status of the intermediary. This would be a most dangerous 
move which would be highly prejudicial. 
Article 6(1 )(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that the 
defendant has the right to examine or have examined, witnesses on his behalf It was 
seen in an earlier section, that barring a defendant from personally cross-examining a 
victim can be justified so long as his legal representatives are permitted to examine on 
his behalf'^^ It could be argued that the use of an intermediary is not only preventing 
the defendant from cross-examining the child but it is also preventing his legal 
representatives from cross-examining on his behalf On that basis it is likely that this 
may be deemed a breach of Article 6. 
If, however, the first form of intermediary is used, this conclusion is not automatically 
reached. I f the intermediary is simply formulating questions into a child-friendly 
See Above. 
Speaking up for Justice, para. 8.73 
i.e. The bench would know that it should listen to the child whereas a jury may be seriously 
confused by hearing two answers that may appear to be contradictory. 
See pp. 120-122 above 
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format, then it could be argued that counsel does retain control of the case. It was 
noted in an earlier section of this thesis that one of the reasons why children have 
traditionally been considered unreliable is because they often cannot understand adult 
language'^^ or that adults cannot understand a child's re fe rence . I f the intermediary 
can help solve that problem then perhaps they are to be welcomed, although it would 
seem more prudent to train counsel in using child-friendly language than to go 
through the inconvenience and expense of employing child psychologists to act as 
intermediaries. 
Ibid. 
See p.69 above. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
This thesis has examined the principal aspects of a Crown Court trial involving 
charges relating to child abuse. The aim of the thesis has been to assess how the 
criminal justice system can adapt to the needs of both the child victim of abuse and 
the defendant. 
Child abuse trials pose a particular problem; not only do such trials evoke strong 
emotions from members of society' but, by definition, offences of child abuse involve 
the child becoming involved in a trial process designed for adults. This can obviously 
cause some difficulties and as such the trial process needs to accommodate those 
without the maturity to cope with adult processes, but without prejudicing the right of 
the defendant to due process. This inevitably causes a tension as seen throughout this 
thesis. 
The decision to prosecute is a key aspect of the criminal justice system. In England 
and Wales the criminal jusfice system operates on the public policy basis, it is not for 
the victim to decide whether or not a prosecution should take place as there is a 
general public interest in the prosecution of crimes against the person. The CPS uses 
two tests to govern the decision to prosecute and unless these two tests are satisfied 
the person accused should not be brought to trial. However, even these tests have had 
to give way to the special considerations in respect of child witnesses. Under the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child the prosecution must be in the 
child's best interests and therefore a prosecution should be stopped i f it could be 
' As evidenced by the special protection those convicted of offences need to receive in prison. 
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harmftal to the child. Traditionally, a victim could not influence a decision to 
prosecute but it was seen in chapter 2 that the Human Rights Act 1998 might permit a 
victim to use Article 8 of the E.C.H.R. to force the CPS to prosecute a case of child 
abuse. 
The tension between adapting the procedures to accommodate the needs of children 
and the rights of the defendant is seen clearly during the process of taking testimony 
from the child. It was seen in chapter 7 that the current methods of testifying fail 
children. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 puts forward a new 
framework to help, inter alia, child victims of abuse to testify. However, important as 
it is to help a child to testify in an adult court, it remains important that the 
defendant's right to due process is not compromised. 
In general, the 1999 Act manages to tread the thin line between helping the child and 
not compromising the rights of the defendant. There are a few aspects of concern; 
notably the changes to oath and competency which could lead to a situation in which a 
witness who does not understand the difference between truth and fiction would 
nevertheless be able to give testimony. Such evidence could be highly prejudicial and 
may render a conviction unsafe. The proposal to permit questioning through an 
intermediary also raises difficulties. 
Nevertheless, the Act makes many improvements. The extension of pre-recorded 
testimony is to be welcomed. However drawing a distinction between sexual abuse 
and other abuse is a mistake. For victims of abuse, there is a presumption that the 
child's cross-examination will be taken pre-trial but no such presumption exists for 
other types of abuse. It was seen in Part IV that pre-recorded testimony carries many 
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advantages; it enables the testimony to be taken early, at the fime of best recollection, 
and it enables the evidence to be taken in a relatively informal atmosphere. Ten years 
ago Pigot recommended that all child testimony should be taken pre-trial. It now 
appears that this position has been reached but it should be used when required 
without disfinguishing between different forms of abuse. When used, considerable 
care need to be taken concerning the timetabling of testimony as there may be a 
conflict between the interests of the victim and the rights of the defendant. A 
defendant is entitled to a reasonable length of time to prepare his defence. Judges 
must ensure that this is not abused and that testimony is taken when appropriate. 
Alongside the tension between the interests of the victim and rights of the defendant, 
there is another tension: between the criminal justice system and the civil protection 
system provided by the Children Act 1989. Where the abuse is intrafamilial abuse^ it 
is likely that the local authority wil l bring protection proceedings. The protection 
proceedings will invariably examine the same facts and issues as the criminal trial, 
and in most cases they will take place before the criminal trial. In Part I I I it was 
shown that conflicts arise because the parents are, in the majority of proceedings, 
subject to both systems. It was seen that parents may be at a disadvantage at a 
subsequent criminal trial i f they co-operate in the civil proceedings yet i f they do not 
co-operate it is possible that the local authority feels compelled to apply for a care 
order, which may, ultimately, lead to the removal of the child. This situation is not an 
easy one to solve because the two systems have different aims. The only way to 
reduce this tension is to train the judiciary to understand the conflict, and help them to 
understand the implications their rulings may have on the other proceedings. 
^ And the majority of child abuse cases are intrafamiiial. See Grubin, D. Police Research Series 
Briefing Note 99 Sex Offences Against Children: Understanding the Risk. Home Office. London 
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Arguably, the key chapter in this thesis is chapter 3: delay. Throughout this thesis it 
has been shown that pre-trial delay is the cause for great concern in both processes. In 
civil proceedings the courts are under a statutory duty to minimise delay'^  yet no such 
duty exists in criminal proceedings. As noted in chapter 2, for many years the criminal 
justice system has attempted to tackle pre-trial delay but without success. The 
majority of the problems relating to the tension between victim and defendant, and the 
criminal justice and civil justice systems can be traced back to delay. For example, 
many of the problems that relate to the testimony of a child are due to pre-trial delay. 
The difficulty relating to section 98 is a problem of delay. I f it were possible to reduce 
pre-trial delay, much of the tension could be reduced. However reduction of delay 
must still provide the defendant with adequate time to prepare his defence. 
The conclusion to this thesis must be that there is a tension which exists between the 
interests of the victim and the rights of the defendant. It is unlikely that this tension 
will ever disappear as the two are issues are diametrically opposed to one and other. 
There is much that can be done to alleviate this tension and it is likely that the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 will help achieve this. It will not be easy to 
reduce the problem and there are likely to be many mistakes on the way. For the 
criminal justice system the right of the defendant to due process must always be the 
primary concern. 
Section 1(2), Children Act 1989 
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APPENDIX A 
CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The decision to prosecute an individual is a serious step. Fair and effective 
prosecution is essential to the maintenance of law and order. But even in a 
small case, a prosecution has serious implications for all involved - the vicfim, 
a witness and a defendant. The Crovm Prosecution Service applied the Code 
for Crown Prosecutors so that it can make fair and consistent decisions about 
prosecutions. 
1.2 The Code contains information that is important to police officers, to others 
who work in the criminal justice system and to the general public. It helps the 
Crown Prosecution Service to play its part in making sure that jusfice is done. 
2. G E N E R A L PRINCIPLES 
2.1 Each case is unique and must be considered on its own, but there are general 
principles that apply in all cases. 
2.2 The duty of the Crown Prosecution Service is to make sure that the right 
person is prosecuted for the right offence and that all relevant facts are given to 
the court. 
2.3 Crown Prosecutors must be fair, independent and objecfive. They must nor let 
their personal views of the ethnic or nafional origin, sex, religious beliefs, 
political views or sexual preference of the offender, victim or witness 
influence their decisions. They must also not be affected by improper or undue 
pressure from any source. 
3. R E V I E W 
3.1 Proceedings are usually started by the police. Sometimes they may consult the 
Crown Prosecution Service before charging a defendant. Each case that the 
police send to the Crown Prosecution Service is reviewed by a Crown 
Prosecutor to make sure that it meets the tests set out in this Code. Crown 
Prosecutors may decide to continue with the original charges, to change the 
charges or sometimes to stop the proceedings. 
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3.2 Review, however, is a continuing process so that Crown Prosecutors can take 
into account any change in circumstances. Wherever possible, they talk to the 
police first i f they are thinking about changing the charges or stopping the 
proceedings. This gives the police the chance to provide more information that 
may affect the decision. The Crown Prosecution Service and the police work 
closely together to reach the right decision, but the final responsibility for the 
decision rests with the Crown Prosecution Service. 
4. T H E C O D E T E S T S 
4.1 There are two stages in the decision to prosecute. The first stage is the 
evidential test. I f the case does not pass the evidential test, it must not go 
ahead, no matter how important or serious it may be. I f the case does pass the 
evidential test. Crown Prosecutors must decide i f a prosecution is needed in 
the public interest. 
4.2 The second stage is the public interest test. The Crown Prosecufion Service 
wil l only start or continue a prosecution when the case has passed both tests. 
The evidenfial test is explained in section 5 and the public interest test is 
explained in section 6. 
5. T H E E V I D E N T I A L T E S T 
5.1 Crown Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is enough evidence to provide a 
'realistic prospect of conviction' against each defendant on each charge. They 
must consider what the defence case may be and how that is likely to affect the 
prosecution case. 
5.2 A realistic prospect of conviction is an objective test. It means that a jury or 
bench of magistrates, properly directed in accordance with the law, is more 
likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged. 
5.3 When deciding whether there is enough evidence to prosecute, Crown 
Prosecutors must consider whether the evidence can be used and is reliable. 
There will be many cases in which the evidence does not give any cause for 
concern. But there will also be cases in which the evidence may not be as 
strong as it first appears. Crovm Prosecutors must ask themselves the 
following questions: 
Can the Evidence be used in court? 
a) Is it likely the evidence wil l be excluded by the court. There are certain 
legal rules which might mean that evidence which seems relevant 
cannot be given at trial. For example, is it likely that the evidence will 
be excluded because of the way in which it was gathered or because of 
the rule against using hearsay as evidence? I f so, is there enough other 
evidence for a realisfic prospect of conviction? 
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Is the evidence reliable? 
b) Is it likely that a confession is unreliable, for example, because of the 
defendant's age, intelligence or lack of understanding? 
c) Is the witness's background likely to weaken the prosecufion case? For 
example, does the witness have any dubious motive that may affect his 
or her attitude to the case or a relevant previous conviction? 
d) I f the identity of the defendant is likely to be questioned, is the 
evidence about this strong enough? 
5.4 Crown Prosecutors should not ignore evidence because they are not sure that it 
can be used or is reliable. But they should look closely at it when deciding i f 
there is a realisfic prospect of convicfion. 
6. T H E P U B L I C INTEREST 
6.1 In 1951, Lord Shawcross, who was Attorney General, made the classic 
statement on public interest, which has been supported by Attorneys General 
ever since: has never been the rule in this country - / hope it never will be -
that suspected criminal offences must automatically be the subject of 
prosecution." (House of Commons Debates, volume 483, column 681, 29 
January 1951.) 
6.2 The public interest must be considered in each case where there is enough 
evidence to provide a realisfic prospect of conviction. In cases of any 
seriousness, a prosecution wil l usually take place unless there are public 
interest factors tending against prosecution which clearly outweigh those 
tending in favour. Although there may be public interest factors against 
prosecution in a particular case, often the prosecution should go ahead and 
those factors should be put to the court for consideration when sentence is 
being passed. 
6.3 Crown Prosecutors must balance factors for an against prosecution careftiUy 
and fairly. Public interest factors that can affect the decision to prosecute 
usually depend on the seriousness of the offence or the circumstances of the 
offender. Some factors may increase the need to prosecute but others may 
suggest that another course of action would be better. 
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The following lists of some common public interest factors, both for and 
against prosecution, are not exhaustive. The factors, both for and against 
prosecution, are not exhaustive. The factors that apply will depend on the 
facts in each case. 
Some common public interest factors in favour ofprosecution. 
6.4 The more serious the offence, the more likely it is that a prosecution will be 
needed in the public interest. A prosecution is likely to be needed if: 
a) a conviction is likely to result in a significant sentence; 
b) a weapon was used or violence was threatened during the commission 
of the offence; 
c) the offence was committed against a person serving the public (for 
example, a police or prison officer, or a nurse); 
d) the defendant was in a position of authority or trust 
e) the evidence shows that the defendant was a ringleader or an organiser 
of the offence; 
f) there is evidence that the offence was premeditated; 
g) there is evidence that the offence was carried out by a group; 
h) the victim of the offence was vulnerable, has been put in considerable 
fear, or suffered personal attack, damage or disturbance. 
i) the offence was motivated by any form of discriminafion against the 
victim's ethnic or national origin, sex, religious beliefs, political views 
or sexual preference. 
j ) there is a marked difference between the actual or mental ages of the 
defendant and the victim, or i f there is any element of corruption; 
k) the defendant's previous convictions or cautions are relevant to the 
present offence; 
1) the defendant is alleged to have committed the offence whilst under an 
order of the court; 
m) there are grounds for believing the offence is likely to be continued or 
repeated, for example, by a history of recurring conduct; or 
n) the offence, although not serious in itself, is widespread in the area 
where it was committed. 
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Some common public interest factors against prosecution 
6.5 A prosecution is less likely to be needed if: 
a) the court is likely to impose a very small or nominal penalty; 
b) the offence was committed as a result of a genuine mistake or 
misunderstanding (these factors must be balanced against the 
seriousness of the offence); 
c) the loss or harm can be described as minor and was the result of a 
single incident, particularly i f it was caused by a misjudgement; 
d) there has been a long delay between the offence taking place and the 
date of the trial, unless 
• the offence is serious; 
• the delay has been caused in part by the defendant; 
• the offence has only recenfiy come to light; or 
• the complexity of the offence has meant that there has been a long 
investigation; 
e) a prosecution is likely to have a very bad effect on the victim's physical 
or mental health, always bearing in mind the seriousness of the offence; 
f) the defendant is elderly or is, or was at the time of the offence, 
suffering from significant mental or physical i l l health, unless the 
offence is serious or there is a real possibility that it may be repeated. 
The Crown Prosecution Service, where necessary, applies Home Office 
guidelines about how to deal with mentally disordered offenders. 
Crown Prosecutors must balance the desirability of diverting a 
defendant who is suffering from significant mental or physical i l l 
health with the need to safeguard the general public; 
g) the defendant has put right the loss or harm that was caused (but 
defendants must not avoid prosecution simply because they can pay 
compensation); or 
h) details may be made public that could harm sources of information, 
international relations or national security. 
6.6 Deciding on the public interest is not simply a matter of adding up the number 
of factors on each side. Crown Prosecutors must decide how important each 
factor is in the circumstances of each and go on to make an overall assessment. 
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The relationship between the victim and the public interest 
6.7 The Crown Prosecution Service acts in the public interest, not just in the 
interests of any one individual. But Crown Prosecutors must always think very 
carefully about the interests of the victim, which are an important factor, when 
deciding where the public interest lies. 
Youth offenders 
6.8 Crown Prosecutors must consider the interests of a youth when deciding 
whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. The stigma of a conviction can 
cause very serious harm to the prospects of a youth offender or a young adult. 
Young offenders can sometimes be dealt with without going to court. But 
Crown Prosecutors should not avoid prosecuting simply because of the 
defendant's age. The seriousness of the offence or the offender's past 
behaviour may make prosecufion necessary. 
Police cautions 
6.9 The police make the decision to caution an offender in accordance with Home 
Office guidelines. I f the defendant admits the offence, cautioning is the most 
common alternative to a court appearance. Crown Prosecutors, where 
necessary, apply the same guidelines and should look at the alternatives to 
prosecution when they consider the public interest. Crown Prosecutors should 
tell the police i f they think that a caution would be more suitable than a 
prosecution. 
7. C H A R G E S 
7.1 Crown Prosecutors should select charges which: 
(a) reflect the seriousness of the offending; 
(b) give the court adequate sentencing powers; and 
(c) enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way. 
This means that Crown Prosecutors may not always continue with the most 
serious charges where there is a choice. Crown Prosecutors should not 
continue with more charges than are necessary. 
7.2 Crovwn Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are 
necessary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In the same 
way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage 
a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one. 
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7.3 Crown Prosecutors should not charge simply because of the decision made by 
the court or the defendant about where the case will be heard. 
8. M O D E O F T R I A L 
8.1 The Crown Prosecution Service applies the current guidelines for magistrates 
who have decided whether cases should be tried in the Crown Court when the 
offence gives the opfion. (See the 'Nafional Mode of Trial Guidelines' issued 
by the Lord Chief Justice.) Crown Prosecutors should recommend Crown 
Court trial when they are satisfied that the guidelines require them to do so. 
8.2 Speed must never be the only reason for asking for a case to stay in the 
magistrates' courts. But Crown Prosecutors should consider the effect of any 
likely delay i f they send a case to the Crown Court, and any possible stress on 
victims and witnesses i f the case is delayed. 
9. A C C E P T I N G G U I L T Y P L E A S 
9.1 Defendants may want to plead guilty to some, but not all, of the charges. Or 
they may want to plead guilty to a different, possibly less serious, charge 
because they are admitting only part of the crime. Crown Prosecutors should 
only accept the defendant's plea i f they think the court is able to pass a 
sentence that matches the seriousness of the offending. Crown Prosecutors 
must never accept a guilty plea just because it is convenient. 
10. R E - S T A R T I N G A PROSECUTION 
10.1 People should be able to rely on decisions taken by the Crown Prosecufion 
Service. Normally, i f the Crown Prosecution Service tells a suspect or 
defendant that there will not be a prosecution, or that the prosecution has been 
stopped, that is the end of the matter and the case will not start again. But 
occasionally there are special reasons why the Crown Prosecution Service will 
re-start the prosecufion, particularly i f the case is serious. 
10.2 These reasons include: 
(a) rare cases where a new look at the original decision shows that it was 
clearly wrong and should not be allowed to stand; 
(b) cases which are stopped so that more evidence which is likely to 
become available in the fairly near future can be collected and 
prepared. In these cases, the Crown Prosecutor will tell the defendant 
that the prosecufion may well start again; 
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(c) cases which are stopped because of a lack of evidence but where more 
significant evidence is discovered later. 
11. CONCLUSION 
11.1 The Crown Prosecution Service is a public service headed by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions. It is answerable to Parliament through the Attorney-
General. The Code for Crown Prosecutors is issued under secfion 10 of the 
Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985 and is a public document. This is the third 
edition and it replaces all earlier versions. Changes to the Code are made from 
time to time and these are also published. 
11.2 The Code is designed to make sure that everyone knows the principles that the 
Crown Prosecution Service applies when carrying out its work. Police officers 
should take account of the principles of the Code when they are deciding 
whether to charge a defendant with an offence. By applying the same 
principles, everyone involved in the criminal justice system is helping the 
system to treat victims fairly, and to prosecute defendants fairly but effectively. 
11.3 The Code is available from; 
Crown Prosecution Service 
Information Branch 
50 Ludgate Hil l 
London 
EC4M 7EX 
Telephone : 0171 273 8049 
Facsimile : 0171 329 8377 
©Crown Copyright. 1994 
Reproduced by permission of the Crown Prosecution Service. 
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Plea and Directions Hearing 
Judge's Questionnaire 
(In accordance with the practice rules issued by 
the Lord Chief Justice) 
The Crown Court at 
Case No. T 
PTI URN 
R v 
A copy of this questionnaire, completed as far as 
possible with the agreement of both advocates, is to 
handed to the court prior to the commencement of the 
Plea and Directions Hearing. 
Date ofPDH 
Name of Prosecution Advocate at PDH 
Name of Defence Advocate at PDH 
1 a Are the actual/proposed not guilty pleas Yes No 
definteiy to be maintained through to a 
jury trial? 
b Has the defence advocate advised his client Yes No 
of section 48 of CJPOA 1994? 
(Reduction in sentence for guilty pleas) 
c Will the prosecution accept part guilty or Yes No 
alternative pleas 
How long is the trial likely to take? 
What are the issues in the case? 
Issues as to the mental or medical condition 
of any defendant or witness. 
Prosecution wimesses whose evidence will 
be given. 
Can any statement be read instead of 
calling the witnesses? 
To be read (number) 
To be called (number) 
Names: 
Form 5122 Plea and Directions Hearings in the Crown Court 
Practice Rules 1995 
Number of Defence witnesses whose 
evidence will be placed before the Court. Defendant + 
Any whose statements have been served 
which can be agreed and accepted in 
writing. 
Is the prosecution intending to serve any Yes No 
further evidence? 
If Yes, what area(s) will it cover? 
What are the witnesses' names? 
Facts which can be admitted and can be 
reduced into writing 
(sl0(2)(b) CJA 1967) 
Exhibits and schedules which are to be 
admitted. 
10 Is the order and pagination of the 
prosecution papers agreed 
11 Any alibi which should have been disclosed 
in accordance with CJA 1967? 
Yes No 
12 a Any points of law likely to arise at trial? 
b Any questions of admissibility of evidence 
together with any authorities it is intended to 
rely upon. 
13 a Has the defence notified the prosecution Yes No 
of any issue arising out of the record of 
interview? 
(Practice Direction Crime: Tape Recording of 
Police Interview) 
What efforts have been made to agree verbatim 
records or summaries and have they succesful? 
14 Any applications granted/pending for: 
(i) evidence to be given through live 
television links? 
Yes No 
(ii) evidence to be given by pre-recorded 
video interviews with children? 
Yes No 
(iii) screens? Yes No 
(iv) the use of video equipment during 
the trial? 
Yes No 
(v) use of playback equipment Yes No 
15 Any other significant matter which might 
affect the proper and convenient trial of 
the case? 
(eg expert witnesses or other cases 
outstanding against the defendant) 
16 Any other work that needs to be done. 
Orders of the Court with time limits 
should be noted on Page 4. 
Prosecution 
Defence 
17 a Witness availability and appropriate length 
of witness evidence. 
Prosecution 
Defence 
b Can any witness attendance be staggered? Yes No 
c If Yes have any arrangements been agreed? Yes No 
18 Advocates' availability? Prosecution 
Defence 
Form 5122 Plea and Directions Hearing in the Crown Court 
Practice Rules 1995 
Case listing arrangements 
Name of Trial Judge: 
Custody Cases Fix or warned lists within 16 weeks if committal 
Fixed for trial on 
Place in warned list for trial 
Further directions fixed for 
Not fixed or put in warned list within 
16 weeks because 
for week beginning 
Bail Cases 
Further directions fixed for 
Fixed for trial on 
Fixed as a floater^acker on 
Place in reserved/warned list for trial 
List officer to allocate 
for week beginning 
within 
before 
days/weeks 
Sentence 
Adjourned for sentence on 
(to follow trial of R v 
Other directions, orders, comments 
Signed: Judge 
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